The current best answer we know seems to be to write each consistent hypothesis in a formal language, and weight longer explanations inverse exponentially, renormalizing such that your total probability sums to 1. Look up aixi, universal prior

Shutting up and multiplying, answer is clearly to save eliezer...and do so versus a lot more people than just three...question is more interesting if you ask people what n (probably greater than 3) is their cut off point.

Due to chaotic / non-linear effects, you're not going to get anywhere near the compression you need for 33 bits to be enough...I'm very confident the answer is much much higher...

you're right. speaking more precisely, by "ask yourself what you would do", I mean "engage in the act of reflecting, wherein you realize the symmetry between you and your opponent which reduces the decision problem to (C,C) and (D,D), so that you choose (C,C)", as you've outlined above. Note though that even when the reduction is not complete (for example, b/c you're fighting a similar but inexact clone), there can still be added incentive to cooperate...

Agreed that in general one will have some uncertainty over whether one's opponent is the type of algorithm who one boxes / cooperates / whom one wants to cooperate with, etc. It does look like you need to plug these uncertainties into your expected utility calculation, such that you decide to cooperate or defect based on your degree of uncertainty about your opponent.

However, in some cases at least, you don't need to be Omega-superior to predict whether another agent one-boxes....for example, if you're facing a clone of yourself; you can just ask yourself what you would do, and you know the answer. There may be some class of algorithms non-identical to you but which are still close enough to you to make this self-reflection increased evidence that your opponent will cooperate if you do.

Agreed with tarleton, the prisoner's dilemma questions do look under-specified...e.g., eliezer has said something like cooperate if he thinks his opponent one-boxes on newcomb-like problems..maybe you could have some write-in box here and figure out how to map the votes to simple categories later, depending on the variety of survey responses you get

Seems worth mentioning: I think a thorough treatment of what "you" want needs to address extrapolated volition and all the associated issues that raises.
To my knowledge, some of those issues remain unsolved, such as whether different simulations of oneself in different environments necessarily converge (seems to me very unlikely, and this looks provable in a simplified model of the situation), and if not, how to "best" harmonize their differing opinions... similarly, whether a single simulated instance of oneself might itself not converge or not provably converge on one utility function as simulated time goes to infinity (seems quite likely; moreover, provable , in a simplified model) etc., etc.
If conclusive work has been done of which I'm unaware, it would be great if someone wants to link to it.
It seems unlikely to me that we can satisfactorily answer these questions without at least a detailed model of our own brains linked to reductionist explanations of what it means to "want" something, etc.

Wh- I definitely agree the point you're making about knives etc., though I think one intepretation of the nfl as applying not to just to search but also to optimization makes your observation an instance of one type of nfl. Admittedly, there are some fine print assumptions that I think go under the term "almost no free lunch" when discussed.