Overview for scaphandre

I exist. I'm actually more east coast, but it looks like attempts to set up an Edinburgh meet-up have fizzled out, so if I can make it to a future Glasgow one, I would be keen to come along.

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In response to comment by WinterShaker on Meetup : Glasgow (Scotland) Meetup

Comment author: scaphandre 05 December 2014 06:45:27AM 0 points [-]

I also exist!

I saw this one too late, but I'm up for Edinburgh or central Glasgow in the future.

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In response to comment by Gavin on On Terminal Goals and Virtue Ethics

Comment author: TheAncientGeek 19 June 2014 08:25:25AM * -2 points [-]

So who would you kill if they stood between you and a good barbecue?

( it's almost like you guys haven't thought about what terminal means)

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In response to comment by TheAncientGeek on On Terminal Goals and Virtue Ethics

Comment author: scaphandre 19 June 2014 03:09:23PM 3 points [-]

I think the 'terminal' in terminal goal means 'end of that thread of goals', as in a train terminus. Something that is wanted for the sake of itself.

It does not imply that you will terminate someone to achieve it.

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In response to comment by ciphergoth on Humans are utility monsters

Comment author: PhilGoetz 17 August 2013 04:13:08PM * 7 points [-]

Well, nematodes might already feel more strongly. If you have a total of 302 neurons, and 15 of them signal "YUM!" when you bite into a really tasty protozoan, that might be pure bliss.

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In response to comment by PhilGoetz on Humans are utility monsters

Comment author: scaphandre 27 August 2013 04:32:58PM 0 points [-]

Do you really think that is at all likely that a nematode might be capable of feeling more informed life-satisfaction than a human?

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In response to Humans are utility monsters

Comment author: scaphandre 27 August 2013 04:19:29PM * 0 points [-]

Nice post.

I disagree with the premise that humans are utility monsters, but I see what you are getting at.

I'm a little weary of the concept of a utility monster as it is easy to imagine and debate but I don't think it is immediately realistic.

I want my considerations of utility to be aware of possible future outcomes. If we imagine a concrete scenario like Zach's fantastic slave pyramid builders for an increasingly happy man, it seems obvious that there is something psychotic about an individual who could be made more happy by the senseless toil of other conscious beings. That is not the desired outcome of implementing their naive 'utilitarian ethics computer' genie.

I agree that that situation is repugnant. I think this is created from a poor implementation of their 'utilitarian ethics computer'.

Here's why humans in general are not repugnant: We are not using the suffering of others to increase solely our own happiness. At least not directly, deliberately and relentlessly.

I do agree that sometimes the life-satisfaction of squirrels is cut short by humans building dams (to follow your example).

Sometimes this could be morally right, sometimes not. Humans are imperfect utilitarians because we do a crappy job of counting the potential benefit and costs of all beings involved, with appropriate weights.

I don't see humans as repugnant monsters because I don't give humans infinitely more weight in this scaling.