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I live in Berlin, but Munich would be fine. Not in June though.
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Ben Goertzel interviews Michael Anissimov regarding existential risk [link]
We’re actually among the stupidest possible species smart enough to launch a civilization.
His last sentence is also problematic- how does he know that with a sample size of one?
Plenty of our ancestors failed to launch a civilisation. Correlated samples, but not really just one data point.
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Ben Goertzel interviews Michael Anissimov regarding existential risk [link]
No. He seems to talk about the species, and not its members.
To answer myself: I am in Nurenberg, with regular visits to Berlin.
I'm sitting in Berlin.
Let's drop abstract truth-seeking for a moment and talk about instrumental values instead.
Believing in causality is useful in a causal world and neutral in an acausal one. Disbelieving in causality is harmful in a causal world and likewise neutral in an acausal one. So, if you assign nonzero credence to the existence of causality (as you implied in a comment above: "why does everybody assume I'm a die-hard believer?"), you'd do better by increasing this credence to 100%, because doing so has positive utility in the causal world (to which you have assigned nonzero credence) and doesn't matter in the acausal one.
Well, if you stipulate that "abstract truth-seeking" has nothing whatsoever to do with my getting along in the world, then you're right I guess.
No such assumption required. For example, if you have 10% credence in your theory, the same 10% says you're defending it by accident. Viewed another way, we have no reason to listen to you if your theory is false and no reason to listen if it's true either. Please apply this logic to your beliefs and update.
Seems to me you're conflating different concepts: "being the reason for" and "being the cause of":
compare what an enemy of determinism could say: "we have no reason to listen to you if your theory is false and no reason to listen if it's true either". Now what?
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Causation as Bias (sort of)
For those who are arguing that a theory of non-causation needn't be considered because it is not predictive, I do not think this is the correct refutation. As spuckblase pointed out in a comment, using the predictive ability to judge the merit of a theory presupposes a causal reality. Fortunately, causal reality is hardly ever challenged.
So what really challenges Hume theory?
In the context of belief in external reality (in the context of considering the intersection of a Hume theory and empiricism), the correct refutation of Hume theory is that while it might be logically conceivable that all the order we see is only chance (like the possibility of flipping heads an infinite number of times), the probability is zero. (ref: Psychohistorian and others.)
However, the general refutation would occur earlier:
Shouldn't we just stop worrying and accept living in a Hume world? Or are there actual arguments in favour of "real" causation?
Yes. There's the problem of order.
What order? If there is no causation, then my observations and perceptions are not causally related to reality. According to Hume non-causation, neurons form spontaneously and memories would not be causally related to the past. However, even my belief in the existence of neurons is not causally related to the actual existence of neurons. I have no reason to believe in the experience of anything other than the thoughts of an instantaneous moment in time.
This theory is indistinguishable from solipsism.
Which I believe is refuted only on the basis of being boring after a while?
Now we're getting to the heart of it. Upvoted. What does it mean to live in a hume world? For example, we would have to accept the existence of non-reducible mental states (everybody here granted the consistency of the theory until now) and take everything on faith. But indeed we cannnot take anything on faith, since we cannot think, if thinking is a causal notion!?
Suppose for the sake of argument we're not living in a hume world, but had massive, perhaps infinite computing power. we could simulate so many hume worlds that there are some with order and inhabitants in them. They would then quasi-think, quasi-feel and make quasi-experiences. Everything happens as if there were necessitating laws governing it, but there aren't. But still, the universe quasi-looks ordered to them.
This theory and solipsism have something in common, but they are distinguishible. solipsism surely is consistent but higly implausible compared to the standard model. But there could be evidence for it. But it is of another sort than the evidence for a hume world. If pigs start to fly, only hume world-theory (HWT from now on) can explain this easily.
Another point not enough discussed so far are evidences for HWT: causal gaps and anomalies in the fabric of the world as we already know it: In a Causal world, how do we properly deal with mental causation, qualia, time travel paradoxes and in general, indeterministic processes? I'm not saying there are no other solutions, but a lot of people think we did not and possibly cannot make progress in these questions, at least in the current framework. But HWT delivers here.
Spuckblase, two things.
First, none of us are being as rude to you as you are to us in this comment alone. If you can't stand the abuse you're getting here, then quit commenting on this post.
Second, we've given this well more than a few minutes' discussion, and you've given us no reason to believe that we misunderstand your theory - you just object to our categorical dismissal of it. I am perfectly willing to believe that the philosophers you discussed this with gave you credit for making an interesting argument - philosophers are generous like that - and for all its faults, your theory is consistent. But around here, interesting is a matter of writing style, and consistent is a sub-minimal requirement: we demand useful. None of us are rationalists just for the lulz - if a theory doesn't help us get what we actually want, it really is of no use to us. And by that standard, any skeptical hypothesis is a waste of time, including your proposed Humeiform worldview, when other hypotheses actually work.
Edit circa 2014: the Slacktivist blog moved (mostly) to a new website - this is the new link to the "sub-minimal requirement" post.
First, none of us are being as rude to you as you are to us in this comment alone. If you can't stand the abuse you're getting here, then quit commenting on this post.
Oh, I can take the abuse, I'm just wondering.
Second, we've given this well more than a few minutes' discussion, and you've given us no reason to believe that we misunderstand your theory
At least at first, I've been given just accusations and incredulous stares.
if a theory doesn't help us get what we actually want, it really is of no use to us
If you want the truth, you have to consider being wrong even about your darlings, say, prediction.
Your theory says you can't cause our beliefs to change and you shouldn't be surprised about it. It also implies that you defend it by accident, not because it's true.
The good news is that you have an obvious upgrade right ahead. Not all of us are so lucky.
Why does everybody assume I'm a die-hard believer in this theory?
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No, later.
I would definitely attend, but not in the first two weekends in August. The 5th is a friday, which may be problematic - at least for some - too. I propose a saturday/sunday meetup later in august. The 20th maybe? End of july would alos be possible.