Comment author: hairyfigment 02 October 2016 01:33:56AM 0 points [-]

I am strongly disagreeing with you. The cultures that existed on Earth for tens of millenia or more were recognizably human; one of them built an LHC "eventually", but any number of chance factors could have prevented this. Like I just said, modern science started with an extreme outlier.

Comment author: wafflepudding 02 October 2016 09:04:04AM 0 points [-]

Gotcha. So, assuming that the actual Isaac Newton didn't rise to prominence*, are you thinking that human life would usually end before his equivalent came around and the ball got rolling? Most of our existential risks are manmade AFAICT. Or you think that we'd tend to die in between him and when someone in a position to build the LHC had the idea to build the LHC? Granted, him being "in a position to build the LHC" is conditional on things like a supportive surrounding population, an accepting government, etcetera; but these things are ephemeral on the scale of centuries.

To summarize, yes, some chance factor would def prevent us from building the LHC as the exact time we did, but with a lot of time to spare, some other chance factor would prime us to build it somewhen else. Building the LHC just seems to me like the kind of thing we do. (And if we die from some other existential risk before Hadron Colliding (Largely), that's outside the bounds of what I was originally responding to, because no one who died would find himself in a universe at all.)

*Not that I'm condoning this idea that Newton started science.

Comment author: hairyfigment 29 September 2016 10:15:19PM 0 points [-]

...As I pointed out recently in another context, humans have existed for tens of thousands of years or more. Even civilization existed for millenia before obvious freak Isaac Newton started modern science. Your position is a contender for the nuttiest I've read today.

Possibly it could be made better by dropping this talk of worlds and focusing on possible observers, given the rise in population. But that just reminds me that we likely don't understand anthropics well enough to make any definite pronouncements.

Comment author: wafflepudding 02 October 2016 01:04:03AM 0 points [-]

Are you responding to "Unless human psychology is expected to be that different from world to world?"? Because that's not my position, I'd think that most things recognizable as human will be similar enough to us that they'd build an LHC eventually. I guess I'm not exactly sure what you're getting at.

Comment author: steven 20 September 2008 10:57:03PM 3 points [-]

IMHO if anthropics worked that way and if the LHC really were a world-killer, you'd find yourself in a world where we had the propensity not to build the LHC, not one where we happened not to build one due to a string of improbable coincidences.

Comment author: wafflepudding 29 September 2016 02:28:39AM 0 points [-]

I'd agree that certain worlds would have the building of the LHC pushed back or moved forward, but I doubt there would be many where the LHC was just never built. Unless human psychology is expected to be that different from world to world?

Comment author: entirelyuseless 13 June 2016 12:15:18PM *  0 points [-]

wafflepudding is saying something similar to this:

You can suffer the $10,000 damage in two ways, Path A and Path B. Normally these two things happen equally often. If you pay the $100, you can prevent Path A from happening, with a 100% chance. That means if you pay, Path B will definitely happen. But it also means that since you're the sort of person who would pay in this situation, you will receive that prophecy only 50% as often, in general, as a person who would not pay; this happens because you only get the prophecy when path B is going to happen, instead of either Path A or path B.

I am not the sort of person who would pay in that situation, and I do not want to be. But I am the sort of person who might very well pay the $100 before hearing any prophecy, and therefore I will get the prophecy 50% as often anyway.

Comment author: wafflepudding 13 June 2016 10:11:35PM 0 points [-]

I am extremely satisfied with this description; I hadn't personally thought of it in such specific terms, and this would be a perfect way to say it. I'll admit I'm a bit confused why you would pay before but not after, considering that either one is done by a person to whom the prophecy is given 50% less often.

Comment author: entirelyuseless 12 June 2016 01:19:38PM 0 points [-]

I would pay Omega in the counterfactual mugging, but I would not pay here.

The reason is that in the counterfactual mugging case, I would want to be the sort of person who pays when they get offered a deal like that.

Here, I would not want to be the sort of person who pays to fight an infallible prophecy.

However, I would want to be the sort of person who pays to fight a non-infallible prophecy, so I would be happy to precommit to pay in non-infallible prophecy situations.

Comment author: wafflepudding 13 June 2016 06:38:59AM 0 points [-]

The kind of person who pays to fight an infallible prophecy is the same kind of person to whom infallible prophecies are given 50% less often. In this case.

Comment author: Pimgd 10 June 2016 08:58:39PM *  0 points [-]

He makes a self-contradictory statement and loses credibility points. Like, a lot of them. Maybe not in general, but a lot of them for this specific topic.

Comment author: wafflepudding 12 June 2016 05:21:35AM 0 points [-]

Hmm, I didn't intend for the prophet to contradict himself. (Based on your comments and others, I seem to have tripped and fallen hard into the illusion of transparency.) Would you mind elaborating on the contradictory statement he makes? And, had he not said anything apparently contradictory, then would you have paid $100?

Comment author: rkyeun 30 July 2012 01:11:29AM 4 points [-]

Imagine a mind as already exists. Now I install a small frog trained to kick its leg when you try to perform Occamian or Laplacian thinking, and its kicking leg hits a button that inverts your output so your conclusion is exactly backwards from the one you should/would have made but for the frog.

And thus symmetry.

Comment author: wafflepudding 10 June 2016 11:17:11PM *  2 points [-]

Though, the anti-Laplacian mind, in this case, is inherently more complicated. Maybe it's not a moot point that Laplacian minds are on average simpler than their anti-Laplacian counterparts? There are infinite Laplacian and anti-Laplacian minds, but of the two infinities, might one be proportionately larger?

None of this is to detract from Eliezer's original point, of course. I only find it interesting to think about.

Comment author: Pimgd 06 June 2016 08:29:38PM 1 point [-]

I definitely would pay Omega. Here, I'm just going "that's one shady prophet".

Comment author: wafflepudding 10 June 2016 08:38:18PM 0 points [-]

And if the prophet is "honest and truly prophetic"?

Comment author: Dagon 06 June 2016 05:27:56PM 0 points [-]

I'm with gjm. I appreciate the attempt, but neither added weirdness (time travel nor prophetic causality) would meet your criterion of not contrived and easy to understand.

Comment author: wafflepudding 07 June 2016 04:52:45PM 0 points [-]

Actually, I still stand by the "not contrived" part. (I think that's what drove me to believe it would be easy to understand.) The idea arose organically when I was thinking about what I would do if presented a prophecy like this, and whether it would be worth expending effort to fight it. On the other hand, there's no reason for Omega to play his game with you other than specifically to illustrate the point of CM.

Comment author: gjm 06 June 2016 12:30:36PM -1 points [-]

For what it's worth, this formulation appears to me substantially more confusing than the ordinary Counterfactual Mugging. It requires a hypothetical world with multiple confusing features (time travel! prophets! prophecies that are absolutely inevitable .. except, wait, no they aren't! or maybe they are but just might not have been!) And for extra confusion, you introduce the idea that I might believe the prophecy immutable when in fact it isn't, while (if I'm understanding right) asking me just to take on trust that in the real world (er, the real world of this hypothetical situation) it really truly definitely is immutable.

The ordinary Counterfactual Mugging is hard to think about, but (at least for me) it's reasonably clear what situation it's describing, whereas here I had to read your description several times before I was confident I'd correctly understood the problem statement (and I'm still not quite certain I have).

I'm also not sure this is equivalent to ordinary CM (is it meant to be?). Ordinary CM says there was a 50% chance of Omega's coin flip coming up either way, but here nothing seems quite to correspond to that. In particular, the 50% reduction in Pr(I perform the unwise action) in your scenario doesn't seem like it plays quite the same role. But maybe I'm misunderstanding something?

Comment author: wafflepudding 06 June 2016 04:52:16PM 1 point [-]

Well, your confusion means my original goal has failed, and I suppose that's that. I am pretty sure this is equivalent to CM in the sense that only UDT wins -- I'd be happy to explain further if you'd like, but otherwise, thanks for your help!

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