I was reading the "Professing and Cheering" article and it reminded me about some of my own ideas about the role of religious dogma as group identity badges. Here's the gist of it:
Religious and other dogmas need not make sense. Indeed, they may work better if they are not logical. Logical and useful ideas pop-up independently and spread easily, and widely accepted ideas are not very good badges. You need a unique idea to identify your group. It helps to have a somewhat costly idea as a dogma, because they are hard to fake and hard to deny. People would need to invest in these bad ideas, so they would be less likely to leave the group and confront the sunk cost. Also, it's harder to deny allegiance to the group afterwards, because no one in their right minds would accept an idea that bad for any other reason.
If you have a naive interpretation of the dogma, which regards it as an objective statement about the world, you will tend to question it. When you’re contesting the dogma, people won’t judge your argument on its merits: they will look at it as an in-group power struggle. Either you want to install your own dogma, which makes you a pretender, or you’re accepted a competing dogma, which makes you a traitor. Even if they accept that you just don’t want to yield to the authority behind the dogma, that makes you a rebel. Dogmas are just off-limits to criticism.
Public display of dismissive attitude to your questioning is also important. Taking it into consideration is in itself a form of treason, as it is interpreted as entertaining the option of joining you against the authority. So it’s best to dismiss the heresy quickly and loudly, without thinking about it.
Do you know of some other texts which shed some light on this idea?
Well -- there's also the human habit of skimming over text to extract the "useful" information -- especially in timed tests or where we believe the text extraneous to the actual function. Word problems are pretty much always an exercise in "these words are an obstacle between me and the formula". So it stands to reason -- superficially that is -- that making it harder to read the font (without increasing the difficulty of the language) would act as a "counterbalance" to the impetus to get done as quickly as possible with the verbal and on to the mathematical.
In other words; I'm asserting a hypothesis that this is illustrating an underlying mechanism regarding how test-takers handle reading their examination questions.
Is it "more rational" to spend more time on the exam question? Perhaps. (Almost definitely, since doing so increases their scores as shown here.) But then we have to ask what the actual goal of test-takers is at the time of taking the exam. Is it truly to "get the highest score"? Or is it "avoid the greatest amount of anxiety this exam produces in me {where 'me'='person taking the test'}"? Very often I have found the latter to be the case -- but I would suspect that this is hardly irrational; those individuals frequently aren't much invested in higher exam scores than are necessary to achieve a passing score. Getting the exam done quicker without falling below that score, then, is the rationally optimum resolution.
Hence my doubt as to whether it would be called a "rational" behavior over a "necessary" one.
I guess I'm confused about your use of the word "necessary".
But you're right. What is the motivation of the test-taker? How much are they trying to get the answers right and how much they want to "just get it over with"? At least part of the cognitive system is lazy/avoidant, but it doesn't seem that test-takers consciously think "I'll just write down the first answer that comes to mind".
But the real question is this: when they read the smaller text, do they feel less anxiety? Probably not. Then, maybe solving the problem requires less effort once you have spent more time at reading the question. But take a look at the CRT: to me, it seems that problems are clear any way you read them.