Comment author: ZankerH 24 November 2011 05:12:32PM 4 points [-]

Clock speed isn't the only measure of CPU performance. In fact, it isn't much of a measure at all, given that new processors are outperforming Pentium 4 chips (ca. 2005) by the factor you'd expect from Moore's law, despite the fact that their clock speeds are lower by as much as a half.

Comment author: mkehrt 27 November 2011 01:52:52AM 2 points [-]

This isn't really true--clock performance is a really good metric for computing power. If your clock speed doubles, you get a 2x speedup in the amount of computation you can do without any algorithmic changes. If you instead increase chip complexity, e.g., with parallelism, you need to write new code to take advantage of it.

Comment author: moridinamael 11 November 2011 05:36:30PM 5 points [-]

I think that the Torture versus Dust Specks "paradox" was invented to show how utilitarianism (or whatever we're calling it) can lead to on-face preposterous conclusions whenever the utility numbers get big enough. And I think that the intent was for everybody to accept this, and shut up and calculate.

However, for me, and I suspect some others, Torture versus Dust Specks and also Pascal's Mugging have implied something rather different: that utilitarianism (or whatever we're calling it) doesn't work correctly when the numbers get too big.

The idea that multiplying suffering by the number of sufferers yields a correct and valid total-suffering value is not fundamental truth, it is just a naive extrapolation of our intuitions that should help guide our decisions.

Let's consider a Modified Torture versus Specks scenario: You are given the same choice as in the canonical problem, except you are also given the opportunity to collect polling data from every single one of the 3^^^3 individuals before you make your decision. You formulate the following queries:

"Would you rather experience the mild distraction of a dust speck in your eye, or allow someone else to be tortured for fifty years?"

"Would you rather be tortured for fifty years, or have someone else experience the mild discomfort of a dust speck in their eye?"

You do not mention, in either query, that you are being faced by the Torture versus Specks dilemma. You are only allowing the 3^^^3 to consider themselves and one hypothetical other.

You get the polling results back instantly. (Let's make things simple and assume we live in a universe without clinical psychopathy.) The vast majority of respondents have chosen the "obviously correct" option.

Now you have to make your decisions knowing that the entire universe totally wouldn't mind having dust specks in exchange for preventing suffering for one other person. If that doesn't change your decision ... something is wrong. I'm not saying something is wrong with the decision so much as something is wrong with your decision theory.

Comment author: mkehrt 12 November 2011 04:44:23AM 3 points [-]

I'm not entirely convinced by the rest of your argument, but

The idea that multiplying suffering by the number of sufferers yields a correct and valid total-suffering value is not fundamental truth, it is just a naive extrapolation of our intuitions that should help guide our decisions.

Is, far and away, the most intelligent thing I have ever seen anyone write on this damn paradox.

Come on, people. The fact that naive preference utilitarianism gives us torture rather than dust specks is not some result we have to live with, it's an indication that the decision theory is horribly, horribly wrong,

It is beyond me how people can look at dust specks and torture and draw the conclusion they do. In my mind, the most obvious, immediate objection is that utility does not aggregate additively across people in any reasonable ethical system. This is true no matter how big the numbers are. Instead it aggregates by minimum, or maybe multiplicatively (especially if we normalize everyone's utility function to [0,1]).

Sorry for all the emphasis, but I am sick and tired of supposed rationalists using math to reach the reprehensible conclusion and then claiming it must be right because math. It's the epitome of Spock "rationality".

Comment author: mkehrt 04 November 2011 07:30:40AM *  14 points [-]

Issues with the survey:

  1. As mentioned elsewhere, politics is Americentric.
  2. Race race seems to be missing some categorizations.
  3. If you are going to include transgender, you probably should call the others cis. Otherwise you run the risk of implying transgendered people are not "really" their target gender, which is a mess.
  4. The question of academic field was poorly phrased. I'm not an academic, so I assumed you meant what academic field was most relevant to my work. But you really should ask this question without referring to academia.
  5. The academic question and the question about field of work need more options.
  6. Expertise question needs CS as an answer :-)

EDIT: Overall, it's pretty good.

Comment author: Alex_Altair 03 November 2011 12:45:43AM 1 point [-]

Because so many people are talking about the Newton question, I'm curious, how many people got closer than 7 years? That's how far I was. Also, I put 93% confidence within 15 years.

Comment author: mkehrt 04 November 2011 07:16:00AM 0 points [-]

27 years early, 60% certain. Oops.

Comment author: Logos01 20 October 2011 03:35:13AM 2 points [-]

... from a comment of his on that self-same thread:

If you're postulating new fundamental physics, things that don't show up microscopically but do show up macroscopically, to explain the Born statistics, there would be a hundred better possibilities that don't violate Special Relativity.

I've never understood why the many-world-ers don't see that their particular 'interpretation' is equally as guilty as CI of violating basic physical laws and creating more problems than it solves in general (note: I'm saying both MWI and CI are equally invalid). Ahh, well.

Comment author: mkehrt 22 October 2011 04:50:28AM 0 points [-]

I'm fairly convinced that MWI is LW dogma because it supports the Bayesian notion that probabilities are mental entitites rather than physical ones, and not on its own merits.

[link] SMBC on utilitarianism and vegatarianism.

2 mkehrt 16 October 2011 03:29AM
In response to Tool ideology
Comment author: pengvado 10 September 2011 02:00:28AM *  26 points [-]

You can never see what changes other people have made since your last commit, because to get the changes, you have to do an update

svn diff -rBASE:HEAD to see the changes since your last update.
svn diff -rHEAD to diff your working tree against the repository.
Which does send the diffs over the web, and is inconveniently slow.

(I'm not a svn user. I just agreed with the initial reaction of "that's ridiculous", and followed it up with "I bet there really is a way to do that" and looked at the manpage.)

In response to comment by pengvado on Tool ideology
Comment author: mkehrt 10 September 2011 02:39:41AM 0 points [-]

This is phenomenal! Thanks!

Comment author: gwillen 22 July 2011 03:04:50PM 0 points [-]

I will be camping with Cydonia, a non-theme camp that will be somewhere near 5:15 and F. I hope to see some of you there!

Comment author: mkehrt 26 July 2011 03:57:16AM 0 points [-]

Every part of this comment is true for me, too.

Comment author: sketerpot 04 June 2011 10:02:55PM 6 points [-]
Comment author: mkehrt 07 June 2011 06:04:54AM 1 point [-]

I think I thought this was better when it was utterly inexplicable, actually.

Comment author: [deleted] 13 April 2011 11:10:59PM 0 points [-]

But what about Eliezer's reply to Pigliucci's photosynthesis argument? As I understand it, Eliezer's counterargument was that intelligence and consciousness are like math in the sense that the simulation is the same as the real thing. In other words, we don't care about simulated sugar because we want the physical stuff itself, but we aren't so particular when it comes to arithmetic--the same answer in any form will do.

As far as I can tell, this argument still applies to gold unless there are good reasons to think that consciousness is substrate dependent. But as Eliezer pointed out in that diavlog, that doesn't seem likely.

In response to comment by [deleted] on Eight questions for computationalists
Comment author: mkehrt 14 April 2011 01:59:19AM 4 points [-]

That reply is entirely begging the question. Whether or not consciousness is a phenomenon "like math" or a phenomenon "like photosynthesis" is exactly is being argued about. So it's not an answering argument; it's an assertion.

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