So here's a question for anyone who thinks the concept of a utility monster is coherent and/or plausible:
The utility monster allegedly derives more utility from whatever than whoever else, or doesn't experience any diminishing returns, etc. etc.
Those are all facts about the utility monster's utility function.
But why should that affect the value of the utility monster's term in my utility function?
In other words: granting that the utility monster experiences arbitrarily large amounts of utility (and granting the even more problematic thesis that experienced utility is intersubjectively comparable)... why should I care?
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I am mildly consequentialist, but not a utilitarian (and not in the closet about it, unlike many pretend-utilitarians here), precisely because any utilitarianism runs into a repugnant conclusion of one form or another. That said, it seems that the utility-monster type RC is addressed by negative utilitarians, who emphasize reduction in suffering over maximizing pleasure.
Isn't there an equivalent negative utility monster, who is really in a ferociously large amount of pain right now?