Comment author: rasthedestroyer100 30 June 2016 12:23:13PM *  0 points [-]

A useful trick to optimize the accuracy of your priors when considering examples is to semantically disentangle each example in the form of a conjunctive statement. This allows you to avoid the conjunction fallacy, where an example, verbally stated, holds only when many smaller statements conjoined by an and or several them are all true.

By doing this, we can also compare examples rather than treating them as all having the same probability value.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 10 March 2008 08:08:35PM 8 points [-]

Mitchell, Unknown, I worry you may have misunderstood the point.

The question "Why am I conscious?" is not meant to be isomorphic to the question "Why do I think I'm conscious?" It's just that the latter question is guaranteed to be answerable, whether or not the first question contains an inherent confusion; and that the second question, if fully answered, is guaranteed to contain whatever information you were hoping to get out of the first question.

"Explain" is a recursive option - whenever you find an answer, you can hit "Explain" again, unless you hit "Worship" or "Ignore" instead. If the answer to "Why do I think I'm conscious?" is "Because I'm conscious"; and you can show that this is true evidence (that is, you would not think you were conscious if you were not conscious); and you carry out this demonstration without reference to any mysterious concepts (i.e., "Because I directly experience qualia!" contains four mysterious concepts, not counting "Because"); then you could hit the "Explain" button again regarding "Because I'm conscious."

The point is that by starting with a belief, you start with an unconfused thing - the belief may be about something confused, but the belief itself is just a cognitive object sitting there in your mind. Even if its meaning is self-contradictory, the representation is just a representation. "This sentence is false" is paradoxical when you try to interpret it, but there is nothing paradoxical about writing four English words between quote marks, it happens all the time.

If you're asking "Why is the sentence 'This sentence is false' both true and false?" you'll end up confused, because you dereferenced it in the question, and the referent is self-contradictory. Ask "Why do I think the sentence 'This sentence is false' is both true and false?" and you'll be able to see how your mind, as an interpreter, goes into an infinite loop - suggesting that not every syntactical English sentence refers to a proposition.

By starting with a belief, un-derefenced, inside quote marks, you start with an unconfused thing - a cognitive representation. Then you keep tracing back the chain of causality until you arrive at something confusing. Then you unconfuse it. Then you keep tracing.

It really does help to start with something unconfused.

Unknown said: So there is an actually unanswerable question (at least as far as anyone knows, by any concepts anyone has yet conceived of), and it is not a meaningless question.

1) No one knows what science doesn't know.

2) Perhaps you should ask "Why do I think this question is unanswerable?" rather than "Why is this question unanswerable?"

Comment author: rasthedestroyer100 30 June 2016 12:02:57PM 2 points [-]

"No one knows what science doesn't know."

This sort of anthropomorphic bias leads to conceptual errors. 'Science' is the method of acquiring knowledge and the collection of acquired knowledge to which the method is rigorously applied. It is incapable of knowing anything independently of what individuals know; in fact, it can't know anything at all without some knowing individual to practice it. And to be sure, we can know things 'science doesn't know': we know we are in love, that we are happy or sad, that we played baseball for the first time when we were 6 years old at the park in Glens Falls, etc.

Comment author: Unknown 10 March 2008 07:14:03PM -1 points [-]

If Eliezer has his way, consciousness is not a "hard problem" at all, since asking why people are conscious is the same as asking "why do people think they are conscious," while "thinking one is conscious" is identified with a physical state of one's brain.

The reason Eliezer cannot have his way is that the identity or non-identity of physical and mental reality is irrelevant to explanation. For example, presumably light of different colors is identical to light of different wavelengths. But if I ask, "why does that light look red," it is NOT a sufficient explanation to say that the light has a certain wavelength, NOR to say that my brain reacts to this wavelength in such and such a physical way. It is easy to see that the explanation is insufficient because given the explanation (info about wavelengths and brain states), one would not be able to draw the conclusion that the light would look red, unless one is given the info that a certain brain state is equivalent to seeing red. But this is the point: why is this brain state equivalent to seeing red? The question, "Why do I think that this brain statement is equivalent to seeing red," is now not helpful at all, because presumably the reason I think they are identical is because they are identical. But why are they identical? This is just what has not been explained, and cannot be explained. So there is an actually unanswerable question (at least as far as anyone knows, by any concepts anyone has yet conceived of), and it is not a meaningless question.

Comment author: rasthedestroyer100 30 June 2016 11:54:16AM *  0 points [-]

"For example, presumably light of different colors is identical to light of different wavelengths."

More specifically, lights of identical wavelengths have identical colors, and vice-versa. Clearly, "waves = colors" is not a valid statement of equality ('color' is an epiphenomenon of wavelengths arising as a percept in a sensory being, while the wavelengths the mind converts into colors exists independently of any observers). A wave is a wave, and a color is a color, and these two properties have a direct relationship upon which the equality or inequality of these properties in some group of objects can be ascertained.

Comment author: Tiiba2 09 March 2008 11:05:11PM 3 points [-]

"Why do I think I was born as myself rather than someone else?"

Because a=a?

Comment author: rasthedestroyer100 30 June 2016 11:50:27AM 0 points [-]

Why does a = a?

Comment author: DonGeddis 09 March 2008 10:08:23PM 1 point [-]

"Why do I think reality exists?"

We could well be in a matrix world, with all an illusion. Or, perhaps we arrived just a moment ago, but intact with false implanted memories. (Sort of like the creationist explanation of evidence for evolution.)

The assumption that "reality exists" is mere convenience. It's helpful in order to predict my future observations (or so my current memory suggests to me). Even if this is a matrix world, there is still the EXACT SAME theory of "reality", which would then be used to predict the future illusions that I'll notice.

Comment author: rasthedestroyer100 30 June 2016 11:49:28AM 0 points [-]

The existence of 'reality' is just a logically circular argument of the form: 'what is real exists because it really exists.' There is no reason to prove the existence of reality; we prove or disprove the existence (or non-existence) of things in reality. We are able to falsify the existence of things by this method due to the satisfied precondition of a reality in which things exist,

Of course we could be experiencing some manufactured illusion, but this still necessarily implies some reality in which this illusion can be constructed. Our ability to experience this illusion would suffice to prove that we are real, since all experience is that of an experiencing being or object. This objective experiencing being must exist in relation to some other second existent object of experience. But then we must posit a third object in relation to which both of these two - the object of experience and the experiencing object - are experienced in turn, and so on. The notion of a purely subjective idea-being without an objective reality or existence is absurd - an idea or sensation not inhering in any object in reality has no body in which the subjective being of even an illusion or misapprehension arises. To be aware is to be aware of something.

In fact, the very notion that we could or are living in a false reality to which our minds are inextricably enslaved is more or less religious superstition: all existence as we experience it would require a designer or predetermined purpose who constructs this illusion, all of the sensory objects in this subterfuge, and all of the laws of nature to which the non-existent hallucinations are consistently obedient that this designer must have arbitrarily laid out in advance.

Comment author: rasthedestroyer100 30 June 2016 11:28:05AM 0 points [-]

"Tracing back the chain of causality, step by step, I discover that my belief that I'm wearing socks is fully explained by the fact that I'm wearing socks. This is right and proper, as you cannot gain information about something without interacting with it."

Maybe I'm being pedantic on this point, but doesn't the interaction with the socks constitute the act of putting them on which actually fully explains that you're wearing them? Of course, you can go back further along the causal chain to the reason you put them on - perhaps the room was cold, or you had to put on boots to go outside. Regardless, the more we regress backwards on this chain, the farther from the change in state from Socksoff to Sockson would we find ourselves in the causal sequence of events leading up to your wearing them.

That being said, wouldn't the circular explanation - I'm wearing socks because I'm wearing socks - actually be the explanation arrived at as we approach the causal chain's resulting state of affairs where we're wearing socks instead of not wearing socks? The 'new information' is actually gained by the interaction with the socks preceding our wearing them or our resulting need to explain this phenomenon.