Comment author: bigjeff5 31 January 2011 07:42:39PM 0 points [-]

The experiment is recorded in the Bible.

Do words written on paper no longer count? Obviously, there are problems with the experiment itself, and a whole lot of reasons not to trust the results, but the fact is it was recorded as history by the Hebrews about 3,000-4,000 years ago.

Comment author: ndm25 05 August 2011 03:20:55PM 1 point [-]

Words written on paper count very well when we have a decent reason to expect that they are not utterly fabricated. The opposite is true in this case. Unless you claim this particular experiment is somehow distinct from all the other parts of the Bible which never happened.

Comment author: Vladimir_M 02 July 2011 06:09:13PM *  1 point [-]

Well, as I pointed out in my other comments, unless I answered your challenges with essays of enormous length, my answer would consist of multiple assertions without supporting evidence that sound outlandish on the face of it. Remember that we are talking about delusions that are presently shared by the experts and/or respectable high-status people.

Note that you should accept my point even if we completely disagree on what these high-status delusions are, as long as we agree that there are some, whatever they might be. Try to focus on the main point in the abstract: if delusion X is low-status and rejected by experts and high-status people (even if it might be fairly widespread among the common folk), while delusion Y is instead accepted by them, so much that by asserting non-Y you risk coming off as a crackpot, should we be more worried about X or Y, in terms of both the idealistic pursuit of truth and the practical problems that follow?

Comment author: ndm25 03 July 2011 10:44:30PM 0 points [-]

Try to focus on the main point in the abstract: if delusion X is low-status and rejected by experts and high-status people (even if it might be fairly widespread among the common folk), while delusion Y is instead accepted by them, so much that by asserting non-Y you risk coming off as a crackpot, should we be more worried about X or Y, in terms of both the idealistic pursuit of truth and the practical problems that follow?

Y, of course. Perhaps I should have started out by saying that while I agree that what you say is possible, I don't know if it describes the real world. Your assertion was that there are many high status delusions, but without evidence of that, all I can say is that I agree that supposed experts are not guaranteed to be correct on every point, and that it is extremely possible that they will reinforce delusions within their community.

Comment author: Vladimir_M 27 June 2011 06:53:44PM *  8 points [-]

Just because they spend their time in a perhaps less than optimal manner (compared to existential risks) doesn't automatically mean that passionate atheists and skeptics are somehow highly irrational people, does it?

I didn't say it was conclusive evidence, only that it is strong evidence.

Moreover, the present neglect of technology-related existential (and other) risk is only one example where the respectable opinion is nowadays remote from reality. There are many other questions where the prevailing views of academic experts, intellectuals, and other high-status shapers of public opinion, are, in my opinion, completely delusional. Some of these are just theoretical questions without much practical bearing on anything, but others have real ugly consequences on a large scale, up to and including mass death and destruction, or seriously threaten such consequences in the future. Many of them also make the world more ugly and dysfunctional, and life more burdensome and joyless, in countless little ways; others are presented as enlightened wisdom on how to live your life but are in fact a recipe for disaster for most people who might believe and try to apply them.

In this situation, if someone focuses on traditional religion as a supposedly especially prominent source of false beliefs and irrationality, it is likely that this is due to ideological reasons, which in turn means that they also swallow much of the above mentioned respectable delusions. Again, there are exceptions, which is why I wrote "lacking other information." But this is really true in most cases.

Also, another devilish intellectual hack that boosts many modern respectable delusions is the very notion of separating "religious" beliefs and opinions from others. Many modern ideological beliefs that are no less metaphysical and irrational than anything found in traditional religions can nevertheless be advertised as rational and objective -- and in turn backed and enforced by governments and other powerful institutions without violating the "separation of church and state" -- just because they don't fall under the standard definition of "religion." In my experience, and again with a few honorable exceptions, those who advocate against traditional religion are often at the same time entirely OK with such enforcement of state-backed ideology, even though there is no rational reason to see it as essentially different from the old-fashion establishment of religion.

Comment author: ndm25 01 July 2011 05:31:29PM *  4 points [-]

There are many other questions where the prevailing views of academic experts, intellectuals, and other high-status shapers of public opinion, are, in my opinion, completely delusional.

Name three?

edit: I find that he has already named three, and two heuristics for determining whether an academic field is full of bunk or not, here. I commend him on this article. While I remain unconvinced on the general strategy outlined, I now understand the sort of field he is discussing and find that, on the specifics, I tentatively agree.

I strongly recommend reading Robin Hanson's answer here.

Many modern ideological beliefs that are no less metaphysical and irrational than anything found in traditional religions can nevertheless be advertised as rational and objective -- and in turn backed and enforced by governments and other powerful institutions without violating the "separation of church and state" -- just because they don't fall under the standard definition of "religion."

Same challenge.

edit: I would still like to hear these.

Comment author: ndm25 13 June 2011 10:39:15PM 1 point [-]

Can you distinguish thoughtless egalitarianism from stupidity a little more? Stupidity seems to me to mean just that sort of thoughtlessness.

Comment author: wedrifid 29 November 2010 03:09:18PM -2 points [-]

A common illustration of this distinction (often told by preachers) is that Blondin the tightrope walker asked the crowd if they believed he could safely carry someone across the Niagra falls on a tightrope, and almost the whole crowd shouted 'yes'. Then he asked for a volunteer to become the first man ever so carried, at which point the crowd shut up. In the end the only person he could find to accept was his manager.

Which is, of course, followed by handing out buckets of stones and pointing out suitable targets of righteous retribution. Adulterers, people who eat beetles, anyone who missed the sermon...

Comment author: ndm25 29 November 2010 07:14:50PM *  1 point [-]

Is that a knee-jerk insult pointed at religion? If so, you're the AI Professor who takes cheap shots at Republicans.

If not, apologies, I must have missed the point.

Comment author: Mass_Driver 09 October 2010 05:24:57AM 1 point [-]

Well, you're partially right. Eliezer says all the time that rationalists ought to win, and he even uses the italics. Of course, that's an argument from authority. On my own authority, I also think rationalists should win; it strikes me as irrational to be correct about a belief at the cost of not achieving your preferred state of the world. Surely there are more important things in life than what I personally have going on in my head in terms of abstract propositions.

And, yes, to a certain extent, persuading an annoying maverick to conform by shunning her at parties might interfere with my ability to reach correct beliefs. The question is, though, isn't that a sacrifice worth making? If I am still perfectly willing to debate this person in private and listen to her point of view, how much of her side of the truth am I really losing? If I attempt to restrain my social boycotts to those who appear to me to be clearly (a) factually incorrect and (b) making logically invalid arguments, how often am I likely to register a false positive and deprive the public of my opponent's true and valid points of view?

I'm curious what you think about all this.

By the way, welcome to Less Wrong!

Comment author: ndm25 13 October 2010 05:55:20PM 0 points [-]

Oh, I see what you mean. You're saying that there's not really any disutility created by you shunning them, and there is disutility created by having to talk to them. (I think)

I think that one should avoid penalizing another for their beliefs when other methods of persuasion are available, but did not take that to the next logical step and say "when rational methods (argument / debate / discussion) are not available, should I attempt to convert someone to my point of view anyway?"

I feel this is the question you are asking. If I am wrong, correct me. Anticipating that I am not, I will attempt to answer it thusly: "Yes, if it is truly important enough."

If, for instance, someone believes that the phenomenon of gravity is due to the flying spaghetti monster's invisible appendages holding them down, but is still willing to apply all the experimentally determined equations and does not change their life because of this belief (and especially, does not preach this belief), then the disutility this causes, aggregated over all time and all people, is probably less than the disulitity provided by what I will call active coercion (economic sanctions and the like), but probably more than the disutility provided by what I will call passive coercion (avoidance).

If they believe that, say, the Earth is 6,000 years old and floats through space on the back of a turtle, and they preach this in a manner than may convince others to agree, the aggregate disutility is probably greater than the disutility of either active or passive sanctions. (cases will, of course, vary, but I think this is likely to be true)

Anyway, that's how I think about it. I don't know etiquette here very well, but if it's considered rude to raise old threads from the dead, I'd love to continue this by email. My username at case dot edu will reach me.

Comment author: Mass_Driver 02 September 2010 05:25:13PM 1 point [-]

My syllogism runs, "I think Susie said something wrong, therefore, I will argue against what she said, but I will not set her on fire, or try to stop her from talking by violence or regulation..."

Exactly how far does your modesty run, Eliezer? Do you disapprove of economic sanctions (e.g. fines, lost business opportunities) for Susie? Do you disapprove of social sanctions (e.g. shunning Susie not because she is useless or dangerous but specifically in order to induce her to change her mind)? Would you avoid such sanctions even if Susie were publicly and successfully tricking large numbers of people into supporting unwise policies based on logically incoherent arguments?

Comment author: ndm25 08 October 2010 05:25:08PM 1 point [-]

While I am, clearly, not Eliezer, I believe that his position as expressed would oppose such sanctions. He seems to want all players of the game to be rational, and the introduction of alternate forms of persuasion (social shunning / economic sanctions) would be an unfair advantage to his side of the argument.

A rationalist shouldn't want to win, they should want to be right. Forms of persuasion outside of pure rational argument contribute only to the first goal, not the latter.

(could be wrong, am new here)