These are difficult question because we are speculating about future mathematics / physics.
First of all, there's the question of how much of the quantum framework will survive the unification with gravity. Up until now, all theories that worked inside it have failed; worse, they have introduced black-hole paradoxes: most notably, thunderbolts and the firewall problem. I'm totally in the dark if a future unification will require a modification of the fundamental mathematical structure of QM. Say, if ER = EPR, and entanglement can be explained with a modified geometry of space-time, does it mean that superposition is also a geometrical phoenomenon that doesn't require multiple worlds? I don't really know.
But more on the point, I think (hope?) that future explorations of the quantum framework will yield an expanded landscape, where interpretations will be seen as the surface phoenomenon of something deeper: for example, something akin to what happens in classical mechanics with the Hamiltonian / Lagrangian formulations.
On a side note, I've read only the Wikipedia article on QBism and my impression was that it had an epistemological leaning, not ontological: if you use only SIC-POVMs, you can explain all quantum quirks with the epistemology of probability distributions. I might be very wrong, though.
Subscribe to RSS Feed
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
Doesn' that rebound on the argument for MWI?
Sincere and consistent instrumentalists may exist, but I think they are rare. What is much more common is for people to compartmentalise, to take and irrealist or instrumetalist stance about things that make them feel uncomfortable, while remaining cheerfully realist about other things.
At the end of the day, being able to predict phenomena isn’t that exciting. People generally do science because they want to find out about the world. And “rationaists”, internet atheists and so on generally do have ontological commitments, to the non-existence of gods and ghosts, some view about whether or not we are ina matrix and so on.
I'm certainly not an instrumentalist. But the argument that MWI supporters (and some critics, like Penrose) generally make, and which I've found persuasive, is that MWI is simply what you get if you take quantum mechanics at face value. Theories like GRW have modifications to the well-established formalism that we, as far as I know, have no empirical confirmation of.