Formatting note: something seems to have deleted a couple of your time units:

I spent ~1500 working on genuinely original scientific research.

and

which subsumes the 100 old Poincare conjecture,

If Turing oracles are not physically impossible, then we need an explanation for how physics implements an infinite tower of Turing oracle levels. Short of that, I'm going to believe Turing oracles are impossible.

even if we did that doesn't mean it's contradictory, not to the extent that using it you'll "mostly derive paradox theorems and contradictions".

If you start with something undecidable and build on it, you usually find that your results are even more undecidable (require a higher level of Turing oracle). There's also the AIT angle, which says that a true Turing oracle possesses infinite Kolmogorov complexity, and since Shannon entropy is the expected-value of Kolmogorov complexity, and Shannon entropy is closely related to physical entropy... we have strong reason to think that a Turing oracle violates basic thermodynamics.

A hypercomputer is a computer that can deterministically decide the Halting Problem for a Turing machine in finite time. We already know that this is physically impossible.

And unfortunately, most of the FAI work I've seen under the assumption of having a hypercomputer tends to end up along the lines of, "We started by assuming we had a Turing Oracle, and proved that given a second-level Turing Oracle, we can implement UDT with blah blah blah."

This is often what MIRI's "unbounded solutions" research is about: finding ways you could solve FAI if you had a hypercomputer.

Sorry to criticize out of the blue, but I think that's a very bad idea. To wit, "Assume a contradiction, prove False, and ex falso quodlibet." If you start by assuming a hypercomputer and reason mathematically from there, I think you'll mostly derive paradox theorems and contradictions.

The LW Tumblr contingent has a Skype group.

You must be joking. The relevant test is "reading comprehension", and Less Wrong comprehensively failed. This essay says many things with which rationalists would agree, if they had been said differently. But some collective cognitive occlusion has apparently

notices the date

Oh. So you are joking. I guess you got me. looks away Well played, well played.

metatroll is the author of Confessions of a Failed Troll.

Relevant previous LW posts on the A_p distribution and model stability

http://lesswrong.com/lw/igv/probability_knowledge_and_metaprobability/

http://lesswrong.com/lw/h78/estimate_stability/

http://lesswrong.com/lw/hnf/model_stability_in_intervention_assessment/

I just realized that some people object to hedonistic utilitarianism (which I've traditionally favored) on the grounds that "pleasure" and "suffering" are meaningless and ill-defined concepts, whereas I tend to find preference utilitarianism absurd on the grounds that "preference" is a meaningless and ill-defined concept.

This seems to point to a difference in how people's motivational systems appear from the inside: maybe for some, "pleasure" is an obvious, atomic concept which they can constantly observe as driving their behavior, whereas others perceive their own actions as being driven more by something like a "preference" that seems like a coherent and obvious concept to them, and others still don't feel that either of these concepts is particularly central, causing them to disregard utilitarianism. (Of course one may also reject utilitarianism for other reasons.)

I wonder if we'll ever see the "shorter, sadder" ending.

Is the novel content written by you, Eliezer, or others?