I don't know if the idea works in general, but if it works as described I think it would still be useful even if it doesn't meet this objection. I don't forsee any authentication system which can distinguish between "user wants money" and "user has been blackmailed to say they want money as convincingly as possible and not to trigger any hidden panic buttons", but even if it doesn't, a password you can't tell someone would still be more secure because:
- you're not vulnerable to people ringing you up and asking what your password is for a security audit, unless they can persaude you to log on to the system for them
- you're not vulnerable to being kidnapped and coerced remotely, you have to be coerced wherever the log-on system is
I think the "stress detector" idea is one that is unlikely to work unless someone works on it specifically to tell the difference between "hurried" and "coerced", but I don't think the system is useless because it doesn't solve every problem at once.
OTOH, there are downsides to being too secure: you're less likely to be kidnapped, but it's likely to be worse if you ARE.
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This is the kind of thing which makes me wonder about a community norm of taking psychological research (which may be badly designed or prove less than it seems to) very seriously.
It's not just a community norm, big chunks of the sequences seem to be built on small amounts of recent research.