Comment author: pdf23ds 09 February 2010 10:29:01AM *  0 points [-]

I forget who brought this up--maybe zero_call? jhrandom?--but I think a good question is "How quickly does brain information decay (e.g. due to autolysis) after the heart stops and before preservative measures are taken?" If the answer is "very quickly" then cryonics in non-terminal-illness cases becomes much less effective.

Comment author: pdf23ds 09 February 2010 10:48:12AM 3 points [-]

I came across a few cites supporting the "quite a bit" answer in the "Cold War" article at Alcor (linked elsewhere on this thread).

It is interesting and more than a little ironic to note that fifteen years prior to the time that Persidsky wrote the words above, a large and growing body of evidence was already present in the scientific literature to discredit the "suicide-bag concept" of lysosomal rupture resulting in destruction of cells shortly after so-called death. I cite below papers debunking this notion:

  • Trump, B.F., P.J. Goldblatt, and R.E. Stowell, "Studies of necrosis in vitro of mouse hepatic parenchymal cells; ultrastructural and cytochemical alterations of cytosomes, cytosegresomes, multivesicular bodies, and microbodies and their relation to the lysosome concept," Lab. Invest., 14, 1946 (1965).

  • Ericsson, J.L.E., P. Biberfeld, and R. Seljelid, "Electron microscopic and cytochemical studies of acid phosphates and aryl sulfatase during autolysis," Acta Patho Microbio Scand, 70, 215 (1967).

  • Trump, B.F. and R.E. Bulger, "Studies of cellular injury in isolated flounder tubules. IV. Electron microscopic observations of changes during the phase of altered hemostasis in tubules treated with cyanide," Lab Invest, 18, 731 (1968).

Eight years before Persidsky pronounced the situation hopeless due to lysosome rupture after death, an excellent and exhaustive paper appeared, entitled "Lysosome and phagosome stability in lethal cell injury" (Hawkins, H.K., et al., Amer. Jour Path., 68, 255 (1972)). The authors subjected human liver cells in tissue culture to lethal insults such as cyanide poisoning and then evaluated them for lysosomal rupture. They state: "In conclusion, the findings do not indicate that the suicide bag mechanism of lysosomal rupture prior to cell death was operative in the two systems studied. On the contrary, the lysosomes appeared to be relatively stable organelles which burst only in the post-mortem phase of cellular necrosis." And when does this "post-mortem phase of cellular necrosis" occur? Again, to quote from the Hawkins paper: "As late as four hours after potassium cyanide and iodoacetic acid poisoning, where irreversible structural changes were uniformly seen, it was clear that the great majority of lysosomes continued to retain the ferritin marker within a morphologically intact membrane . . ." To translate: even four hours after poisoning with drugs that mimic complete ischemia, the cells had stable lysosomes.

There's more at the link.

Comment author: BenAlbahari 08 February 2010 12:38:44PM 1 point [-]

I've added most of your sources to the TakeOnIt wiki debate:

"Is cryonics worthwhile?"
http://www.takeonit.com/question/318.aspx

The cryonics debate now has four sub debates:

  • Is information-theoretic death the most real interpretation of death?
  • Is cryonic restoration technically feasible in the future?
  • Is living forever or having a greatly extended lifespan desirable?
  • Is there life after death?

Am I missing any major sub-debate?

Comment author: pdf23ds 09 February 2010 10:29:01AM *  0 points [-]

I forget who brought this up--maybe zero_call? jhrandom?--but I think a good question is "How quickly does brain information decay (e.g. due to autolysis) after the heart stops and before preservative measures are taken?" If the answer is "very quickly" then cryonics in non-terminal-illness cases becomes much less effective.

Comment author: pdf23ds 05 February 2010 02:41:26AM *  1 point [-]

Here's another one. When reading wikipedia on Chaitin's constant, I came across an article by Chaitin from 1956 (EDIT: oops, it's 2006) about the consequences of the constant (and its uncomputability) on the philosophy of math, that seems to me to just be completely wrongheaded, but for reasons I can't put my finger on. It really strikes the same chords in me that a lot of inflated talk about Godel's Second Incompleteness theorem strikes. (And indeed, as is obligatory, he mentions that too.) I searched on the title but didn't find any refutations. I wonder if anyone here has any comments on it.

Comment author: pdf23ds 05 February 2010 02:31:05AM 1 point [-]

I may be stretching the openness of the thread a little here, but I have an interesting mechanical engineering hobbyist project, and I have no mechanical aptitude. I figure some people around here might, and this might be interesting to them.

The Avacore CoreControl is a neat little device, based on very simple mechanical principles, that lets you exercise for longer and harder than you otherwise could, by cooling down your blood directly. It pulls a slight vacuum on your hand, and directly applies ice to the palm. The vacuum counteracts the vasocontriction effect of cold and makes the ice effective.

I'm mainly interested in building one because I play a lot of DDR, but anyone who gets annoyed with how quickly they get hot during exercise could use one.

I called the company, and they sell the device for $3000 dollars (and they were very rude to me when I suggested making hobbyist plans available), but given the simplicity of the principles, it should be easy to build one using stuff from a hardware store for under $200. I have a post about it on my blog here.

In response to comment by pdf23ds on Bizarre Illusions
Comment author: wedrifid 28 January 2010 08:43:40PM 0 points [-]

Neutral vote. I like the PEZ juxtaposition but 'arational' would fit better. A simply false assertion doesn't fit well with the irony.

In response to comment by wedrifid on Bizarre Illusions
Comment author: pdf23ds 29 January 2010 12:01:43AM 0 points [-]

As it was mocking bgrah's assertion, and bgrah used "unrational", and in my estimation his meaning was closer to "irrational" than "arational", I used the former. Perhaps using "unrational" would have been better, though.

Comment author: Blueberry 28 January 2010 07:50:56PM 0 points [-]

If it's not utterly voluntary when committed, I don't class it as suicide.

I'm still unclear why you classify it as death at all. You end up surviving it.

I think you're thinking of a each copy as an individual. I'm thinking of the copies collectively as a tool used by an individual.

The difference between what you proposed and the sleeping pill scenario is that in the latter, there's never a situation where an individual is deprived of rights.

Ok, say you enter into a binding agreement forcing yourself to take a sleeping pill tomorrow. You have someone there to enforce it if necessary. The next day, you change your mind, and the person forces you to take the pill anyway. Have you been deprived of rights? (If it helps, substitute eating dessert, or gambling, or doing heroin for taking the pill.)

Comment author: pdf23ds 28 January 2010 08:17:25PM 0 points [-]

Ok, say you enter into a binding agreement forcing yourself to take a sleeping pill tomorrow.

I don't think any such agreement could be legally binding under current law, which is relevant since we're talking about rights.

In response to comment by bgrah449 on Bizarre Illusions
Comment author: SilasBarta 28 January 2010 07:22:56PM *  2 points [-]

How so? I wasn't spouting the usual greedy/fake reductionist cliches; I was talking about the paintings that look like a 3-year-old made a mess, yet get classified as art, and noting that an art class probably wouldn't convince me this is appropriate.

What specific criticism of that claim do you have?

Comment author: pdf23ds 28 January 2010 07:35:38PM *  0 points [-]

Disliking Pollock is irrational. As is disliking Cage. Or Joyce. Or PEZ.

Comment author: MrHen 28 January 2010 06:40:17PM *  1 point [-]

You may be a good person to ask this question:

I was wondering if there was a function f(x, y, z) so that x and z represent the left and right sides of common mathematic operators and y represents the level of operation. So f(1, 2, 4) would be 1 + 4 and f(2, 2, 4) would be 2 * 4. Better versions of f(x, y, z) would have fewer end cases hardcoded into it.

The reason behind this is to handle operator levels greater than addition, multiplication, and exponents. The casual analysis from my grade school and undergrad level math shows the pattern that multiplication is repeated addition and exponents are repeated multiplication.

My quick attempts at coming up with such a function are spiraling into greater and greater complexities. I figured someone else has to have thought about this. Do you know of a place I can start reading up on ideas similar to this? Is what I am doing even plausible?

Quick thoughts based on me playing around:

  • Addition may be level 0, not level 1
  • The sequences never really look exactly like multiplication tables, but the patterns are similar enough to appease me
  • Ideally, everything can be reduced to the simple concept of X + 1 so as to walk along the number line
  • In practical terms, I have no idea how to express "negative" levels. Division and roots are unapproachable at this point in my playing around.
In response to comment by MrHen on Bizarre Illusions
Comment author: pdf23ds 28 January 2010 06:55:50PM *  1 point [-]

Hyper operators. You can represent even bigger numbers with Conway chained arrow notation. Eliezer's 3^^^^3 is a form of hyper operator notation, where ^ is exponentiation, ^^ is tetration, ^^^ is pentation, etc.

If you've ever looked into really big numbers, you'll find info about Ackermann's function, which is trivially convertable to hyper notation. There's also Busy Beaver numbers, which grow faster than any computable function.

In response to comment by pdf23ds on Bizarre Illusions
Comment author: SilasBarta 27 January 2010 11:00:48PM 0 points [-]

Sure it does -- Faithful reproductions give the shadowed portion the appropriate colors for matching how your brain would perceive a real-life shadowed portion of a scene.

Comment author: pdf23ds 27 January 2010 11:26:08PM *  0 points [-]

Umm, that's not what I meant by "faithful reproductions", and I have a hard time understanding how you could have misunderstood me. Say you took a photograph using the exact visual input over some 70 square degrees of your visual field, and then compared the photograph to that same view, trying to control for all the relevant variables*. You seem to be saying that the photograph would show the shadows as darker, but I don't see how that's possible. I am familiar with the phenomenon, but I'm not sure where I go wrong in my thought experiment.

* photo correctly lit, held so that it subtends 70 square degrees of your visual field, with your head in the same place as the camera was, etc.

Comment author: SilasBarta 27 January 2010 09:47:50PM 0 points [-]

Well said (including your later comment about color constancy). Along the same lines, this is why cameras often show objects in shadows as blacked out -- because that's the actual image it's getting, and the image your own retinas get! It's just that your brain has cleverly subtracted out the impact of the shadow before presenting it to you, so you can still see significant contrast and colors in the shadowed objects.

Comment author: pdf23ds 27 January 2010 10:14:25PM 4 points [-]

Along the same lines, this is why cameras often show objects in shadows as blacked out -- because that's the actual image it's getting, and the image your own retinas get! It's just that your brain has cleverly subtracted out the impact of the shadow before presenting it to you

That doesn't explain why faithful reproductions of images with shadows don't prompt the same reinterpretation by your brain.

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