Arbitrage of prediction markets

6 taw 04 December 2009 10:29PM

I've noticed something very curious on Intrade markets for 2012 Republican Presidential Nominee - Ron Paul gets 3.5% of getting a nomination - a value that's clearly (and spare me EMH here) wishful thinking of Ron Paul supporters more than any genuine estimate.

And this brings me to a question - if prediction markets overestimate chance of winning of some rare case, how can I profit from that? Naively if I know true chance is 1%, I win $3.5 99% of the time, and lose $97.5 1% of the time, for expected payoff of $2.5. But my maximum loss is 39x higher than my expected profit, and I won't be getting any money out of it for three more years.

I'd need to bet significant amount to earn any money out of it, and that would require accepting 39x as high maximum loss. No reasonably prediction market would accept this kind of leverage without some collateral, nor could I get any reasonable loan for it at rates that would make this arbitrage profitable.

The only way I can think of would be convincing someone with plenty of money that I'm right, and have him provide me with collateral for some (probably very high) portion of the payoff. But if results depend on my ability to convince rich people, that's not prediction market! None of this is a problem for people trying to artificially pump estimates for Ron Paul - they'll just take the loss, and write it off as marketing expense.

None of these problems occur if some position is vastly overestimated, like 60% estimate if I know true value to be 40% - this would be a cheap bet - maximum loss of $40 for expected profit of $20, and people who want to pump it need to take about as much risk as people who want to bring it back to the true value, not a lot more.

I'm confused. Is there some nice way to arbitrage this, or is this an inherent weakness of prediction markets and we should only trust positions they pick as leaders, not chances of their long tail?

 

Contrarianism and reference class forecasting

26 taw 25 November 2009 07:41PM

I really liked Robin's point that mainstream scientists are usually right, while contrarians are usually wrong. We don't need to get into details of the dispute - and usually we cannot really make an informed judgment without spending too much time anyway - just figuring out who's "mainstream" lets us know who's right with high probability. It's type of thinking related to reference class forecasting - find a reference class of similar situations with known outcomes, and we get a pretty decent probability distribution over possible outcomes.

Unfortunately deciding what's the proper reference class is not straightforward, and can be a point of contention. If you put climate change scientists in the reference class of "mainstream science", it gives great credence to their findings. People who doubt them can be freely disbelieved, and any arguments can be dismissed by low success rate of contrarianism against mainstream science.

But, if you put climate change scientists in reference class of "highly politicized science", then the chance of them being completely wrong becomes orders of magnitude higher. We have plenty of examples where such science was completely wrong and persisted in being wrong in spite of overwhelming evidence, as with race and IQ, nuclear winter, and pretty much everything in macroeconomics. Chances of mainstream being right, and contrarians being right are not too dissimilar in such cases.

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How to test your mental performance at the moment?

22 taw 23 November 2009 06:35PM

We all have our good days and our bad days. Due to insufficient sleep, illness, stress, distractions, and many other causes we often find ourselves far below our usual levels of mental performance. When we find ourselves in such a state, it's not really worth putting effort in doing many tasks, like programming or long term planning - as quality will suffer a lot.

The problem is - other than observing deterioration of results, I have no idea if I'm in such a state or not. I cannot be sure if it's also true for others, but I had to find out a few tests of what's my mental performance at the moment. Tests that are deeply flawed, so I'd request better if there are any. I also cannot predict my mental state in advance, as my life isn't terribly regular.

The most reliable test I found, and by accident, was fighting bots on a certain Quake 3 map - me vs 10 or so highest difficulty bots. The challenge was to get 50 frags without dying. As the map was huge and full of power ups, it wasn't really that difficult as long as I could maintain full alertness for 10-15 minutes - but if I was tired or distracted, I would invariably fail. This test was unfortunately extremely slow.

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Efficient prestige hypothesis

18 taw 16 November 2009 10:25PM

There's a contrarian theory presented by Robin that people go to highly reputable schools, visit highly reputable hospitals, buy highly reputable brands etc. to affiliate with high status individuals and institutions.

But what would a person who completely didn't care about such affiliations do? Pretty much the same thing. Unless you know a lot about schools, hospitals, and everything else, you're better off simply following prestige as proxy for quality (in addition to price and all the other usual criteria). There's no denying that prestige is better indicator of quality than random chance - the question is - is it the best we can do?

It's possible to come up with alternative measures, which might correlate with quality too, like operation success rates for hospitals, graduation rates for schools etc. But if they really indicated quality that well, wouldn't they be simply included in institution's prestige, and lose their predictive status? The argument is highly analogous to one for efficient market hypothesis (or to some extent with Bayesian beauty contest with schools, as prestige might indicate quality of other students). Very often there are severe faults with alternative measures, like with operation success rates without correcting for patient demographics.

If you postulate that you have better indicator of quality than prestige, you need to do some explaining. Why is it not included in prestige already? I don't propose any magical thinking about prestige, but we shouldn't be as eager to throw it away completely as some seem to be.

Practical rationality in surveys

-2 taw 08 November 2009 02:27PM

"Statistically significant results" mean that there's a 5% chance that results are wrong in addition to chance that the wrong thing was measures, chance that sample was biased, chance that measurement instruments were biased, chance that mistakes were made during analysis, chance that publication bias skewed results, chance that results were entirely made up and so on.

"Not statistically significant results" mean all those, except chance of randomly mistaken results even if everything was ran correct is not 5%, but something else, unknown, and dependent of strength of the effect measured (if the effect is weak, you can have study where chance of false negative is over 99%).

So results being statistically significant or not, is really not that useful.

For example, here's a survey of civic knowledge. Plus or minus 3% measurement error? Not this time, they just completely made up the results.

Take home exercise - what do you estimate Bayesian chance of published results being wrong to be?

Shortness is now a treatable condition

9 taw 20 October 2009 01:13AM

There was some talk here about height taxes, but there's a better solution - redefine shortness as a treatable condition and use HGH to cure it. They even got FDA on board with that, at least for 1.2% shortest people.

Unsatisfactory sexual performance became a treatable condition with Viagra. Depression and hyperactivity became treatable conditions with SSRIs. Being ugly is already almost considered a treatable condition, at least one can get that impression from cosmetic surgery ads. Being overweight is universally considered an illness, even though we don't have too many effective treatment options (surgery is unpopular, and effective drugs like fen-phen and ECA are not officially prescribed any more). If we ever figure out how to increase IQ, you can be certain low IQ will be considered a treatable condition too. Almost everything undesirable gets redefined as an illness as soon as an effective way to fix it is developed.

I welcome these changes. Yes, redefining large parts of normal human variability as illness is a lie, but if that's what society needs to work around its taboos against human enhancement, so be it.

Sociosexual Orientation Inventory, or failing to perform basic sanity checks

3 taw 16 September 2009 10:00AM

I just did some reading about "Sociosexual Orientation Inventory", a simple 7-item test designed to measure one's openness to sex without love and long term commitment.

Here are the questions. How long will it take you to spot the huge problem ahead...

  1. With how many different partners have you had sex (sexual intercourse) within the last year.
  2. How many different partners do you foresee yourself having sex with during the next five years? (Please give a specific, realistic estimate)
  3. With how many different partners have you had sex on one and only one occasion?
  4. How often do (did) you fantasize about having sex with someone other than your current (most recent) dating partner? (1 never ... 8 at least once a day)
  5. "Sex without love is OK" (1 strongly disagree ... 9 stronly agree)
  6. "I can imagine myself being comfortable and enjoying `casual' sex with different partners (1 strongly disagree ... 9 stronly agree)
  7. "I would have to be closely attached to someone (both emotionally and psychologially) before I could feel comfortable and fully enjoy having sex with him or her" (1 strongly disagree ... 9 stronly agree)

Score is: 5 x item1 + 1 x item2 (capped at 30) + 5 x item3 + 4 x item4 + 2 x (mean of item5, item6, and reversed item7)

Do you see the problem already?

Quite predictably, researchers report that men have much higher SOI scores than women in all countries. But the first three questions (ignoring non-1:1 gender ratios, differently biased sampling for different genders, different rates of homosexuality between genders, different behaviour of homosexuals of different genders, 30 partners cap on the second item, differently biased forecasts of the second item and other small details that won't affect the score much) - simply have to be identical for men and women, so the entire difference would have to be explained by items 4 to 7, which have relatively low weights!

The differences between men and women can be really extreme for some countries, Ukraine has 50.79±28.92 (mean±sd) for men, and 17.36±8.65 for women, which means that either Ukrainian men, or Ukrainian women, or both, are notoriously lying when asked about past and future sex partners. In most countries the differences are more moderate, with total 48-country sample's scores being 46.67±29.68 for men, and 27.34±19.55 for women. Latvia leads the way with smallest difference, and so most likely greatest honesty, with 49.42±23.61 for men, and 41.68±26.68 for women, what can be plausibly explained by just differences in attitude. (fake lie detector experiments have shown it's almost exclusively women who are lying when answering questions like that)

SOI seems to be considered quite useful by psychologists, it correlates with many nice things, not only other questionnaires, but country SOI averages correlate with various demographic, economic, and health scores in quite systematic way. Still, I cannot read papers about it without asking myself - why didn't they bother to perform this basic sanity check - which would detect huge number of outright lies in answers. And more importantly - what proportion of "serious science" suffers from problems like that?

References: The 48 country SOI study, fake lie detectors shows which gender lies more.

Notes on utility function experiment

13 taw 05 September 2009 07:10PM

I just finished a two-week experiment of trying to live by a point system. I attached a point value to various actions and events, and made some effort to maximize the score. I cannot say it was successful in making me achieve more than normally during the same period of time, but it made more clear some of the problems with my behaviour.

Here's some notes from my experiment:

  • Points are marginal utilities, they are for things you want to do more of, but don't due to akrasia. If you want to exercise more you'll assign very high value to half an hour of exercise, but that doesn't mean you want to spend 8 hours a day cross-training. As expected, I got most points for thing that weren't that important but I finally got myself to do more.
  • Values can be put on terminal values (results), or instrumental values (effort, and partial results). Valuing only the former tends to be highly demoralizing, valuing the latter tends to be highly encouraging.
  • It's a good idea to assign some points to cleanup of your system (decide against doing something that was previously on your list, get trivial thing off your list). It cleans your mind, even if it doesn't progress your big goals.
  • Another good idea are points for sitting down and thinking, making mindmaps and so on.
  • One big problem that the system didn't cover at all were distractions, like spending too much time on Wikipedia or TvTropes.
  • Another big problem were times when I didn't have enough energy to do anything big, but wasn't sleepy enough to sleep. It's usually pure waste of time.
  • During the first week I was more successful (in terms of points) almost every day, then it went far downhill, perhaps due to my enthusiasm running out. This made me decide against extending the experiment past the original two week schedule.
  • In other words - there was some value to it, but akrasia mostly won again.

Anyone else wants to share their anti-akrasia experiments?

Some counterevidence for human sociobiology

0 taw 29 August 2009 02:08AM

I love seeing counter-evidence for everything. I estimate that while most of my beliefs are true (otherwise I wouldn't believe them in the first place), a small percentage is almost certainly completely false - and I don't really have any reliable way of telling the two apart.

Indiscriminatingly looking for counter-evidence for all of them can be very rewarding - the ones that are true are much more likely to sustain the assault of it than the ones that aren't. Yes, I might ignore counter-evidence of something that's false, or accept it for something that's true, ending up worse off, but it seems plausible that on average it should improve quality of my beliefs.

For example some of the standard beliefs about human sociobiology that seemed to be extremely widely held here are:

  • Men have lower chances of having any kids than women
  • Richer people, especially men, are more likely to have kids, and have more kids

Charting Parenthood: Statistical Portrait of Fathers and Mothers in America disagrees with them.

  • It's true that young men are less likely to have children than young women, but it reverses at old age, and total chance of having children during lifetime is - for people over 45 - 84% for men, and 86% for women. As some of childless men might still have children between 45 and their death (quite a few according to data), but almost no woman will, the difference must get smaller by the time of death, or it might even reverse. This is pretty convincing evidence against a major gender difference in chance of having children, at least as far as modern America is concerned.
  • The chance of having children is highest for people between 100% and 200% of poverty line (poverty line, not median income, these are all poorer than average people). For women going either lower or higher reduces chances of having children considerably. For men getting poorer reduces chance of having children considerably, while getting richer reduces it but only slightly. However - younger people are much more likely to fall below poverty line, and men tend to reproduce later, so even that can easily be an artifact of age-income relationship. The data is fully compatible with both poverty and wealth being negatively correlated with chance of having children in both genders.

These are not direct tests of sociobiological claims, so what we have is not exactly what we would like to, but I find them to be quite convincing counter-evidence. My belief in these sociobiological claims is definitely lower than before, at least as far as they concern modern world, even though I can imagine more focused studies changing my mind back.

More counter-evidence for things we commonly believe here, sociobiological or otherwise, welcomed in comments.

Mathematical simplicity bias and exponential functions

12 taw 26 August 2009 06:34PM

One of biases that are extremely prevalent in science, but are rarely talked about anywhere, is bias towards models that are mathematically simple and easier to operate on. Nature doesn't care all that much for mathematical simplicity. In particular I'd say that as a good first approximation, if you think something fits exponential function of either growth or decay, you're wrong. We got so used to exponential functions and how convenient they are to work with, that we completely forgot the nature doesn't work that way.

But what about nuclear decay, you might be asking now... That's as close you get to real exponential decay as you get... and it's not nowhere close enough. Well, here's a log-log graph of Chernobyl release versus theoretical exponential function, plotted in log-log.

Well, that doesn't look all that exponential... The thing is that even if you have perfect exponential decay processes as with single nucleotide decay, when you start mixing a heterogeneous group of such processes, the exponential character is lost. Early in time faster-decaying cases dominate, then gradually those that decay more slowly, somewhere along the way you might have to deal with results of decay (pure depleted uranium gets more radioactive with time at first, not less, as it decays into low half-life nuclides), and perhaps even some processes you didn't have to consider (like creation of fresh radioactive nuclides via cosmic radiation).

And that's the ideal case of counting how much radiation a sample produces, where the underlying process is exponential by the basic laws of physics - it still gets us orders of magnitude wrong. When you're measuring something much more vague, and with much more complicated underlying mechanisms, like changes in population, economy, or processing power.

According to IMF, world economy in 2008 was worth 69 trillion $ PPP. Assuming 2% annual growth and naive growth models, the entire world economy produces 12 cents PPP worth of value in entire first century. And assuming fairly stable population, an average person in 3150 will produce more that the entire world does now. And with enough time dollar value of one hydrogen atom will be higher than current dollar value of everything on Earth. And of course with proper time discounting of utility, life of one person now is worth more than half of humanity millennium into the future - exponential growth and exponential decay are both equally wrong.

To me they all look like clear artifacts of our growth models, but there are people who are so used to them that they treat predictions like that seriously.

In case you're wondering, here are some estimates of past world GDP.

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