All of AndyC's Comments + Replies

AndyC10

If it requires a round-trip of human speech through a professor (and thus the requisition of the attention of the entire class) then you can hardly say they are given as many opportunities to test as they'd like. A person of functioning social intelligence certainly has no more than 20 such round-trips available consecutively, and less conservatively even 4 might be pushing it for many.

Give them a computer program to interact with and then you can say they have as many opportunities to test as they'd like.

AndyC30

Utilitarianism is unlikely to rescue anyone from the conundrum (unless it's applied in the most mindless way -- in which case, you might as well not think about it).

There's an obvious social benefit to being secure against being randomly sacrificed for the benefit of others. You're not going to be able to quantify the utility of providing everyone in society this benefit as a general social principle, and weigh the benefit of consistency on that point against the benefit of violating the principle in any given instance, any more easily than you could have decided the issue without any attempt at quantification.

AndyC00

USA Presidents routinely try to signal lower class than they have.

AndyC30

It's important to note that employers are not seeking to maximize employee performance. They're seeking to maximize the difference between the value provided by the employee and the wage provided to the employee.

0themusicgod1
Couldn't you argue this the opposite way? That life is such misery, that extra torture isn't really adding to it. The world with the torture gives 3^^^3+1 suffering souls a life of misery, suffering and torture. The world with the specs gives 3^^^3+1 suffering souls a life of misery, suffering and torture, only basically everyone gets extra specks of dust in their eye. In which case, the first is better? It's not as much of a stretch as you might think..
AndyC40

With that many instances, it's even highly likely that at least one of the specs in the eye will offer a rare opportunity for some poor prisoner to escape his captors, who had intended to subject him to 50 years of torture.

AndyC50

First of all, you might benefit from looking up the beard fallacy.

To address the issue at hand directly, though:

Of course there are sharp discontinuities. Not just one sharp discontinuity, but countless. However, there is not particular voltage at which there is a discontinuity. Rather, increasing the voltage increases the probability of a discontinuity.

I will list a few discontinuities established by torture.

  1. Nightmares. As the electrocution experience becomes more severe, the probability that it will result in a nightmare increases. After 50 years

... (read more)
AndyC50

That makes no sense. Just because one thing cost $1, and another thing cost $1000, does not mean that the first thing happening 1001 times is better than the second one happening once.

Preferences logically precede prices. If they didn't, nobody would be able to decide what they were willing to spend on anything in the first place. If utilitarianism requires that you decide the value of things based on their prices, then utilitarians are conformists without values of their own, who derive all of their value judgments from non-utilitarian market particip... (read more)

AndyC50

There's an interesting paper on microtransactions and how human rationality can't really handle decisions about values under a certain amount. The cognitive effort of making a decision outweighs the possible benefits of making the decision.

How much time would you spend making a decision about how to spend a penny? You can't make a decision in zero time, it's not physically possible. Rationally you have to round off the penny, and the spec of dust.

AndyC40

You're misunderstanding. It has nothing to do with time -- it's not a time line. It means the dust motes are infinitesimal, while the torture is finite. A finite sum of infinitesimals is always infinitesimal.

Not that you really need to use a math analogy here. The point is just that there is a qualitative difference between specs of dust and torture. They're incommensurable. You cannot divide torture by spec of dust, because neither one is a number to start with.

-1Slider
There is a perfectly good way of treating this as numbers. Transfinite division is a thing. With X people experiencing infinidesimal discomfort and Y people experiening finite discomfort if X and Y are finites then torture is always worse. With X being transfinite dust specks could be worse. But in reverse if you insist that the impacts are reals ie finites then there are finite multiples that go past each other that is for any r,y,z in R r>0,y>r, there is a z so that rz>y.
2dxu
This is an interesting claim. Either it implies that the human brain is capable of detecting infinitesimal differences in utility, or else it implies that you should have no preference between having a dust speck in your eye and not having one in your eye.
-1AlexanderRM
I think the dust motes vs. torture makes sense if you imagine a person being bombarded with dust motes for 50 years. I could easily imagine a continuous stream of dust motes being as bad as torture (although possibly the lack of variation would make it far less effective than what a skilled torturer could do). Based on that, Eliezer's belief is just that the same number of dust motes spread out among many people is just as bad as one person getting hit by all of them. Which I will admit is a bit harder to justify. One possible way to make the argument is to think in terms of rules utilitarianism, and imagine a world where a huge number of people got the choice, then compare one where they all choose the torture vs. one where they all choose the dust motes- the former outcome would clearly be better. I'm pretty sure there are cases where this could be important in government policy.
AndyC90

I don't understand why it's supposed to be somehow better to have more people, even if they are equally happen. 10 billion happy people is better than 5 billion equally happy people? Why? It makes no intuitive sense to me, I have no innate preference between the two (all else equal), and yet I'm supposed to accept it as a premise.

1altleft
It makes some sense in terms of total happiness, since 10 billion happy people would give a higher total happiness than 5 billion happy people.
0AlexanderRM
Isn't it usually brought up by people who want you to reject it as a premise, as an argument against hedonic positive utilitarianism? Personally I do disagree with that premise and more generally with hedonic utilitarianism. My utility function is more like "choice" or "freedom" (an ideal world would be one where everyone can do whatever they want, and in a non-ideal one we should try to optimize to get as close to that as possible), so based on that I have no preference with regards to people who haven't been born yet, since they're incapable of choosing whether or not to be alive. (on the other hand my intuition is that bringing dead people back would be good if it were possible... I suppose that if the dead person didn't want to die at the moment of death, that would be compatible with my ideas, and I don't think it's that far off from my actual, intuitive reasons for feeling that way.)
AndyC80

But it's not true. Consider by analogy: if you can't explain something to a 4-year-old, you don't understand it yourself. After all, you were a 4-year-old once yourself.

No, actually, sometimes you can't explain something to someone because you don't have a good enough understanding of their mental processes. It doesn't matter if you once experienced those same mental processes; the relevant memories of that time are very likely lost to you now. Explaining math to novices is a different skill than understanding math. It requires the ability to figure o... (read more)