The episodic nature of this story is wearing on me a bit. I'm not talking about wanting to know what happens and having to wait for that knowledge to be doled out bit by bit. That's pretty much fine. It's the feeling that there's a grand overarching plot that's being distracted from by Plots of the Month. Even if the PotM do contribute to the overall plot--and they probably do--it feels like they do so in a rather meandering, patchwork way. Where's my beloved "use science to figure out the nature of magic, and use that to cure death for everyone" plotline? Will we finally get back to it now that Hermione's dead?
It strikes me as a little awful to only care about bad people inasmuch as they're likely to become good people. Maybe I've been perverted by my Catholic upbringing, but I was taught to love everyone, including the sinners, including the people you'd never want to hang out with. This appeals to me in part because I sin and people don't want to hang out with me, and yet I want to be loved regardless.
It's possible that I am the weird one here, but shows with complex but evil characters such as Breaking Bad do seem largely popular. There is a large current in modern adult TV of these sorts of villainous antagonists, and I think it's more than just false sophistication. I think it's people with the courage to see the dark parts of themselves reflected in fictional characters.
Yes, shows like that are very popular, and I'm getting really sick of it. I don't understand it, but I don't really think that it's false sophistication. Or courageous self-examination.
Well, he's saying that. I don't know which part of this is the part you're having trouble with.
I was confused by the way he was using the term "non-determinism". Then I read this:
It's important to understand that computer scientists use the term "nondeterministic" differently from how it's typically used in other sciences. A nondeterministic TM is actually deterministic in the physics sense
-Theoretical Computer Science Stack Exchange
Assuming that person was correct, then it seems like Aaronson is responding to an argument that uses the physics sense of "non-determined", but replying with the CS sense--which I'm thinking makes a difference in this case. But that's just what it seems like to me--I must be misunderstanding something (probably a lot of things).
I'd really like it if someone could explain to me what Aaronson is saying here:
I've often heard the argument which says that not only is there no free will, but the very concept of free will is incoherent. Why? Because either our actions are determined by something, or else they're not determined by anything, in which case they're random. In neither case can we ascribe them to "free will."
For me, the glaring fallacy in the argument lies in the implication Not Determined ⇒ Random. If that was correct, then we couldn't have complexity classes like NP---we could only have BPP. The word "random" means something specific: it means you have a probability distribution over the possible choices. In computer science, we're able to talk perfectly coherently about things that are non-deterministic, but not random.
Look, in computer science we have many different sources of non-determinism. Arguably the most basic source is that we have some algorithm, and we don't know in advance what input it's going to get. If it were always determined in advance what input it was going to get, then we'd just hardwire the answer. Even talking about algorithms in the first place, we've sort of inherently assumed the idea that there's some agent that can freely choose what input to give the algorithm.
On #4, I'm fine with my morality existing for it's own sake. I don't need a justification for the things from which I derive justification.
[1] The level of simulation present in the Universe is sufficiently high that the only purpose of it would BE simulation, meaning that [2] our physical laws would necessarily be quite close to the laws of whatever universe overlies us.
[2] does not follow from [1]. The REAL real world might be sufficiently more complex than ours and it can be running thousand of simulations for a variety of reasons. I'm really not sure why you think that our level of simulation or physical laws are as complex as it gets but this is not a valid argument.
For a quick example of what I mean I would like you to think about us full-on simulating a 2 dimnesions(+time) environment.
In the absence of other evidence, could you not use some sort of complexity measure to estimate that, if our universe is being simulated, the simulating universe is more likely to have simpler laws than more complex ones? (And maybe even that having no simulating universe--meaning our universe is not a simulation--is even simpler, and therefore more likely?) But I have no idea what the actual difference in probabilities would be, if you could.
pie
Surely you mean cake? (For those who don't get it, the above post pattern-matches with certain asexual/aromantic relationship preferences.)
You're right, cake would have been more appropriate. :) (Except I love pie way more.)
For those who don't get it, the above post pattern-matches with certain asexual/aromantic relationship preferences.
Now I don't get it even more.
To the OP:
it's more like people eating delicious pie together; it's not driven by attraction.
Can you explain the difference? To me eating delicious pie together looks like a good metaphor for sex.
Well, people usually enjoy yummy food even if they have no, uh... co-eating attraction? to the person they're eating it with. Something like "co-eating attraction" could exist, maybe there are people out there who have that, where they experience an arousal of their gustatory desires in response to another person, but I don't think that's typical. (I hope it's clear that what I'm talking about is different from the quite common phenomenon of food being more enjoyable when other factors, such as the company, ambiance, etc. are also enjoyable.)
Sexual attraction, on the other hand, is a common thing, and people's enjoyment of sex is often strongly related to their attraction to the person they're having sex with. Of course, it's also possible for some people to enjoy sex without being at all attracted to the person they're having sex with, but that's not the typical scenario, is it? If I tried really hard for a long time, maybe I could learn to enjoy sex with a woman despite being exclusively androsexual, but I'm not at all confident that I could.
So yes, sex can be non-attractional like pie, but it's more commonly thought of as being strongly attractional. It's that attraction part that my weirdtopia doesn't have. People in my weirdtopia could still enjoy sex, but why would they when they've got pie, I mean wire-heading?
My sexual weirdtopia is that the majority of people self-modify (using some sort of technology) to eliminate their sexual attractions and romantic attractions. They still feel other kinds of love and affection, and they still desire closeness with others. They might choose to enjoy pleasures* as intense as sex together with someone they love, but it's more like people eating delicious pie together; it's not driven by attraction. Sexual and romantic love only remain to a minority of people who chose not to follow the trend.
(*Intense pleasures delivered via a little light wire-heading, perhaps, but not to the level that would cause you to ignore the rest of life.)
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I see no justification for that statement. Perhaps True Patronuses can't take the form of an animal, but that says nothing about what they can look like.
Would a sentient snake wizard say a True Patronus can't look like an ape?
Being a transhumanist, and being good at the kind of mental gymnastics that allowed him to do partial transfiguration, Harry might be able to change his Patronus into any form he likes if he tries hard enough. We know mental stuff can change Patronuses in canon: Tonks' Patronus changed due to her feelings for Lupin, though she didn't do it on purpose.