Robust decision theory?

Occam's Razor is required reading for anyone who thinks Occam's Razor proves the existence of God.

I think it's more than just that simple game:

Indeed, 4-year-olds monitor apparent differences in reliability even when no obvious errors are involved. Having watched one informant name objects accurately and another informant make non-committal remarks about them (e.g., “Let me look at that”) or express ignorance, children subsequently invested more trust in the accurate as opposed to the non-committal informant (Corriveau, Meints & Harris, 2009) or the ignorant11 informant (Koenig & Harris, 2005). Fourth, reliability monitoring can reverse the normal pattern of vertical trust. Although preschoolers trust an adult informant over a peer, that preference is reversed if the peer proves more reliable (Jaswal & Neely, 2006). Finally, selective trust is not transient. When a second test phase was administered, either 3-4 days or an entire week after the initial test phase, 3- and 4-year-olds still invested more trust in the previously correct informant (Corriveau & Harris, 2009a).

-- Harris and Corriveau 2011

Benjamin Franklin sure knew how to use the caps. I miss the old days.

I really like the discussions of the problems, but I would have loved to see more discussions of the solutions. How do we know, more specifically, that they will solve things? What are the obstacles to putting them into effect -- why, more specifically, do people just not want to do it? I assume it's something a bit more complex than a bunch of people going around saying "Yeah, I know science is flawed, but I don't really feel like fixing it." (Or maybe it isn't?)

Also, they could be wrong about whether they actually disagree.

The problem, often not discovered until late in life, is that when you look for things in life like love, meaning, motivation, it implies they are sitting behind a tree or under a rock. The most successful people in life recognize, that in life they create their own love, they manufacture their own meaning, they generate their own motivation. For me, I am driven by two main philosophies, know more today about the world than I knew yesterday. And lessen the suffering of others. You'd be surprised how far that gets you.

-- Neil DeGrasse Tyson

I imagine the ideal diologue going something like this:

A: I'm a human, how can I help?

B: That depends, what can you do?

A: I have general intelligence.

B: I mean, what kind of specific talents would you bring that would make you qualified compared to everyone else with general intelligence?

A: Oh. I'm an artist. Er, sorry, I mean I'm a human with qualifications in art.

B: I don't know how artists can help us, sorry.

you could be overestimating how much you care about animals being in pain due to anthropomorphizing them somewhat.

Definitely a possibility, though I try to eliminate it.

Put aside my earlier notions of "inequal" and "unfair"... I don't think they're necessary for us to proceed on this issue.

You said these things were "bad when they on net hurt people". I noticed you said people, and not non-human animals, but you have said that you put at least some value on non-human animals.

Likewise, you've agreed that the pro-friend, pro-family preference only carries so far. But how far does the pro-human preference go? Assuming we agree on (1) the quality of life of certain nonhuman animals as they are made for food, (2) the capabilities for these nonhuman animals to feel a range of pain, and (3) the change in your personal quality of life by adopting habits to avoid most to all of this food (three big assumptions), then it seems like you're fine with a significant measure of spiecieism.

I guess if you're reaction is "so what", we might just have rather different terminal values, though I'm kind of surprised that would be the case.