If we know that there's a burglar, then we think that either an alarm or a recession caused it; and if we're told that there's an alarm, we'd conclude it was less likely that there was a recession, since the recession had been explained away.

Should that be "since the burglar had been explained away"? Or am I confused?

Edit: I was confused. The burglar was explained; the recession was explained away.

Since my expectations sometimes conflict with my subsequent experiences, I need different names for the thingies that determine my experimental predictions and the thingy that determines my experimental results. I call the former thingies 'beliefs', and the latter thingy 'reality'.

I think it's apt but ironic that you find a definition of "truth" by comparing beliefs and reality. Beliefs are something that human beings, and maybe some animals have. Reality is vast in comparison, and generally not very animal-centric. Yet every one of these diagrams has a human being or brain in it.

With one interesting exception, the space of all possible worlds. Is truth more animal-centric that reality? Wouldn't "snow is white" be a true statement if people weren't around? Maybe not--who would be around to state it? But I find it easy to imagine a possible world with white snow but no people.

Edit: What would a hypothetical post titled "The Useful Idea of Reality" contain? Would it logically come before or after this post?

Beliefs should pay rent, check. Arguments about truth are not just a matter of asserting privilege, check. And yet... when we do have floating beliefs, then our arguments about truth are largely a matter of asserting privilege. I missed that connection at first.