The lack of understanding in this comment is depressing.
You say:
"No. The AI does not have good intentions. Its intentions are extremely bad."
If you think this is wrong, take it up with the people whose work I am both quoting and analyzing in this paper, because THAT IS WHAT THEY ARE CLAIMING. I am not the one saying that "the AI is programmed with good intentions", that is their claim.
So I suggest you write a letter to Muehlhauser, Omohundro, Yudkowsky and the various others quoted in the paper, explaining to them that you find their lack of precision depressing.
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Well of course, talking of doing what is good without giving content to the phrase isn't very precise or helpful, either. I certainly expect that if we build a "friendly superintelligence" and successfully program it to do what is good, I will experience a higher baseline level of happiness on a daily basis than if we don't (because, for example, we will be able to ask the AI how to cure depression). It needs saying that while The Good strongly implies (high likelihood/high log-odds) high broad levels of happiness throughout the population, happiness alone is very weak evidence (low but positive log-odds, likelihood nearer to 0.5) of The Good, insofar as the abstraction doesn't leak.
But, and this is an important point, if you give me a normative-ethical theory of The Good which implies that I specifically, or the population broadly, ought to be unhappy, or a meta-ethical theory of naturalizing morality which outputs a normative theory which implies that I/we ought to be unhappy, then something has gone very, very wrong.
Using "good" to only refer to what is actually good is however vastly better, as precision goes. What I am taking issue to here is the careless equivocation between maximising pleasure and good intentions. A correct description of the "nanny AI" scenario would read something like this:
Of course it is true that a AI programmed to do what is good would most likely generally increase happiness (and even pleasure) to some extent, but to conclude from that that these things are interchangeable is pure folly.