For some time now, "Promoted" has been reserved for articles written by MIRI staff, mostly about MIRI activities.  Which, I suppose, would be reasonable, if this were MIRI's blog.  But it isn't.  MIRI has its own blog.  It seems to me inconvenient both to readers of LessWrong, and to readers of MIRI's blog, to split MIRI's material up between the two.

People visiting lesswrong land on "Promoted", see a bunch of MIRI blogs, mostly written by people who don't read LessWrong themselves much anymore, and get a mistaken impression of what people talk about on LessWrong.  Also, LessWrong looks like a dying site, since often months pass between new posts.

I suggest the default landing page be "New", not "Promoted".

I've put together a list of what I think are the best Yvain (Scott Alexander) posts for new readers, drawing from SlateStarCodex, LessWrong, raikoth.net, and Scott's LiveJournal.

The list should make the most sense to people who start from the top and read through it in order, though skipping around is encouraged too. Rather than making a chronological list, I’ve tried to order things by a mix of "where do I think most people should start reading?" plus "sorting related posts together."

This is a work in progress; you’re invited to suggest things you’d add, remove, or shuffle around. Since many of the titles are a bit cryptic, I'm adding short descriptions. See my blog for a version without the descriptions.

I. Rationality and Rationalization

• Blue- and Yellow-Tinted Choices  ·····  An introduction to context-sensitive biases.
• The Apologist and the Revolutionary  ·····  Do separate brain processes rationalize and question ideas?
• Historical Realism  ·····  When reality is unrealistic.
• Simultaneously Right and Wrong  ·····  On self-handicapping and self-deception.
• You May Already Be A Sinner  ·····  Self-deception in cases where your decisions make no difference.
• Beware the Man of One Study  ·····  On minimum wage laws and cherry-picked evidence.
• Debunked and Well-Refuted  ·····  When should we say that a study has been "debunked"?
• How to Not Lose an Argument  ·····  How to be more persuasive in entrenched arguments.
• The Least Convenient Possible World  ·····  Why it's useful to strengthen arguments you disagree with.
• Bayes for Schizophrenics: Reasoning in Delusional Disorders  ·····  Hypotheses about the role of perception, evidence integration, and priors in delusions.
• Generalizing from One Example  ·····  On the typical mind fallacy: assuming other people are like you.
• Typical Mind and Politics  ·····  Do political disagreements stem from neurological disagreements?

II. Probabilism

• Confidence Levels Inside and Outside an Argument  ·····  Should you believe your own conclusions, when they're extreme?
• Schizophrenia and Geomagnetic Storms  ·····  When bizarre ideas turn out to be true.
• Talking Snakes: A Cautionary Tale  ·····  Should we dismiss all absurd claims?
• Arguments from My Opponent Believes Something  ·····  Ten fully general arguments.
• Statistical Literacy Among Doctors Now Lower Than Chance  ·····  Common errors in probabilistic reasoning.
• Techniques for Probability Estimates  ·····  Six methods for quantifying uncertainty.
• On First Looking into Chapman’s “Pop Bayesianism”  ·····  Reasons Bayesian epistemology may not be trivial.
• Utilitarianism for Engineers  ·····  Are there good-enough heuristics for comparing people's preferences?
• If It’s Worth Doing, It’s Worth Doing with Made-Up Statistics  ·····  The practical value of probabilities.
• Marijuana: Much More Than You Wanted to Know  ·····  Assessing marijuana's costs and benefits.
• Are You a Solar Deity?  ·····  On confirmation bias in the comparative study of religions.
• The "Spot the Fakes" Test  ·····  An approach to testing humanities hypotheses.
• Epistemic Learned Helplessness  ·····  What should we do when bad arguments sound convincing?

III. Science and Doubt

• Google Correlate Does Not Imply Google Causation  ·····  Peculiar correlations between Google search terms.
• Stop Confounding Yourself! Stop Confounding Yourself!  ·····  A correlational study on the effects of bullying.
• Effects of Vertical Acceleration on Wrongness  ·····  On evidence-based medicine.
• 90% Of All Claims About The Problems With Medical Studies Are Wrong  ·····  Is it the case that "90% of medical research is false"?
• Prisons are Built with Bricks of Law and Brothels with Bricks of Religion, But That Doesn’t Prove a Causal Relationship  ·····  Do psychiatric interventions increase suicide risk?
• Noisy Poll Results and the Reptilian Muslim Climatologists from Mars  ·····  Skepticism about poll results.
• Two Dark Side Statistics Papers  ·····  Statistical tricks for creating effects out of nothing.
• Alcoholics Anonymous: Much More Than You Wanted to Know  ·····  Is AA effective for treating alcohol abuse?
• The Control Group Is Out Of Control  ·····  Parapsychology as the "control group" for all of psychology.
• The Cowpox of Doubt  ·····  Focusing on easy questions inoculates against uncertainty.
• The Skeptic's Trilemma  ·····  Explaining mysteries, vs. worshiping them, vs. dismissing them.
• If You Can't Make Predictions, You're Still in a Crisis  ·····  On psychology studies' replication failures.

IV. Medicine, Therapy, and Human Enhancement

• Scientific Freud  ·····  How does psychoanalysis compare to cognitive behavioral therapy?
• Sleep – Now by Prescription  ·····  On melatonin.
• In Defense of Psych Treatment for Attempted Suicide  ·····   Suicide is usually not a rational, informed decision.
• Who By Very Slow Decay  ·····  On old age and death in the medical system.
• Medicine, As Not Seen on TV  ·····  What is it actually like to be a doctor?
• Searching for One-Sided Tradeoffs  ·····  How can we find good ideas that others haven't found first?
• Do Life Hacks Ever Reach Fixation?  ·····  Why aren't there more good ideas that everyone has adopted?
• Polyamory is Boring  ·····  Deromanticizing multi-partner romance.
• Can You Condition Yourself?  ·····  On shaping new habits by rewarding oneself.
• Wirehead Gods on Lotus Thrones  ·····  Is the future boring? Transcendently blissful? Boringly blissful?
• Don’t Fear the Filter  ·····  Does the Fermi Paradox mean that our species is doomed?
• Transhumanist Fables  ·····  Six futurist fairy tales.

V. Introduction to Game Theory

• Backward Reasoning Over Decision Trees  ·····  Sequential games, and why adding options can hurt you.
• Nash Equilibria and Schelling Points  ·····  Simultaneous games, mixed strategies, and coordination.
• Introduction to Prisoners' Dilemma  ·····  Why Nash equilibria are sometimes bad for everyone.
• Real-World Solutions to Prisoners' Dilemmas  ·····  How society and evolution ensure mutual cooperation.
• Interlude for Behavioral Economics  ·····  Fairness, superrationality, and self-image in real-world games.
• What is Signaling, Really?  ·····  Actions that convey information, sometimes at great cost.
• Bargaining and Auctions  ·····  Idealized models of correct bidding.
• Imperfect Voting Systems  ·····  Strengths and weaknesses of different voting systems.
• Game Theory as a Dark Art  ·····  Ways to exploit seemingly "economically rational" behavior.

VI. Promises and Principles

• Beware Trivial Inconveniences  ·····  Small obstacles can have a huge effect on behavior.
• Time and Effort Discounting  ·····  On inconsistencies in our revealed preferences.
• Applied Picoeconomics  ·····  Binding your future self to your present goals.
• Schelling Fences on Slippery Slopes  ·····  Using arbitrary thresholds to improve coordination.
• Democracy is the Worst Form of Government Except for All the Others Except Possibly Futarchy  ·····  Like democracy, futarchy (rule by prediction markets) has the advantage of appearing impartial.
• Eight Short Studies on Excuses  ·····  When should we allow exceptions to our rules?
• Revenge as Charitable Act  ·····  Revenge can be a personally costly way to disincentivize misdeeds.
• Would Your Real Preferences Please Stand Up?  ·····  Are we hypocrites, or just weak-willed?
• Are Wireheads Happy?  ·····  Distinguishing "wanting" something from "liking" it.
• Guilt: Another Gift Nobody Wants  ·····  An evolutionary, signaling-based explanation of guilt.

VII. Cognition and Association

• Diseased Thinking: Dissolving Questions about Disease  ·····  On verbal disagreements.
• The Noncentral Fallacy — The Worst Argument in the World?  ·····  Judging an entire category by an emotional association that only applies to typical category members.
• The Power of Positivist Thinking  ·····  Focus on statements' empirical content.
• When Truth Isn't Enough  ·····  It's possible to agree denotationally while disagreeing connotationally.
• Ambijectivity  ·····  When a question is both subjective and objective.
• The Blue-Minimizing Robot  ·····  A parable on agency.
• Basics of Animal Reinforcement  ·····  A primer on classical and operant conditioning.
• Wanting vs. Liking Revisited  ·····  Distinguishing motivation to act from reinforcement.
• Physical and Mental Behavior  ·····  Behaviorism meets thinking.
• Trivers on Self-Deception  ·····  The conscious mind as a self-serving social narrative.
• Ego-Syntonic Thoughts and Values  ·····  On endorsed vs. non-endorsed mental behavior.
• Approving Reinforces Low-Effort Behaviors  ·····  Using your self-image to blackmail yourself.
• To What Degree Do We Have Goals?  ·····  Are our unconscious drives like an agent?
• The Limits of Introspection  ·····  Are we good at directly perceiving our cognition?
• Secrets of the Eliminati  ·····  Reducing phenomena to simpler parts, vs. eliminating them.
• Tendencies in Reflective Equilibrium  ·····  Aspiring to become more consistent.
• Hansonian Optimism  ·····  If ego-syntonic goals are about signaling, is goodness a lie?

VIII. Doing Good

• Newtonian Ethics  ·····  Satirizing moral parochialism and sloppy systematizations of ethics.
• Efficient Charity: Do Unto Others...  ·····  How should we act when our decisions matter most?
• The Economics of Art and the Art of Economics  ·····  Should Detroit sell its publicly owned artwork?
• A Modest Proposal  ·····  Using dead babies as a unit of currency.
• The Life Issue  ·····  What are the consequences of drone warfare?
• What if Drone Warfare Had Come First?  ·····  A thought experiment.
• Nefarious Nefazodone and Flashy Rare Side-Effects  ·····  On choosing between drug side-effects.
• The Consequentialism FAQ  ·····  Argues for assessing actions based on how they help or harm people.
• Doing Your Good Deed for the Day  ·····  Doing some good can reduce people's willingness to do more good.
• I Myself Am A Scientismist  ·····  Why apply scientific methods to non-scientific domains?
• Whose Utilitarianism?  ·····  Questioning the objectivity and uniqueness of utilitarianism.
• Book Review: After Virtue  ·····  On virtue ethics, a reaction against modern moral philosophy.
• Read History of Philosophy Backwards  ·····  Historical texts reveal our implicit assumptions.
• Virtue Ethics: Not Practically Useful Either  ·····  Is virtue ethics useful prescriptively or descriptively?
• Last Thoughts on Virtue Ethics  ·····  What claims do virtue ethicists make?
• Proving Too Much  ·····  If an argument sometimes proves falsehoods, it can't be valid.

IX. Liberty

• The Non-Libertarian FAQ (aka Why I Hate Your Freedom)
• A Blessing in Disguise, Albeit a Very Good Disguise
• Basic Income Guarantees
• Book Review: The Nurture Assumption
• The Death of Wages is Sin
• Thank You For Doing Something Ambiguously Between Smoking And Not Smoking
• Lies, Damned Lies, and Facebook (Part 1 of ∞)
• The Life Cycle of Medical Ideas
• Vote on Values, Outsource Beliefs
• A Something Sort of Like Left-Libertarian-ist Manifesto
• Plutocracy Isn’t About Money
• Against Tulip Subsidies
• SlateStarCodex Gives a Graduation Speech

X. Progress

• Intellectual Hipsters and Meta-Contrarianism
• A Signaling Theory of Class x Politics Interaction
• Reactionary Philosophy in an Enormous, Planet-Sized Nutshell
• A Thrive/Survive Theory of the Political Spectrum
• We Wrestle Not With Flesh And Blood, But Against Powers And Principalities
• Poor Folks Do Smile… For Now
• Apart from Better Sanitation and Medicine and Education and Irrigation and Public Health and Roads and Public Order, What Has Modernity Done for Us?
• The Wisdom of the Ancients
• Can Atheists Appreciate Chesterton?
• Holocaust Good for You, Research Finds, But Frequent Taunting Causes Cancer in Rats
• Public Awareness Campaigns
• Social Psychology is a Flamethrower
• Nature is Not a Slate. It’s a Series of Levers.
• The Anti-Reactionary FAQ
• The Poor You Will Always Have With You
• Proposed Biological Explanations for Historical Trends in Crime
• Society is Fixed, Biology is Mutable

XI. Social Justice

• Practically-a-Book Review: Dying to be Free
• Drug Testing Welfare Users is a Sham, But Not for the Reasons You Think
• The Meditation on Creepiness
• The Meditation on Superweapons
• The Meditation on the War on Applause Lights
• The Meditation on Superweapons and Bingo
• An Analysis of the Formalist Account of Power Relations in Democratic Societies
• Arguments About Male Violence Prove Too Much
• Social Justice for the Highly-Demanding-of-Rigor
• Against Bravery Debates
• All Debates Are Bravery Debates
• A Comment I Posted on “What Would JT Do?”
• We Are All MsScribe
• The Spirit of the First Amendment
• A Response to Apophemi on Triggers
• Lies, Damned Lies, and Social Media: False Rape Accusations
• In Favor of Niceness, Community, and Civilization

XII. Politicization

• Right is the New Left
• Weak Men are Superweapons
• You Kant Dismiss Universalizability
• I Can Tolerate Anything Except the Outgroup
• Five Case Studies on Politicization
• Black People Less Likely
• Nydwracu’s Fnords
• All in All, Another Brick in the Motte
• Ethnic Tension and Meaningless Arguments
• Race and Justice: Much More Than You Wanted to Know
• Framing for Light Instead of Heat
• The Wonderful Thing About Triggers
• Fearful Symmetry
• Archipelago and Atomic Communitarianism

XIII. Competition and Cooperation

• Galactic Core
• Book Review: The Two-Income Trap
• Just for Stealing a Mouthful of Bread
• Meditations on Moloch
• Misperceptions on Moloch
• The Invisible Nation — Reconciling Utilitarianism and Contractualism
• Freedom on the Centralized Web
• Book Review: Singer on Marx
• Does Class Warfare Have a Free Rider Problem?
• Book Review: Red Plenty

If you liked these posts and want more, I suggest browsing the SlateStarCodex archives.

My future posts

I have been living in the lesswrong rationality space for at least two years now. Recently more active than previously. This has been deliberate. I plan to make more serious active posts in the future. In saying so I wanted to announce the posts I intend on making when moving forwards from today.  This should do a few things:

1. keep me on track
2. keep me accountable to me more than anyone else
3. keep me accountable to others
4. allow others to pick which they would like to be created sooner
5. allow other people to volunteer to create/collaborate on these topics
6. allow anyone to suggest more topics
7. meta: this post should help to demonstrate one person's method of developing rationality content and the time it takes to do that.

Unpublished but written:

A very long list of sleep maintenance suggestions – I wrote up all the ideas I knew of; there are about 150 or so; worth reviewing just to see if you can improve your sleep because the difference in quality of life with good sleep is a massive change. (20mins to write an intro Actually 2 hours)

A list of techniques to help you remember names. - remembering names is a low-hanging social value fruit that can improve many of your early social interactions with people. I wrote up a list of techniques to help. (2.5hrs to get feedback on and post)

Posts so far:

The null result: a magnetic ring wearing experiment. - a fun one; about how wearing magnetic rings was cool; but not imparting of superpowers. (done)

Updated here (old: list of useful apps)- my current list of apps that I use also some very good suggestions in the comments. (done)

How to learn X – How to attack a problem of learning a new area that you don't know a lot about (for a generic thing) (done)

A list of common human goals – when plotting out goals that matter to you; so you can look over some common ones and see you fulfilling them interests you. (done)

Lesswrong real time chat - A Slack channel for hanging out with other rationalists.  Also where I talk about my latest posts before I put them up.

Future posts

Goals of your lesswrong group – Do you have a local group; why? What do you want out of it (do people know)? setting goals, doing something particularly, having fun anyway, changing your mind. (4hrs)

Goals interrogation + Goal levels – Goal interrogation is about asking <is this thing I want to do actually a goal of mine> and <is this the best way to achieve that>, goal levels are something out of Sydney Lesswrong that help you have mutual long term goals and supporting short term goal. (2hrs)

How to human – A zero to human guide. A guide for basic functionality of a humanoid system. (4hrs)

General buying things considerations – New to the whole adult thing?  wondering what to ask yourself when considering purchases?  Here is a list of general considerations. (3hrs)

List of strategies for getting shit done – working around the limitations of your circumstances and understanding what can get done with the resources you have at hand. (4hrs)

List of superpowers and kryptonites – when asking the question "what are my superpowers?" and "what are my kryptonites?". Knowledge is power; working with your powers and working out how to avoid your kryptonites is a method to improve yourself. (6hrs over a week)

List of effective behaviours – small life-improving habits that add together to make awesomeness from nothing. And how to pick them up. (8hrs over 2 weeks)

Memory and notepads – writing notes as evidence, the value of notes (they are priceless) and what you should do. (1hr + 1hr over a week)

Suicide prevention checklist – feeling off? You should have already outsourced the hard work for "things I should check on about myself" to your past self. Make it easier for future you. Especially in the times that you might be vulnerable. (4hrs)

Make it easier for future you. Especially in the times that you might be vulnerable. - as its own post in curtailing bad habits. (5hrs)

A p=np approach to learning – Sometimes you have to learn things the long way; but sometimes there is a short cut. Where you could say, "I wish someone had just taken me on the easy path early on". It's not a perfect idea; but start looking for the shortcuts where you might be saying "I wish someone had told me". Of course my line now is, "but I probably wouldn't have listened anyway" which is something that can be worked on as well. (2hrs)

Rationalists guide to dating – attraction. Relationships. Doing things with a known preference. Don't like stupid people? Don't try to date them. Think first; an exercise in thinking hard about things before trying trial-and-error on the world. (half written, needs improving 2hrs)

Training inherent powers (weights, temperatures, smells, estimation powers) – practice makes perfect right? Imagine if you knew the temperature always, the weight of things by lifting them, the composition of foods by tasting them, the distance between things without measuring. How can we train these, how can we improve. (2hrs)

Strike to the heart of the question. The strongest one; not the one you want to defeat – Steelman not Strawman. Don't ask "how do I win at the question"; ask, "am I giving the best answer to the best question I can give", (2hrs)

Posts not planned at the original writing of the post:

Sensory perception differences and how it shapes personal experience - Is a sound as loud to you as everyone else?  What about a picture?  Are colours as clear and vivid to you as they are to other people?  This post is a consideration in whether the individual difference in experiences can shape our experience and choices in how we live our lives.  Includes some short exercises in sensory perceptions.

Posts added to the list:

Exploration-Exploitation and a method of applying the secretary problem to real life.  I devised a rough equation for application of the secretary problem to real life dating and the exploration-exploitation dilemma.

How to approach a new problem - similar to the "How to solve X" post.  But considerations for working backwards from a wicked problem: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wicked_problem, as well as trying "The least bad solution I know of", Murphy-jitsu, and known solutions to similar problems.  0. I notice I am approaching a problem.

being the kind of person that advice works for - The same words of advice can work for someone and not someone else.  Consider why that is; and how you can better understand the advice that you are given, and how you might become the kind of person that advice works for.

New Year's Resolutions: Things worth considering - At the time of writing; New-year is fast approaching.  As a natural shelling point here is a list of considerations on what you might like to get around to doing next year.  (Not a post on how; only about making those considerations)

2015: a year in review - All of humanities science and technology milestones that I could find; gathered into one exciting list; originally created for the solstice, but now everyone can share it and celebrate in humanities successes!

Inbox zero - You should do inbox zero; this is a brief guide on how to do the laziest form of inbox zero I know of.

Procrastination checklist - a process to go through to try to break out of procrastination

Black box thinking - A way to describe known unknowns, or excuse yourself from knowing things

Preference over preference - If an entity has preference, and an entity prefers another entity to have a particular preference, I call this preference over preference.  And it's worth talking about.

Cultivate the desire to X - You maybe want to do a thing; maybe don't know if you do.  There is a helpful middle ground.  You want to do the thing; but don't seem to have actually managed to make yourself do it?  Try this.

Purposeful Anti-Rush - Instrumental process of slowing down.

Lesswrong potential changes - Everything that everyone things should change about lesswrong.  All compiled together, it took a long time to create.

The lesswrong 2016 survey - the demographic survey of lesswrong users and visitors. 

A very quick values exercise - A value is like a direction - you go north, or south. You may hit goal mountains and hang a right past that tree but you still want to be going north. Specifically you may want to lose weight on the way to being healthy, but being healthy is what you value.

Adversity to success - Why are there so many adversity to success stories?

Edit: links adding as I write them.

I bought a plastic mat to put underneath my desk chair, to protect the wooden floor from having bits of stone ground into it by the chair wheels. But it kept sliding when I stepped onto it, nearly sending me stumbling into my large, expensive, and fragile monitor. I decided to replace the mat as soon as I found a better one.

Before I found a better one, though, I realized I wasn't sliding on it anymore. My footsteps had adjusted themselves to it.

Over and over again, someones says that living for a very long time would be a bad thing, and then some futurist tries to persuade them that their reasoning is faulty.  They tell them that they think that way now, but they'll change their minds when they're older.

The thing is, I don't see that happening.  I live in a small town full of retirees, and those few I've asked about it are waiting for death peacefully.  When I ask them about their ambitions, or things they still want to accomplish, they have none.

Suppose that people mean what they say.  Why do they want to die?

Related: Diplomacy as a Game Theory Laboratory by Yvain.

I've been floating this idea around for a while, and there was enough interest to organize it.

Diplomacy is a board game of making and breaking alliances. It is a semi-iterative prisoner's dilemma with 7 prisoners. The rules are very simple, there is no luck factor and any tactical tricks can be learned quickly. You play as one of the great powers in pre-WW1 Europe, and your goal is to dominate over half of the board. To do this, you must negotiate alliances with the other players, and then stab them at the most opportune moment. But beware, if you are too stabby, no one will trust you. And if you are too trusting, you will get stabbed yourself.

If you have never played the game, don't worry. It is really quick to pick up. I explain the rules in detail here.

The game will (most likely) be played at webdiplomacy.net. You need an account, which requires a valid email. To play the game, you will need to spend at least 10 minutes every phase (3 days) to enter your orders. In the meantime, you will be negotiating with other players. That takes as much as you want it to, but I recommend setting away at least 30 minutes per day (in 5-minute quantums). A game usually lasts about 10 in-game years, which comes down to 30-something phases (60-90 days). A phase can progress early if everyone agrees. Likewise, the game can be paused indefinitely if everyone agrees (e.g. if a player will not have Internet access).

Joining a game is Serious Business, as missing a deadline can spoil it for the other 6 players. Please apply iff:

1. You will be able to access the game for 10 minutes every 3 days (90% certainty required)
2. If 1) changes, you will be able to let the others know at least 1 day in advance (95% certainty required)
3. You will be able to spend an average of 30 minutes per day (standard normal distribution)
4. You will not hold an out-of-game grudge against a player who stabbed you (adjusting for stabbyness in potential future games is okay)

If you still wish to play, please sign up in the comments. Please specify the earliest time it would suit you for the game to start. If we somehow get more than 7 players, we'll discuss our options (play a variant with more players, multiple games, etc).

See also: First game of LW Diplomacy

Well, the interest is there, so I've set up two games.

Game 1: http://webdiplomacy.net/board.php?gameID=164863  (started!)

Game 2: http://webdiplomacy.net/board.php?gameID=164912  (started! First phase will be extended to end on the 4th of August)

Password: clippy

Please note a couple important rules of the webdiplomacy.net website:

1. You can only have one account. If you are caught with multiple accounts, they will all be banned.
2. You may not blame your moves on the website bugs as a diplomacy tactic. This gives the site's mods extra work to do when someone actually reports the bug.
3. Should go without saying, but you are not allowed to illegally access another player's account (i.e. hacking).

A putative new idea for AI control; index here.

In a previous post, I looked at unnatural concepts such as grue (green if X was true, blue if it was false) and bleen. This was to enable one to construct the natural categories that extend AI behaviour, something that seemed surprisingly difficult to do.

The basic idea discussed in the grue post was that the naturalness of grue and bleen seemed dependent on features of our universe - mostly, that it was easy to tell whether an object was "currently green" without knowing what time it was, but we could not know whether the object was "currently grue" without knowing the time.

So the naturalness of the category depended on the type of evidence we expected to find. Furthermore, it seemed easier to discuss whether a category is natural "given X", rather than whether that category is natural in general. However, we know the relevant X in the AI problems considered so far, so this is not a problem.

Natural category, probability flows

Fix a boolean random variable X, and assume we want to check whether the boolean random variable Z is a natural category, given X.

If Z is natural (for instance, it could be the colour of an object, while X might be the brightness), then we expect to uncover two types of evidence:

• those that change our estimate of X; this causes probability to "flow" as follows (or in the opposite directions):

• ...and those that change our estimate of Z:

Or we might discover something that changes our estimates of X and Z simultaneously. If the probability flows to X and and Z in the same proportions, we might get:

What is an example of an unnatural category? Well, if Z is some sort of grue/bleen-like object given X, then we can have Z = X XOR Z', for Z' actually a natural category. This sets up the following probability flows, which we would not want to see:

More generally, Z might be constructed so that X∧Z, X∧¬Z, ¬X∧Z and ¬X∧¬Z are completely distinct categories; in that case, there are more forbidden probability flows:

and

In fact, there are only really three "linearly independent" probability flows, as we shall see.

Less pictures, more math

Let's represent the four possible state of affairs by four weights (not probabilities):

Since everything is easier when it's linear, let's set w₁₁ = log(P(X∧Z)) and similarly for the other weights (we neglect cases where some events have zero probability). Weights are correspond to the same probabilities iff you get from one set to another by multiplying by a strictly positive number. For logarithms, this corresponds to adding the same constant to all the log-weights. So we can normalise our log-weights (select a single set of representative log-weights for each possible probability sets) by choosing the w such that

w₁₁ + w₁₂ + w₂₁ + w₂₂ = 0.

Thus the probability "flows" correspond to adding together two such normalised 2x2 matrices, one for the prior and one for the update. Composing two flows means adding two change matrices to the prior.

Four variables, one constraint: the set of possible log-weights is three dimensional. We know we have two allowable probability flows, given naturalness: those caused by changes to P(X), independent of P(Z), and vice versa. Thus we are looking for a single extra constraint to keep Z natural given X.

A little thought reveals that we want to keep constant the quantity:

w₁₁ + w₂₂ - w₁₂ - w₂₁.

This preserves all the allowed probability flows and rules out all the forbidden ones. Translating this back to a the general case, let "e" be the evidence we find. Then if Z is a natural category given X and the evidence e, the following quantity is the same for all possible values of e:

log[P(X∧Z|e)*P(¬X∧¬Z|e) / P(X∧¬Z|e)*P(¬X∧Z|e)].

If E is a random variable representing the possible values of e, this means that we want

log[P(X∧Z|E)*P(¬X∧¬Z|E) / P(X∧¬Z|E)*P(¬X∧Z|E)]

to be constant, or, equivalently, seeing the posterior probabilities as random variables dependent on E:

• Variance{log[ P(X∧Z|E)*P(¬X∧¬Z|E) / P(X∧¬Z|E)*P(¬X∧Z|E) ]} = 0.

Call that variance the XE-naturalness measure. If it is zero, then Z defines a XE-natural category. Note that this does not imply that Z and X are independent, or independent conditional on E. Just that they are, in some sense, "equally (in)dependent whatever E is".

Almost natural category

The advantage of that last formulation becomes visible when we consider that the evidence which we uncover is not, in the real world, going to perfectly mark Z as natural, given X. To return to the grue example, though most evidence we uncover about an object is going to be the colour or the time rather than some weird combination, there is going to be somebidy who will right things like "either the object is green, and the sun has not yet set in the west; or instead perchance, those two statements are both alike in falsity". Upon reading that evidence, if we believe it in the slightest, the variance can no longer be zero.

Thus we cannot expect that the above XE-naturalness be perfectly zero, but we can demand that it be low. How low? There seems no principled way of deciding this, but we can make one attempt: that we cannot lower it be decomposing Z.

What do we mean by that? Well, assume that Z is a natural category, given X and the expected evidence, but Z' is not. Then we can define a new category boolean Y to be Z with high probability, and Z' otherwise. This will still have low XE-naturalness measure (as Z does) but is obviously not ideal.

Reversing this idea, we say Z defines a "XE-almost natural category" if there is no "more XE-natural" category that extends X∧Z (and the other for conjunctions). Technically, if

X∧Z = X∧Y,

Then Y must have equal or greater XE-naturalness measure to Z. And similarly for X∧¬Z, ¬X∧Z, and ¬X∧¬Z.

Note: I am somewhat unsure about this last definition; the concept I want to capture is clear (Z is not the combination of more XE-natural subvariables), but I'm not certain the definition does it.

Beyond boolean

What if Z takes n values, rather than being a boolean? This can be treated simply.

If we set the w_jk to be log-weights as before, there are 2n free variables. The normalisation constraint is that they all sum to a constant. The "permissible" probability flows are given by flows from X to ¬X (adding a constant to the first column, subtracting it from the second) and pure changes in Z (adding constants to various rows, summing to 0). There are 1+ (n-1) linearly independent ways of doing this.

Therefore we are looking for 2n-1 -(1+(n-1))=n-1 independent constraints to forbid non-natural updating of X and Z. One basis set for these constraints could be to keep constant the values of

w_j1 + w_(j+1)2 - w_j2 - w_(j+1)1,

where j ranges between 1 and n-1.

This translates to variance constraints of the type:

• Variance{log[ P(X∧{Z=j}|E)*P(¬X∧{Z=j+1}|E) / P(X∧{Z=j+1}|E)*P(¬X∧{Z=j}|E) ]} = 0.

But those are n different possible variances. What is the best global measure of XE-naturalness? It seems it could simply be

• Max_jk Variance{log[ P(X∧{Z=j}|E)*P(¬X∧{Z=k}|E) / P(X∧{Z=k}|E)*P(¬X∧{Z=j}|E) ]} = 0.

If this quantity is zero, it naturally sends all variances to zero, and, when not zero, is a good candidate for the degree of XE-naturalness of Z.

The extension to the case where X takes multiple values is straightforward:

• Max_jklm Variance{log[ P({X=l}∧{Z=j}|E)*P({X=m}∧{Z=k}|E) / P({X=l}∧{Z=k}|E)*P({X=m}∧{Z=j}|E) ]} = 0.

Note: if ever we need to compare the XE-naturalness of random variables taking different numbers of values, it may become necessary to divide these quantities by the number of variables involved, or maybe substitute a more complicated expression that contains all the different possible variances, rather than simply the maximum.

And in practice?

In the next post, I'll look at using this in practice for an AI, to evade presidential deaths and deflect asteroids.

First post here, and I'm disagreeing with something in the main sequences.  Hubris acknowledged, here's what I've been thinking about.  It comes from the post "Are your enemies innately evil?":

On September 11th, 2001, nineteen Muslim males hijacked four jet airliners in a deliberately suicidal effort to hurt the United States of America.  Now why do you suppose they might have done that?  Because they saw the USA as a beacon of freedom to the world, but were born with a mutant disposition that made them hate freedom?

Realistically, most people don't construct their life stories with themselves as the villains.  Everyone is the hero of their own story.  The Enemy's story, as seen by the Enemy, is not going to make the Enemy look bad.  If you try to construe motivations that would make the Enemy look bad, you'll end up flat wrong about what actually goes on in the Enemy's mind.

If I'm misreading this, please correct me, but the way I am reading this is:

1) People do not construct their stories so that they are the villains,

therefore

2) the idea that Al Qaeda is motivated by a hatred of American freedom is false.

Reading the Al Qaeda document released after the attacks called Why We Are Fighting You you find the following:

What are we calling you to, and what do we want from you?

1.  The first thing that we are calling you to is Islam.

A.  The religion of tahwid; of freedom from associating partners with Allah Most High , and rejection of such blasphemy; of complete love for Him, the Exalted; of complete submission to his sharia; and of the discarding of all the opinions, orders, theories, and religions that contradict with the religion He sent down to His Prophet Muhammad.  Islam is the religion of all the prophets and makes no distinction between them. 

It is to this religion that we call you …

2.  The second thing we call you to is to stop your oppression, lies, immorality and debauchery that has spread among you.

A.  We call you to be a people of manners, principles, honor and purity; to reject the immoral acts of fornication, homosexuality, intoxicants, gambling and usury.

We call you to all of this that you may be freed from the deceptive lies that you are a great nation, which your leaders spread among you in order to conceal from you the despicable state that you have obtained.

B.  It is saddening to tell you that you are the worst civilization witnessed in the history of mankind:

i.  You are the nation who, rather than ruling through the sharia of Allah, chooses to invent your own laws as you will and desire.  You separate religion from you policies, contradicting the pure nature that affirms absolute authority to the Lord your Creator….

ii.  You are the nation that permits usury…

iii.   You are a nation that permits the production, spread, and use of intoxicants.  You also permit drugs, and only forbid the trade of them, even though your nation is the largest consumer of them.

iv.  You are a nation that permits acts of immorality, and you consider them to be pillars of personal freedom.  

"Freedom" is of course one of those words.  It's easy enough to imagine an SS officer saying indignantly: "Of course we are fighting for freedom!  For our people to be free of Jewish domination, free from the contamination of lesser races, free from the sham of democracy..."

If we substitute the symbol with the substance though, what we mean by freedom - "people to be left more or less alone, to follow whichever religion they want or none, to speak their minds, to try to shape society's laws so they serve the people" - then Al Qaeda is absolutely inspired by a hatred of freedom.  They wouldn't call it "freedom", mind you, they'd call it "decadence" or "blasphemy" or "shirk" - but the substance is what we call "freedom".

Returning to the syllogism at the top, it seems to be that there is an unstated premise.  The conclusion "Al Qaeda cannot possibly hate America for its freedom because everyone sees himself as the hero of his own story" only follows if you assume that What is heroic, what is good, is substantially the same for all humans, for a liberal Westerner and an Islamic fanatic.

(for Americans, by "liberal" here I mean the classical sense that includes just about everyone you are likely to meet, read or vote for.  US conservatives say they are defending the American revolution, which was broadly in line with liberal principles - slavery excepted, but since US conservatives don't support that, my point stands).

When you state the premise baldly like that, you can see the problem.  There's no contradiction in thinking that Muslim fanatics think of themselves as heroic precisely for being opposed to freedom, because they see their heroism as trying to extend the rule of Allah - Shariah - across the world.

Now to the point - we all know the phrase "thinking outside the box".  I submit that if you can recognize the box, you've already opened it.  Real bias isn't when you have a point of view you're defending, but when you cannot imagine that another point of view seriously exists.

That phrasing has a bit of negative baggage associated with it, that this is just a matter of pigheaded close-mindedness.  Try thinking about it another way.  Would you say to someone with dyscalculia "You can't get your head around the basics of calculus?  You are just being so close minded!"  No, that's obviously nuts.  We know that different peoples minds work in different ways, that some people can see things others cannot. 

Orwell once wrote about the British intellectuals inability to "get" fascism, in particular in his essay on H.G. Wells.  He wrote that the only people who really understood the nature and menace of fascism were either those who had felt the lash on their backs, or those who had a touch of the fascist mindset themselves.  I suggest that some people just cannot imagine, cannot really believe, the enormous power of faith, of the idea of serving and fighting and dying for your god and His prophet.  It is a kind of thinking that is just alien to many.

Perhaps this is resisted because people think that "Being able to think like a fascist makes you a bit of a fascist".  That's not really true in any way that matters - Orwell was one of the greatest anti-fascist writers of his time, and fought against it in Spain. 

So - if you can see the box you are in, you can open it, and already have half-opened it.  And if you are really in the box, you can't see the box.  So, how can you tell if you are in a box that you can't see versus not being in a box?  

The best answer I've been able to come up with is not to think of "box or no box" but rather "open or closed box".  We all work from a worldview, simply because we need some knowledge to get further knowledge.  If you know you come at an issue from a certain angle, you can always check yourself.  You're in a box, but boxes can be useful, and you have the option to go get some stuff from outside the box.

The second is to read people in other boxes.  I like steelmanning, it's an important intellectual exercise, but it shouldn't preclude finding actual Men of Steel - that is, people passionately committed to another point of view, another box, and taking a look at what they have to say.  

Now you might say: "But that's steelmanning!"  Not quite.  Steelmanning is "the art of addressing the best form of the other person’s argument, even if it’s not the one they presented."  That may, in some circumstances, lead you to make the mistake of assuming that what you think is the best argument for a position is the same as what the other guy thinks is the best argument for his position.  That's especially important if you are addressing a belief held by a large group of people.

Again, this isn't to run down steelmanning - the practice is sadly limited, and anyone who attempts it has gained a big advantage in figuring out how the world is.  It's just a reminder that the steelman you make may not be quite as strong as the steelman that is out to get you.  

[EDIT: Link included to the document that I did not know was available online before now]

Sean Carroll, physicist and proponent of Everettian Quantum Mechanics, has just posted a new article going over some of the common objections to EQM and why they are false. Of particular interest to us as rationalists:

Now, MWI certainly does predict the existence of a huge number of unobservable worlds. But it doesn’t postulate them. It derives them, from what it does postulate. And the actual postulates of the theory are quite simple indeed:

1. The world is described by a quantum state, which is an element of a kind of vector space known as Hilbert space.
2. The quantum state evolves through time in accordance with the Schrödinger equation, with some particular Hamiltonian.

That is, as they say, it. Notice you don’t see anything about worlds in there. The worlds are there whether you like it or not, sitting in Hilbert space, waiting to see whether they become actualized in the course of the evolution. Notice, also, that these postulates are eminently testable — indeed, even falsifiable! And once you make them (and you accept an appropriate “past hypothesis,” just as in statistical mechanics, and are considering a sufficiently richly-interacting system), the worlds happen automatically.

Given that, you can see why the objection is dispiritingly wrong-headed. You don’t hold it against a theory if it makes some predictions that can’t be tested. Every theory does that. You don’t object to general relativity because you can’t be absolutely sure that Einstein’s equation was holding true at some particular event a billion light years away. This distinction between what is postulated (which should be testable) and everything that is derived (which clearly need not be) seems pretty straightforward to me, but is a favorite thing for people to get confused about.

Very reminiscent of the quantum physics sequence here! I find that this distinction between number of entities and number of postulates is something that I need to remind people of all the time.

META: This is my first post; if I have done anything wrong, or could have done something better, please tell me!

diegocaleiro wrote:

I'm tired of people never, ever, ever, EVER stopping 2 hours to 1) Think of what their goals are 2)Checking if their current path leads to desired goals 3)Correcting course and 4)Creating a system to verify, in the future, whether goals are being achieved. I'm really tired of that. Really.

... so we may want to remind and encourage each other to do so, and exchange tips!

• Have you thought about your life goals recently?
• Do you know what your long-term and medium-term goals are?
• If you're facing big problems or annoyances, have you thought of ways of solving them?
• Do you have a system you use regularly that pushes you in the right direction?

See also: Humans are not automatically strategic, levels of action.