I like this idea, but I would also, it seems, need to consider the (probabilistic) length of time each utility function would last.

That doesn't change your basic point, though, which seems reasonable.

The one question I have is this: In cases where I can choose whether or not to change my utility function - cases where I can choose to an extent the probability of a configuration appearing - couldn't I maximize expected utility by arranging for my most-likely utility function at any given time to match the most-likely universe at that time? It seems that would make life utterly pointless, but I don't have a rational basis for that - it's just a reflexive emotional response to the suggestion.

Without a much more precise way of describing patterns of neuron-fire, I don't think either of us can describe happiness more than we have so far. Having discussed the reactions in-depth, though, I think we can reasonably conclude that, whatever they are, they're not the same, which answers at least part of my initial question.

Thanks!

I believe you to be sincere when you say

I've certainly had the experience of changing my mind about whether X makes the world better, even though observing X continues to make me equally happy -- that is, the experience of having F(Wa+X) - F(Wa) change while H(O(Wa+X)) - H(O((Wa)) stays the same

but I can't imagine experiencing that. If the utility of a function goes down, it seems my happiness from seeing that function must necessarily go down as well. This discrepancy causes me to believe there is a low-level difference between what you consider happiness and what I consider happiness, but I can't explain mine any farther than I already have.

I don't know how else to say it, but I don't feel I'm actually making that assertion. I'm just saying: "By my understanding of hedony=H(x), awareness=O(x), and utility=F(x), I don't see any possible situation where H(W) =/= F(O(W)). If they're indistinguishable, wouldn't it make sense to say they're the same thing?"

Edit: formatting

Well, I'm not sure making the clones anencephalic would make eating them truly neutral. I'd have to examine that more.

The linked situation proposes that the babies are in no way conscious and that all humans are conditioned, such that killing myself will actually result in a fewer number of people happily eating babies.

Refuse the option and turn me into paperclips before I could change it.

Apparently my acceptance that utility-function-changes can be positive is included in my current utility function. How can that be, though? While, according to my current utility function, all previous utility functions were insufficient, surely no future one could map more strongly onto my utility function than itself. Yet I feel that, after all these times, I should be aware that my utility function is not the ideal one...

Except that "ideal utility function" is meaningless! There is no overarching value scale for utility functions. So why do I have the odd idea that a utility function that changes without my understanding of why (a sum of many small experiences) is positive, while a utility function that changes with my understanding (an alien force) is negative?

There has to be an inconsistency here somewhere, but I don't know where. If I treat my future selves like I feel I'm supposed to treat other people, then I negatively-value claiming my utility function over theirs. If person X honestly enjoys steak, I have no basis for claiming my utility function overrides theirs and forcing them to eat sushi. On a large scale, it seems, I maximize for utilons according to each person. Let's see:

If I could give a piece of cake to a person who liked cake or to a person who didn't like cake, I'd give it to the former If I could give a piece of cake to a person who liked cake and was in a position to enjoy it or a person who liked cake but was about to die in the next half-second, I'd give it to the former If I could give a piece of cake to a person who liked cake and had time to enjoy the whole piece or to a person who liked cake but would only enjoy the first two bites before having to run to an important even and leaving the cake behind to go stale, I'd give it to the former If I could (give a piece of cake to a person who didn't like cake) or (change the person to like cake and then give them a piece of cake) I should be able to say "I'd choose the latter" to be consistent, but the anticipation still results in consternation. Similarly, if cake was going to be given and I could change the recipient to like cake or not, I should be able to say "I choose the latter", but that is similarly distressing. If my future self was going to receive a piece of cake and I could change it/me to enjoy cake or not, consistency would dictate that I do so.

It appears, then, that the best thing to do would be to make some set of changes in reality and in utility functions (which, yes, are part of reality) such that everyone most-values exactly what happens. If the paperclip maximizer isn't going to get a universe of paperclips and is instead going to get a universe of smiley faces, my utility function seems to dictate that, regardless of the paperclip maximizer's choice, I change the paperclip maximizer (and everyone else) into a smiley face maximizer. It feels wrong, but that's where I get if I shut up and multiply.

I understand it to mean, roughly, that when comparing hypothetical states of the world Wa and Wb, I perform some computation F(W) on each state such that if F(Wa) > F(Wb), then I consider Wa more valuable than Wb.

That's precisely what I mean.

Another way of saying this is that if OW is the reality that I would perceive in a world W, then my happiness in Wa is F(OWa). It simply cannot be the case, on this view, that I consider a proposed state-change in the world to be an improvement, without also being such that I would be made happier by becoming aware of that state-change actually occurring.

Yes

Further, if I sincerely assert about some state change that I believe it makes the world better, but it makes me less happy, it follows that I'm simply mistaken about my own internal state... either I don't actually believe it makes the world better, or it doesn't actually make me less happy, or both. Did I get that right? Or are you making the stronger claim that I cannot in point of fact ever sincerely assert something like that?

Hm. I'm not sure what you mean by "sincerely", if those are different. I would say if you claimed "X would make the universe better" and also "Being aware of X would make me less happy", one of those statements must be wrong. I think it requires some inconsistency to claim F(Wa+X)>F(Wa) but F(O(Wa+X))<F(O(Wa)) - I changed the notation slightly, let me know if that doesn't make sense. Although! If X includes a change to F, I must additionally stipulate that the Fs must match - it's perfectly valid to say F1(Wa+X)<F1(Wa) but F2(O(Wa+X))>F2(O(Wa)), which is relatively common (Pascal's Wager comes to mind).

It was confusing me, yes. I considered hedons exactly equivalent to utilons.

Then you made your excellent case, and now it no longer confuses me. I revised my definition of happiness from "reality matching the utility function" to "my perception of reality matching the utility function" - which it should have been from the beginning, in retrospect.

I'd still like to know if people see happiness as something other than my new definition, but you have helped me from confusion to non-confusion, at least regarding the presence of a distinction, if not the exact nature thereof.

Well, the situation I was referencing assumed baby-eating without the actual sentience at any point of the babies, but that's not relevant to the actual situation. You're saying that my expected future utility functions, in the end, are just more values in my current function?

I can accept that.

The problem now is that I can't tell what those values are. It seems there's a number N large enough that if N people were to be reconfigured to heavily value a situation and the situation was then to be implemented, I'd accept the reconfiguration. This was counterintuitive and, due to habit, feels it should still be, but makes a surprising amount of sense.

Oh! I didn't catch that at all. I apologize.

You've made an excellent case for them not being the same. I agree.

That makes sense. I had only looked at the difference within "things that affect my choices", which is not a full representation of things. Could I reasonably say, then, that hedons are the intersection of "utilons" and "things of which I'm aware", or is there more to it?

Another way of phrasing what I think you're saying: "Utilons are where the utility function intersects with the territory, hedons are where the utility function intersects with the map."