Comment author: quen_tin 13 August 2012 08:41:40PM *  4 points [-]

I wonder if the same mechanisms could be invovled in conspiracy theorists. Their way of thinking seems very similar. I also suspect a reinforcement mechanism: it becomes more and more difficult for the subject to deny his own beliefs, as it would require abandonning large parts of his present (and coherent) belief system, leaving him with almost nothing left.

This could explain why patients are reluctant to accept alternative versions afterwards (such as "you have a brain damage").

Comment author: TimS 22 November 2011 07:20:40PM *  2 points [-]

I don't understand what you mean by "absurd."

Bob tells you that he is going to climb a boring and uninteresting mountain because he randomly feels like it. There's nothing to see there that couldn't be seen elsewhere, and everyone else thinks that climbing that mountain is pointless. Omega verifies that Bob has no other motivation for climbing the mountain.

Would you say that Bob's desire to climb the mountain is (a) mentally defective (i.e. insane), (b) immoral, (c) impossible, (d) not relevant to your point, or (e) something else?

In response to comment by TimS on The curse of identity
Comment author: quen_tin 22 November 2011 08:16:13PM 1 point [-]

What do you mean by "randomly feels like it"? Maybe he wants some fresh air or something... Then it's a personal motivation, and my answer is (d) not relevant to ethic. The discussion in this article was not, I think, about casual goals like climbing a mountain, but about the goals in your life, the important things to do (maybe I should use the term "finalities" instead). It was a matter of ethic.

If Bob believes that climbing this mountain is good or important while he admits that his only motivation is "randomly feeling like it", then I call his belief absurd.

Comment author: Kaj_Sotala 20 November 2011 08:26:47PM 3 points [-]

Like Wei Dai said - the core problem (at least in my case) wasn't in the prestige-seeking by itself, it was in the cached and incorrect thoughts about what would lead to prestigious results, and the fact that those cached thoughts hijacked the reasoning process. If I had stopped to really think about whether the actions made any sense, I should have realized that such actions wouldn't lead to prestige, they would lead to screwing up (in the first and second example, at least). But instead I just went with the first cliché of prestige that my brain associated with this particular task.

If I had actually thought about it, I would have realized that there were better ways of both achieving the goal and getting prestige... but because my mind was so focused on the first cliché of prestige that came up, I didn't want to think about anything that would have suggested I couldn't do it. I subconsciously believed that if I didn't get prestige this way, I wouldn't get it in any other way either, so I pushed away any doubts about it.

Comment author: quen_tin 22 November 2011 07:46:31PM 2 points [-]

Maybe I misunderstood a bit your point. I understood: - "I thought I wanted to work for a great cause but it turned out I only wanted to be the kind of person who work for a great cause"

Now I understand: - "I really wanted to work for a great cause, but it turned out all my actions were directed toward giving the impression, in the short-term, that I was"

In other words, you were talking about shortsightedness when I thought it was delusion?

Comment author: TimS 22 November 2011 05:58:52PM 0 points [-]

We seem to be having a definitional problem. Perhaps if you taboo the word gratitude, then we might understand your position better.

In response to comment by TimS on The curse of identity
Comment author: quen_tin 22 November 2011 06:40:34PM 0 points [-]

Ok. I would replace "Being grateful for an action" by "recognizing that an action is important/beneficial". Pursuing a pure gratitude-free goal would mean: pursuing a goal that nobody think is beneficial or important to do (except you, because you do it), and supposedly nobody ever will. My claim is that such action is absurd from an ethical (universalist) perspective.

Comment author: TheOtherDave 22 November 2011 05:40:22PM *  0 points [-]

So, at the risk of caricaturing your view again, consider the following scenario:

At time T1, I observe some repeatable phenomenon X. For the sake of concreteness, suppose X is my underground telescope detecting a new kind of rock formation deep underground that no person has ever before seen... that is, I am the discoverer of X.

At time T2, I publish my results and show everyone X, and everyone agrees that yes, there exists such a rock formation deep underground.

If I've understood you correctly, you would say that if B is the belief that there exists such a rock formation deep underground, then at T1 B is "subjectively true," prior to T1 B doesn't exist at all, and at T2 B is "inter-subjectively or universally true". Is that right?

Let's call NOT(B) the denial of B -- that is, NOT(B) is the belief that such rock formations don't exist.

At times between T1 and T2, when some people believe B and others believe NOT(B) with varying degrees of confidence, what is the status of B in your view? What is the status of NOT(B)? Are either of those beliefs true?

And if I never report X to anyone else, then B remains subjectively true, but never becomes inter-subjectively true. Yes?

Now suppose that at T3, I discover that my tools for scanning underground rock formations were flawed, and upon fixing those tools I no longer observe X. Suppose I reject B accordingly. I report those results, and soon nobody believes B anymore.

On your view, what is the status of B at T3? Is it still intersubjectively true? Is it still subjectively true? Is it true at all?

Does knowing the status of B at T3 change your evaluation of the status of B at T2 or T1?

Comment author: quen_tin 22 November 2011 06:15:57PM 0 points [-]

At T1, B is "subjectively true" (I believe that B). However it's not an established truth. From the point of view of the whole society, the result needs replication: what if I was deceiving everyone? At T2, B is controversial. At T3, B is false.

Now is the status of B changing over time? That's a good question. I would say that the status of B is contextual. B was true at T1 to the extent of the actions I had performed at that time. It was "weakly true" because I had not checked every flaws in my instruments. It became false in the context of T3. Similarly, one could say that Newtonian physics is true in the context of slow speeds and weak energies.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 22 November 2011 05:12:17PM *  0 points [-]

The error in reasoning is analogous.

Comment author: quen_tin 22 November 2011 05:36:18PM 1 point [-]

I don't think so. Let me precise that my thoughts are to be understood from an ethical perspective: by "goal" I mean something that deserves to be done, in other words, "something good". I start from the assumption that having a goal supposes thinking that it's somehow something good (=something I should do), which is kind of tautologic.

Now I am only suggesting that a goal that does not deserve any gratitude can't be "good" from an ethical point of view.

Moreover, I am not proclaming I am purely seeking gratitude in all my actions.

Comment author: lessdazed 21 November 2011 05:50:26PM 1 point [-]

What prediction about the world can you make from these beliefs? What would be less - or more - surprising to you than to those with typical beliefs here?

Comment author: quen_tin 22 November 2011 05:07:04PM 0 points [-]

Let me justify my position.

Gratitude-free actions are absurd from an ethical point of view, because we do not have access to any transcendant and absolute notion of "good". Consequently, we have no way to tell if an action is good if noone is grateful for it.

If you perform a gratitude-free action, either it's only good for you: then you're selfish, and that's far from the universal aim of ethics. Either you you believe in a transcendant notion of "good", together with a divine gratitude, which is a religious position.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 21 November 2011 06:56:52PM 2 points [-]
Comment author: quen_tin 22 November 2011 04:55:40PM 0 points [-]

Seeking gratitude has nothing to do with selfishness., on the contrary. Something usually deserve gratitude if it benefits others. My position is very altruistic.

Comment author: TimS 21 November 2011 06:24:59PM 0 points [-]

Is the following a reasonable paraphrase of your position:

If game theoretic considerations do not justify behaving in a way labelled "altruistic," then there is no reason to behave in "altruistic" ways.

In response to comment by TimS on The curse of identity
Comment author: quen_tin 22 November 2011 04:45:39PM 0 points [-]

My view is very altruistic on the contrary : seeking gratitude is seeking to perform actions that benefits others or the whole society. Game theoretic considerations would justify being selfish, which does not deserve gratitude at all.

Comment author: TheOtherDave 21 November 2011 05:51:38PM 2 points [-]

I'm entirely on board with endorsing beliefs that can successfully serve as a basis for action with expected results by calling them "true," and on board with the whole "we don't have access to absolutes" thing.

I am not on board with endorsing beliefs as "true" just because I can convince other people of them.

You seem to be talking about both things at once, which is why I'm confused.

Can you clarify what differences you see (if any) between "it works/it serves as a reliable basis for action" on the one hand, and "it can convince people" on the other, as applied to a belief, and why those differences matter (if they do)?

Comment author: quen_tin 22 November 2011 04:35:39PM 0 points [-]

In my view, going from subjective truth to universal (inter-subjective) truth requires agreement between different people, that is, convincing others (or being convinced). I hold a belief because it is reliable for me. If it is reliable for others as well, then they'll probably agree with me. I will convince them.

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