I precommit to acting as if I had made any precommittment I find myself wishing I had made. If I make this clear before iterated prisoners' dilemma, a rational partner would not try the "finger slipped" excuse against me, because I would wish that I had precommitted to punishing defection due to finger slipping.
I would still allow the grieving student to turn in the paper late, because in that situation, I do not wish I had precommitted to rejecting that excuse.
Thats fine, as long as you lay out the relative importance of different aspects so people can predict what will and won't be important to you.
Why is this a problem? (Along the lines of, why do you need to accurately know the reasons why you do things?) I'm trying to relate. I see beliefs as something I need in order to decide what to do. As long as I'm doing what I decide to do, why would I worry about varied reasons for doing it?
As long as I'm doing what I decide to do, why would I worry about varied reasons for doing it?
One reason that comes to mind is that you might be avoiding something you should be doing.
There is no reason to propose such a being - privileging the hypothesis is when you consider a hypothesis before any evidence has forced you to raise that hypothesis to the level of consideration.
Unless you have a mountain of evidence (and I'm guessing it'll have to be cosmological to support a god that hasn't visibly intervened in the world) already driving you to argue that there might be a god, don't bother proposing the possibility.
Ah, I see what you are saying. Thanks for the explanation. And you are indeed correct.
I was with you up until the "similarly". After that you start privileging the hypothesis - you should expect a god to make itself obvious during a human lifetime, by any description of a god ever proposed in history.
I'm not sure I see how I"m privileging the hypothesis. Not saying that I'm not, but if you can explain how I'd appreciate it.
Aside from that, I think you are using "god" to mean any of the gods discussed by any popular religion. By this definition, I'd probably agree with you.
I was using the word "god" in a much more general sense... not sure I can define it though, probably something similar to: any "being" that is omnipotent and omniscient, or maybe: any "being" that created reality as we know it. In either definition, there is not really a reason to expect got to make itself obvious to us on any timescale that we consider reasonable. There is no reason to believe that we are special enough that we'd get that kind of treatment.
For anyone interested, here is a decent algorithm for getting the "correct" number of lines in your linear regression.
http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~wayne/kleinberg-tardos/06dynamic-programming-2x2.pdf
Pages 5 and 6.
That seems like an easy case to test, provided you have some way to re-light the candle.
You need to make two assumptions for the analogy.
1) You can't re-light the candle.
2) If you do things exactly right, you'll get out with just before starving to death (or dying somehow) otherwise, you are dead.
My initial response was to chuckle, but when my analytical capacities kicked in a moment later I was disappointed.
If his initial assumptions was that he was walking into a bar, does that make him atheist in this metaphor? Substitute "walked into a bar" by "believed there is a god", the thing I assume it is a metaphor of. You will see it makes no sense.
I think it makes sense, as a poke at atheists.
Think about it this way. You walk into a bar, and you see no bartender. In your mind, you say "anything that is a bar will have a bartender. No bar tender, not a bar." Of course, the best thing to do before revising your assumptions is to wait for a bar tender. Maybe he/she is in the bathroom.
Similarly, if you claim there is no evidence of god that I've seen in my lifetime, you are using the wrong measure. Why should god (if there is one) make itself obvious during the short period that is a human lifetime.
This is almost an "irrationality quote" instead of a rationality quote, but still enlightening.
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A question about Bayesian reasoning:
I think one of the things that confused me the most about this is that Bayesian reasoning talks about probabilities. When I start with Pr(My Mom Is On The Phone) = 1/6, its very different from saying Pr(I roll a one on a fair die) = 1/6.
In the first case, my mom is either on the phone or not, but I'm just saying that I'm pretty sure she isn't. In the second, something may or may not happen, but its unlikely to happen.
Am I making any sense... or are they really the same thing and I'm over complicating?