Comment author: wdmacaskill 28 December 2013 12:07:57PM *  6 points [-]

Argh! Original post didn't go through (probably my fault), so this will be shorter than it should be:

First point:

I know very little about CEA, and a brief check of their website leaves me a little unclear on why Luke recommends them, aside from the fact that they apparently work closely with FHI.

CEA = Giving What We Can, 80,000 Hours, and a bit of other stuff

Reason -> donations to CEA predictably increase the size and strength of the EA community, a good proportion of whom take long-run considerations very seriously and will donate to / work for FHI/MIRI, or otherwise pursue careers with the aim of extinction risk mitigation. It's plausible that $1 to CEA generates significantly more than $1's worth of x-risk-value [note: I'm a trustee and founder of CEA].

Second point:

Don't forget CSER. My view is that they are even higher-impact than MIRI or FHI (though I'd defer to Seanoh if he disagreed). Reason: marginal donations will be used to fund program management + grantwriting, which would turn ~$70k into a significant chance of ~$1-$10mn, and launch what I think might become one of the most important research institutions in the world. They have all the background (high profile people on the board; an already written previous grant proposal that very narrowly missed out on being successful). High leverage!

Comment author: peter_hurford 27 December 2013 03:05:09PM *  4 points [-]

movement-building activities are likely to be valuable, to increase the odds of the people at that government or corporation being conscious of AI safety issues

CEA and CFAR don't do anything, to my knowledge, that would increase these odds, except in exceedingly indirect ways. FHI might be the most credible opportunity here because of their academic associations, which give them more credibility in PR. I remember Luke saying that FHI and CSER's academic ties as the reason why they -- an not MIRI -- are better suited to do publicity than FHI.

Therefore, while I disagree with you that the most important thing is to increase the odds of the people at that government or corporation being conscious of AI safety issues, I think that given what values you have told me, FHI is the most likely to maximize them.

Comment author: wdmacaskill 27 December 2013 08:43:36PM 22 points [-]

CEA and CFAR don't do anything, to my knowledge, that would increase these odds, except in exceedingly indirect ways.

People from CEA, in collaboration with FHI, have been meeting with people in the UK government, and are producing policy briefs on unprecedented risks from new technologies, including AI (the first brief will go on the FHI website in the near future). These meetings arose as a result of GWWC media attention. CEA's most recent hire, Owen Cotton-Barratt, will be helping with this work.

Comment author: Dias 26 November 2013 03:48:58AM *  2 points [-]

I would or recognize as 'EA' actions and organizations that are ethical through ways other than producing welfare/happiness, as long as they apply rationality to doing good.

You're a CEA employee, if I remember correctly? If so, your account of effective altruism seems rather different from Will's: "Maybe you want to do other things effectively, but then it's not effective altruism". This sort of mixed messaging is exactly what I was objecting too.

I would be interested to hear an elaboration of why a promise keeping charity is the best thing to do

I'm far from certain it is. But as far as I'm aware no effort at all is put into it at present, so there could be very low hanging fruit.

Comment author: wdmacaskill 26 November 2013 03:40:08PM 0 points [-]

your account of effective altruism seems rather different from Will's: "Maybe you want to do other things effectively, but >then it's not effective altruism". This sort of mixed messaging is exactly what I was objecting too.

I think you've revised the post since you initially wrote it? If so, you might want to highlight that in the italics at the start, as otherwise it makes some of the comments look weirdly off-base. In particular, I took the initial post to aim at the conclusion: 1. EA is utilitarianism in disguise which I think is demonstrably false.

But now the post reads more like the main conclusion is: 2. EA is vague on a crucial issue, which is whether the effective pursuit of non-welfarist goods counts as effective altruism. which is a much more reasonable thing to say.

Comment author: Dias 26 November 2013 03:53:47AM *  2 points [-]

Thanks for the response. I agree with most of the territory covered, of course, but my objection here is to the framing, not the philosophy.

Maybe you want to do other things effectively, but then it's not effective altruism

So why does the website explicitly list fairness, justice and trying to do as much good as possible as EA goals in themselves? And why does user:weeatquince (whose identity we both know but I will not 'out' on a public forum) think that "actions and organizations that are ethical through ways other than producing welfare/happiness, as long as they apply rationality to doing good" are EA?

Comment author: wdmacaskill 26 November 2013 03:32:05PM 5 points [-]

I think the simple answer is that "effective altruism" is a vague term. I gave you what I thought was the best way of making it precise. Weeatquince, and Luke Muelhauser wanted to make it precise in a different way. We could have a debate about which is the more useful precisifcation, but I don't think that here is the right place for that.

On either way of making the term precise, though, EA is clearly not trying to be the whole of morality, or to give any one very specific conception of morality. It doesn't make a claim about side-constraints; it doesn't make a claim about whether doing good is supererogatory or obligatory; it doesn't make a claim about the nature of welfare. EA is broad tent, and deliberately so: very many different ethical perspectives will agree, for example, that it's important to find out which charities do the most to improve the welfare of those living in extreme poverty (as measured by QALYs etc), and then encouraging people to give to those charities. If so, then we've got an important activity that people of very many different ethical backgrounds can get behind - which is great!

Comment author: wdmacaskill 25 November 2013 10:18:36PM 16 points [-]

Hi,

Thanks for this post. The relationship between EA and well-known moral theories is something I've wanted to blog about in the past.

So here are a few points:

1. EA does not equal utilitarianism.

Utilitarianism makes many claims that EA does not make:

EA does not claim whether it's obligatory or merely supererogatory to spend one's resources helping others; utilitarianism claims that it is obligatory.

EA does not make a claim about whether there are side-constraints - certain things that it is impermissible to do, even if it were for the greater good. Utilitarianism claims that it's always obligatory to act for the greater good.

EA does not claim that there are no other things besides welfare that are of value; utilitarianism does claim this.

EA does not make a precise claim about what promoting welfare consists in (for example, whether it's more important to give one unit of welfare to someone who is worse-off than someone who is better-off; or whether hedonistic, preference-satisfactionist or objective list theories of wellbeing are correct); any specific form of utilitarianism does make a precise claim about this.

Also, note that some eminent EAs are not even consequentialist leaning, let alone utilitarian: e.g. Thomas Pogge (political philosopher) and Andreas Mogensen (Assistant Director of Giving What We Can) explicitly endorse a rights-based theory of morality; Alex Foster (epic London EtG-er) and Catriona MacKay (head of the GWWC London chapter) are both Christian (and presumably not consequentialist, though I haven't asked).

2. Rather, EA is something that almost every plausible moral theory is in favour of.

Almost every plausible moral theory thinks that promoting the welfare of others in an effective way is a good thing to do. Some moral theories that promoting the welfare of others is merely supererogatory, and others think that there are other values at stake. But EA is explicitly pro promoting welfare; it's not anti other things, and it doesn't claim that we're obligated to be altruistic, merely that it's a good thing to do.

3. Is EA explicitly welfarist?

The term 'altruism' suggests that it is. And I think that's fine. Helping others is what EAs do. Maybe you want to do other things effectively, but then it's not effective altruism - it's "effective justice", "effective environmental preservation", or something. Note, though, that you may well think that there are non-welfarist values - indeed, I would think that you would be mistaken not to act as if there were, on moral uncertainty grounds alone - but still be part of the effective altruism movement because you think that, in practice, welfare improvement is the most important thing to focus on.

So, to answer your dilemma:

EA is not trying to be the whole of morality.

It might be the whole of morality, if being EA is the only thing that is required of one. But it's not part of the EA package that EA is the whole of morality. Rather, it represents one aspect of morality - an aspect that is very important for those living in affluent countries, and who have tremendous power to help others. The idea that we in rich countries should be trying to work out how to help others as effectively as possible, and then actually going ahead and doing it, is an important part of almost every plausible moral theory.

Comment author: JonahSinick 24 May 2013 06:33:12PM *  3 points [-]

The nature of the evidence could be either qualitative or quantitative, and the things you mention in "implications" are generally quantitative.

  • Assessing the quality of the people behind a project is qualitative rather than quantitative.
  • Room for more funding is in principle quantitative, but my experience has been that in practice, room for more funding analysis ends up being more qualitative, as you have to make judgments about things such as who would otherwise have funded the project, which hinge heavily on knowledge of the philanthropic landscape in respects that aren't easily quantified.
  • Gauging historical precedent requires many judgment calls, and so can't be quantified.
  • Deciding what giving opportunities one can learn the most from can't be quantified.

In terms of "good done per dollar" - for me that figure is still far greater than I began with (and I take it that that's the question that EAs are concerned with, rather than "lives saved per dollar"). [...] because, in my initial analysis - and in what I'd presume are most people's initial analyses - benefits to the long-term future weren't taken into account, or weren't thought to be morally relevant.

I explicitly address this in the second paragraph of the "The history of GiveWell’s estimates for lives saved per dollar" section of my post as well as the "Donating to AMF has benefits beyond saving lives" section of my post.

Building a movement of people who are aiming to do the most good with their marginal resources, and who are trying to work out how best to do that, strikes me as a good way to achieve both of these things.

I agree with this. I don't think that my post suggests otherwise.

Comment author: wdmacaskill 25 May 2013 11:01:11AM 3 points [-]

I explicitly address this in the second paragraph of the "The history of GiveWell’s estimates for lives saved per dollar" section of my post as well as the "Donating to AMF has benefits beyond saving lives" section of my post.

Not really. You do mention the flow-on benefits. But you don't analyse whether your estimate of "good done per dollar" has increased or decreased. And that's the relevant thing to analyse. If you argued "cost per life saved has had greater regression to your prior than you'd expected; and for that reason I expect my estimates of good done per dollar to regress really substantially" (an argument I think you would endorse), I'd accept that argument, though I'd worry about how much it generalises to cause-areas other than global poverty. (e.g. I expect there to be much less of an 'efficient market' for activities where there are fewer agents with the same goals/values, like benefiting non-human animals, or making sure the far-future turn out well). Optimism bias still holds, of course.

You say that "cost-effectiveness estimates skew so negatively." I was just pointing out that for me that hasn't been the case (for good done per $), because long-run benefits strike me as swamping short-term benefits, a factor that I didn't initially incorporate into my model of doing good. And, though I agree with the conclusion that you want as many different angles as possible (etc), focusing on cost per life saved rather than good done per dollar might lead you to miss important lessons (e.g. "make sure that you've identified all crucial normative and empirical considerations"). I doubt that you personally have missed those lessons. But they aren't in your post. And that's fine, of course, you can't cover everything in one blog post. But it's important for the reader not to overgeneralise.

I agree with this. I don't think that my post suggests otherwise.

I wasn't suggesting it does.

Comment author: wdmacaskill 24 May 2013 05:11:57PM 11 points [-]

Good post, Jonah. You say that: "effective altruists should spend much more time on qualitative analysis than on quantitative analysis in determining how they can maximize their positive social impact". What do you mean by "qualitative analysis"? As I understand it, your points are: i) The amount by which you should regress to your prior is much greater than you had previously thought, so ii) you should favour robustness of evidence more than you had previously. But that doesn't favour qualitative vs non-qualitative evidence. It favours more robust evidence of lower but good cost-effectiveness over less robust evidence of higher cost-effectiveness. The nature of the evidence could be either qualitative or quantitative, and the things you mention in "implications" are generally quantitative.

In terms of "good done per dollar" - for me that figure is still far greater than I began with (and I take it that that's the question that EAs are concerned with, rather than "lives saved per dollar"). This is because, in my initial analysis - and in what I'd presume are most people's initial analyses - benefits to the long-term future weren't taken into account, or weren't thought to be morally relevant. But those (expected) benefits strike me, and strike most people I've spoken with who agree with the moral relevance of them, to be far greater than the short-term benefits to the person whose life is saved. So, in terms of my expectations about how much good I can do in the world, I'm able to exceed those by a far greater amount than I'd previously thought likely. And that holds true whether it costs $2000 or $20000 to save a life. I'm not mentioning that either to criticise or support your post, but just to highlight that the lesson to take from past updates on evidence can look quite different depending on whether you're talking about "good done per dollar" or "lives saved per dollar", and the former is what we ultimately care about.

Final point: Something you don't mention is that, when you find out that your evidence is crappier than you'd thought, two general lessons are to pursue things with high option value and to pay to gain new evidence (though I acknowledge that this depends crucially on how much new evidence you think you'll be able to get). Building a movement of people who are aiming to do the most good with their marginal resources, and who are trying to work out how best to do that, strikes me as a good way to achieve both of these things.

Comment author: Jayson_Virissimo 05 March 2013 03:33:39AM *  4 points [-]

In what ways does this differ from Nozick's recommendation in Nature of Rationality where he combines the results from EDT and CDT but gives them different weights depending on the priors (about the applicability to the situation and truth value of each decision theory)?

Comment author: wdmacaskill 05 March 2013 03:37:51PM *  1 point [-]

Thanks for mentioning this - I discuss Nozick's view in my paper, so I'm going to edit my comment to mention this. A few differences:

As crazy88 says, Nozick doesn't think that the issue is a normative uncertainty issue - his proposal is another first-order decision theory, like CDT and EDT. I argue against that account in my paper. Second, and more importantly, Nozick just says "hey, our intuitions in Newcomb-cases are stakes-sensitive" and moves on. He doesn't argue, as I do, that we can explain the problematic cases in the literature by appeal to decision-theoretic uncertainty. Nor does he use decision-theoretic uncertainty to respond to arguments in favour of EDT. Nor does he respond to regress worries, and so on.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 05 March 2013 01:19:36PM 5 points [-]

Sorry if this is an uncomfortable question, but does your theory do anything UDT doesn't do? Or is the idea that this is a general process which both humans and AIs would use if a flaw in UDT is found, and if so, how does it differ from Nick Bostrom's parliamentary decision process? Wouldn't almost any AI or human which endorsed this theory be vulnerable to Pascal's Mugging because at least one subtheory woudl be vulnerable to it?

Comment author: wdmacaskill 05 March 2013 03:33:44PM 3 points [-]

Don't worry, that's not an uncomfortable question. UDT and MDT are quite different. UDT is a first-order decision theory. MDT is a way of extending decision theories - so that you take into account uncertainty about which decision theory to use. (So, one can have meta causal decision theory, meta evidential decision theory, and (probably, thought I haven't worked through it) meta updateless decision theory.)

UDT, as I understand it (and note I'm not at all fluent in UDT or TDT) always one-boxes; whereas if you take decision-theoretic uncertainty into account you should sometimes one-box and sometimes two-box, depending on the relative value of the contents of the two boxes. Also, UDT gets what most decision-theorists consider the wrong answer in the smoking lesion case, whereas the account I defend, meta causal decision theory, doesn't (or, at least, doesn't, depending on one's credences in first-order decision theories).

To illustrate, consider the case:

High-Stakes Predictor II (HSP-II) Box C is opaque; Box D, transparent. If the Predictor predicts that you choose Box C only, then he puts one wish into Box C, and also a stick of gum. With that wish, you save the lives of 1 million terminally ill children. If he predicts that you choose both Box C and Box D, then he puts nothing into Box C. Box D — transparent to you — contains an identical wish, also with the power to save the lives of 1 million children, so if one had both wishes one would save 2 million children in total. However, Box D contains no gum. One has two options only: choose Box C only, or both Box C and Box D.

In this case, intuitively, should you one box, or two box? My view is clear: that if someone one-boxes in the above case, they made the wrong decision. And it seems to me that this is best explained with appeal to decision-theoretic uncertainty.

Other questions: Bostrom's parliamentary model is different. Between EDT and CDT, the intertheoretic comparisons of value are easy, so there's no need to use the parliamentary analogy - one can just straightforwardly take an expectation over decision theories.

Pascal's Mugging (aka the "Fanaticism" worry). This is a general issue for attempts to take normative uncertainty into account in one's decision-making, and not something I discuss in my paper. But if you're concerned about Pascal's mugging and, say, think that a bounded Decision Theory is the best way to respond to the problem - then at the meta level you should also have a bounded decision theory (and at the meta meta level, and so on).

Meta Decision Theory and Newcomb's Problem

5 wdmacaskill 05 March 2013 01:29AM

Hi all,

As part of my PhD I've written a paper developing a new approach to decision theory that I call Meta Decision Theory. The idea is that decision theory should take into account decision-theoretic uncertainty as well as empirical uncertainty, and that, once we acknowledge this, we can explain some puzzles to do with Newcomb problems, and can come up with new arguments to adjudicate the causal vs evidential debate. Nozick raised this idea of taking decision-theoretic uncertainty into account, but he did not defend the idea at length, and did not discuss implications of the idea.

I'm not yet happy to post this paper publicly, so I'll just write a short abstract of the paper below. However, I would appreciate written comments on the paper. If you'd like to read it and/or comment on it, please e-mail me at will dot crouch at 80000hours.org. And, of course, comments in the thread on the idea sketched below are also welcome.

 

Abstract

First, I show that our judgments concerning Newcomb problems are stakes-sensitive. By altering the relative amounts of value in  the transparent box and the opaque box, one can construct situations in which one should clearly one-box, and one can construct situations in which one should clearly two-box. A plausible explanation of this phenomenon is that our intuitive judgments are sensitive to decision-theoretic uncertainty as well as empirical uncertainty: if the stakes are very high for evidential decision theory (EDT) but not for Causal Decision theory (CDT) then we go with EDT's recommendation, and vice-versa for CDT over EDT.

Second, I show that, if we 'go meta' and take decision-theoretic uncertainty into account, we can get the right answer in both the Smoking Lesion case and the Psychopath Button case.

Third, I distinguish Causal MDT (CMDT) and Evidential MDT (EMDT). I look at what I consider to be the two strongest arguments in favour of EDT, and show that these arguments do not work at the meta level. First, I consider the argument that EDT gets the right answer in certain cases. In response to this, I show that one only needs to have small credence in EDT in order to get the right answer in such cases. The second is the "Why Ain'cha Rich?" argument. In response to this, I give a case where EMDT recommends two-boxing, even though two-boxing has a lower average return than one-boxing.

Fourth, I respond to objections. First, I consider and reject alternative explanations of the stakes-sensitivity of our judgments about particular cases, including Nozick's explanation. Second, I consider the worry that 'going meta' leads one into a vicious regress. I accept that there is a regress, but argue that the regress is non-vicious.

In an appendix, I give an axiomatisation of CMDT.

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