All of B Jacobs's Comments + Replies

B Jacobs0-5

This post does not talk about strength of preferences so this seems a bit off topic. Nevertheless I think this misses some important considerations. You say:

the probability that one would actually go ahead and vote in a race does correlate with the strength of one's preferences. So, perhaps, this is indeed working as intended.

This doesn't take into account voter suppression. Take for example Texas; from 2012 to 2018, 542 polling places were closed in counties with significant increases in African-American and Latino populations, while counties with fewer m... (read more)

B Jacobs-2-2

the best-researched article I know of on gender differences in chess

So I read this article and occasionally checked the sources and while it's not a bad article by any stretch, the scientific backing is not as strong as they imply. For example they write:

the sexes differ in their -preferences- for competition. As both Kasparov and Repková have intuited, men are simply -more competitive-

With the words "preferences" and "more competitive" being hyperlinks to their source. This implies (especially in the context) a "nature" explanation, but the source doesn't... (read more)

Hmmm, I don't know if that works. There have definitely been times were I (phenomenologically) felt inconsistent preferences at the same time, e.g. I simultaneously want to hang a painting there and not hang a painting there. I do get this a lot more with aesthetic preferences than with other preferences for some reason. I think the proposed solution that we're multiple agents is quite plausible, but it does have some problems, so that's why I proposed this solution as a possible alternative.

I tried a bit of a natural experiment to see if rationalists would be more negative towards an idea if it's called socialism vs if it's called it something else. I made two posts that are identical, except one calls it socialism right at the start, and one only reveals I was talking about socialism at the very end (perhaps it would've been better if I hadn't revealed it at all). The former I posted to LW, the latter I posted to the EA forum.

I expected that the comments on LW would be more negative, that I would get more downvotes and gave it a 50% chance t... (read more)

Viliam100

My problem with calling things "socialist" is that the word is typically used in a motte-and-bailey fashion: "seizing the means of production, centralized planning" vs "cooperating, helping each other". (Talking about the latter, but in a way that makes an applause light of the former.) This is analogical to "religion" meaning either "following the commandments in ancient books literally, obeying religious leaders" or "perceiving beauty in the universe, helping each other". Neither socialists not christians have invented the concept of human cooperation.

Mo... (read more)

2Dagon
I was one of the downvotes you predicted, but I didn't react as negatively as I expected to.  I suspect I'd have been roughly as critical of "democratization" - it's a word that can mean many many different things, and the article, while long and somewhat interesting, didn't actually match either title.   Fun experiment, and mostly I'm surprised that there's so little overlap between the sites that nobody pointed out the duplicate, which should have been a crosspost.
3Raemon
Just wanted to say I think this was an interesting experiment to run. (I’m not sure I think the data here is clean enough to directly imply anything, since among other things EAF and LW have different audiences. But, still think this was a neat test of the mods)

Sorry guys. I woke up to another giant batch of new comments and I just don't have the time or energy to respond to them all with the quality that I would want. My comments were already getting shorter and shorter while my longer, more nuanced comments were getting sniped before I could post them. I'm sure some of you made some excellent points.

B Jacobs-1-1

I cited controlled experiments, you counter with an observation that I have already responded to in both the post and the comments:

I explained this in this section:

One issue that arises with starting a socialist firms is acquiring initial investing.[27] This is probably because co-ops want to maximize income (wages), not profits. They pursue the interests of their members rather than investors and may sometimes opt to increase wages instead of profits. Capitalist firms on the other hand are explicitly investor owned so investor interests wil

... (read more)

A spot check is supposed to take a number of random sources and check them, not pick the one claim you find most suspicious (that isn't even about co-ops) and use that to dismiss the entire literature on co-ops.

3tailcalled
There seem to be three parts to this objections: 1. I did not spot-check sufficiently many claims 2. I filtered the claim to spot-check based on being the most suspicious 3. I did not filter the claims based on being about co-ops With regards to point 1, I agree that I cannot know your accuracy very precisely without doing more checks, but the problem is that each check takes time and there are a lot of posts on the internet to read, so I have to limit how much I search. With regards to point 2, it's not that I spot-checked the most suspicious one, rather it's that I spot-checked the first suspicious one. This is still a filter on suspiciousness, but a much weaker one. I think some filter on suspiciousness is appropriate since suspicious claims are also the ones I can learn the most from if they turn out to be true, as claims become suspicious through a combination of being unlikely and having big implications. With regards to point 3, if you put much more effort into verifying the accuracy of your claims about co-ops than your claims about other stuff, then your accuracy on co-ops might not be that correlated with your accuracy on other stuff, and I ought to do a spot-check specifically on your claims about co-ops. I don't know if that is true. If it is true, it might also be helpful to mention it as a disclaimer in the post so people know what claims to mostly focus on. So it's not so much that I'm dismissing the entire literature on co-ops. (Or well, I would generally dismiss any social science that I haven't done some surface checks of. But that's different from my comments here.) It's more that I'm dismissing your literature review of the literature.

I cite four different studies that show that the theory doesn't match the observations, Lao Mein doesn't cite anything. This is the most extreme version of being a selective skeptic.

-1Aiyen
He cites the observation that socialized firms have not taken over the economy.  That's clearly true and clearly relevant.  Your response was that you'd already explained why socialized firms might not take over even if they were productive.  What were those reasons again?  Reviewing your post, it looks like it might be the difficulty of gaining investment and brain drain from the most productive workers leaving, but both of those reasons would be strong arguments against socialization.  Rose Wrist's ideas for gaining investment anyway are interesting, but until socialized firms actually do raise enough funding to compete, saying that they theoretically maybe can sounds remarkably hollow.   The point of evidence is to see things that are more likely under one hypothesis than another.  In the world where socialized firms are better, I do not expect to see them failing to take over.  In the world where they are not, I do expect that it's possible to generate arbitrarily long lists of pro-socialism citations.   The strength of a case depends on the strength of the evidence, not on the number of citations!

I’m not handwaving anything I wrote a whole section about how experiments contradict this and what could explain this:

“Experiments have shown that people randomly allocated to do tasks in groups where they can elect their leaders and/or choose their pay structures are more productive than those who are led by an unelected manager who makes pay choices for them.[20] One study looked at real firms with high levels of worker ownership of shares in the company and found that workers are keener to monitor others, making them more productive than those with low ... (read more)

-3Aiyen
The specific handwave I'm referring to is Amartya Sen's.  "In the case of the free rider hypothesis, these 'rational fools' act based on such a narrow conception of self-interest that they don't take into account the obviously damaging long-term consequences of their behavior, both to the firm and ultimately to themselves. Normal, reasonable people - who are different to rational economic man - are usually happy to put efforts into a collective endeavor that will deliver benefits for them in the long run, even if that means foregoing some short-term gains." This sounds like it would predict that people reliably cooperate on prisoner's dilemmas, and pick stag in stag hunts.  In reality, of course, that's not a thing!  Cooperation exists, but tends to require coordination mechanisms.  Worse, it sounds like it's advocating an incoherent decision theory.  While there are certainly times where it's wise to make a choice that isn't the best in the most narrow, myopic possible sense (Newcomb's problem is the obvious example, or superrationality dynamics), that's very different than putting efforts into collective endeavor in the hopes of collective success.   The evidence you cite is interesting, though Lao Mein's evidence suggests it isn't a slam dunk.  But Sen is committing a fallacy here, and the same fallacy as was often used in support of socialist regimes.  As such, it's a valid answer to tailcalled's question. 
B Jacobs*-11

My prior is that other things are less effective and you need evidence to show they are more effective not vice versa.

Appeal to presuppositions always feels weird to me. A socialist could just as easily say 'my priors say the opposite'. In any case, you made a claim of comparison, not me, why is the burden of proof suddenly on me?

Of course. I'm saying it doesn't even get to make that argument which can sometimes muddy the waters enough to make some odd-seeming causes look at least plausibly effective.

I'm trying to explain the scientific literature on co-ops, not persuade you of some scam.

However, in spot-checking whether the statistics were totally wrong, I found myself struggling with wading through signups and links and long mostly irrelevant articles. Of course some nonzero amount of this is likely to happen with spot-checks but it seemed like the layers of links just made it even worse.


This is dishonest, the vast majority of the sources are primary scientific studies and the few times I do refer to secondary sources it isn't irrelevant.

You did handle it right, especially your deleted comment.

OP to explain what data/model it was based o

... (read more)
2tailcalled
I wasn't talking about the vast majority of the sources, I was talking about source 3, which turned into source 2, which turned into some other source that I had to find myself. My deleted comment was nearly identical to one of the non-deleted comments. It's just that I realized there was a problem with one of my comments after posting it and I needed to take some time to look at it. The problem is that the primary source does not seem credible without additional information.

But anyway, no, this link doesn't link directly to the study either, it links to a report that links to the study

You can immediately see a button that says "download report" when you click on that link. I wouldn't call that "digging for sources".

The wall of text doesn't really answer my questions about the independence of employee engagement.

Furthermore they suggest that managers have a huge effect on employee engagement, which seems to point to a potential area where this assumption could fail.

It's not independent, co-ops let you vote on managers which al... (read more)

4tailcalled
I have downloaded the report. When I searched for keywords from the sentence "This is not only terrible for the workers but also for the economy, since businesses with engaged workers have 23% higher profit, while employees who are not engaged cost the world $7.8 trillion in lost productivity, equal to 11% of global GDP." in the report, the main section that appeared was this: The other potentially relevant section that appeared was this: Neither of these sections give any idea of how Gallup came to the conclusion, but the link in the first section contains a link to a different document that probably forms the foundation/primary source for their analysis. I mean if the independence of employee engagement doesn't hold, then the causal inference doesn't go through, and you can't infer that engagement has this much effect on productivity... ... however this sounds like a different form of independence than the one I brought up.

I've already explained why socialists firms wouldn't necessarily take over the economy even if they were productive in both the post and other comments.

  • They were not direct links to the study, but instead i direct links to articles that talk about the study, so I had to dig further manually.


It was the second source in the post: [2]

  • The articles are often big and contain lots of specific things that might not be directly relevant to your point of using it in the post. 

There was a summary of it on the linked page itself:

Unfortunately, most employees remain disengaged at work. In fact, low engagement alone costs the global economy $7.8 trillion.
 

 

Even having opened the study, I'm still left wit

... (read more)
2tailcalled
Oh I think one confusing factor was the footnote placement. But anyway, no, this link doesn't link directly to the study either, it links to a report that links to the study. I had to go through additional links to find this document which appears to be the original source with the actual analysis. The wall of text doesn't really answer my questions about the independence of employee engagement. Ah sorry, that's my mixup between the effects of employee engagement vs effects of co-opts.

There's just no way that things like this are remotely as effective as say GiveWell causes

Do you have any evidence for this?

and it barely even has longtermist points

Not all EA's are longtermists.

1Tenoke
My prior is that other things are less effective and you need evidence to show they are more effective not vice versa. Of course. I'm saying it doesn't even get to make that argument which can sometimes muddy the waters enough to make some odd-seeming causes look at least plausibly effective.

What data and model are these estimates of the causal effects of it based on?

You can find my sources in the references section. This was based on a gallup study

Another thing that confuses me is why socialist firms need special support and don't naturally come to dominate the economy. You seem to attribute this to owners extracting value, but that seems short-sighted; presumably if you have an economy with a mixture of socialist and non-socialist firms, and the socialist firms are much more productive, they would grow quicker and become dominant over time.

I... (read more)

2tailcalled
The issue is basically friction. There were several things that made your links difficult to use: * They were not direct links to the study, but instead i direct links to articles that talk about the study, so I had to dig further manually. * The articles are often big and contain lots of specific things that might not be directly relevant to your point of using it in the post.  * Even having opened the study, I'm still left with confusions about the methodology. It looks to me like they basically just correlated employee engagement with productivity. This is valid if employee engagement varies in a way that is uncorrelated with other factors that have a big effect on productivity, but they don't seem to justify that assumption and it doesn't seem anecdotally sensible to me. Furthermore they suggest that managers have a huge effect on employee engagement, which seems to point to a potential area where this assumption could fail. I would like to see a factor analysis containing employee engagement and a bunch of other variables before I believe it to be reasonably independent of other factors. Now, these are questions I could study myself, so why put the burden on you? I'd say friction and scale: If everyone reading your article studies this themselves, then it is a lot of duplicated work. Meanwhile if you did the work, e.g. making sure to link directly instead of indirectly to the studies you've read, and making sure to also link to factor analyses demonstrating independence or whatever else is assumed, then the work would be only performed once, and the results of the work would be available to everyone reading the article. I'm not sure I understand the economics of this. If co-ops have an inherent massive growth advantage, wouldn't that outweigh the advantage capitalist firms have in giving more dividends to investors? Because while in the short term the capitalist firms would maybe give more to their investors, in the long term the co-ops would grow bigger

I have a Mnemonic device for checking whether a model is Gears-like or not.
G E A R S:

Does a variable Generate Empirical Anticipations?

Can a variable be Rederived?

Is a variable hard to Substitute?

There's evidence in the form of observations of events outside the cartesian boundary. There's evidence in internal process of reasoning, whose nature depends on the mind.

My previous comment said:

both empirical and tautological evidence

With "empirical evidence" I meant "evidence in the form of observations of events outside the cartesian boundary" and with "tautological argument" I meant "evidence in internal process of reasoning, whose nature depends on the mind".

When doing math, evidence comes up more as a guide to intuition than anything explicitly cons

... (read more)
2Vladimir_Nesov
We have two examples of what "evidence" could mean here: mathematical proofs and physical events (things happening in a certain place at a certain time). You can study proofs. And you can study physics. There are hardly any arguments where these two different things are predictably interchangeable, so using the same word for them is a problem. Consider the statement "evidence exists". Making it specific for our two examples, we get "proofs exist" and "physical events exist". I'm not aware of a good use for these statements (it's not at all clear what they could possibly mean).

I meant both empirical and tautological evidence, so general information that indicates whether a belief is more or less valid. When you say that you can keep track of truth, why do you believe you can? What is that truth based on, evidence?

2Vladimir_Nesov
There's evidence in the form of observations of events outside the cartesian boundary. There's evidence in internal process of reasoning, whose nature depends on the mind. When doing math, evidence comes up more as a guide to intuition than anything explicitly considered. There are also metamathematical notions of evidence, rendering something evidence-like clear. Hence the question. To figure things out, it's necessary to be specific. It's impossible to figure out a large vague idea all at the same time, but some of its particular incarnations might be tractable.

It might be interesting to distinguish between "personal hingeyness" and "utilitarian hingeyness". Humans are not utilitarians so we care mostly about stuff that's happening in our own lives, when we die, our personal tree stops and we can't get more hinges. But the "utilitarian hingeyness" continues as it describes all possible utility. I made this with population ethics in mind, but you could totally use the same concept for your personal life, but then the most hingey time for you and the most hingey time for ever... (read more)

2Donald Hobson
I was just trying to make the point that the bredth of available options doesn't actually mean real world control. Imagine a game where 11 people each take a turn to play in order. Each person can play either a 1 or a 0. Each player can see the moves of all the previous players. If the number of 1's played is odd, everyone wins a prize. If you aren't the 11'th player, it doesn't matter what you pick, all that matters is whether or not the 11'th player wants the prize. (Unless all the people after you are going to pick their favourite numbers, regardless of the prize, and you know what those numbers are.

If in the first image we replace the 0 with a -100 (much wider) what happens? The amount of endings for 1 is still larger than 3. The amount of branches for 1 is still larger than 3. The width of the range of the possible utility of the endings for 1 is [-100 to 8] and for 3 is [-100 to 6] (smaller). The width of the range of the total amount of utility you could generate over the future branches is [1->3->-100 = -96 up to 1->2->8= 11] for 1 and [3->-100= -97 up to 3->6= 9] for 3 (smaller). Is this a good example of what you're trying to convey? If not could you maybe draw an example tree, to show me what you mean?

Ending in negative numbers wouldn't change anything. The amount of endings will still shrink, the amount of branches will shrink, the range of the possible utility of the endings will still shrink or stay the same length, the range of the total amount of utility you could generate over the future branches will also shrink or stay the same length. Try it! Replace any number in any of my models with a negative number or draw your own model and see what happens.

1crl826
It wasn't about being negative or not. My question works just as well with a positive number. I was trying to get at what happens when the range of one of the final branches goes wider than another final branch. If that is the case, then it is mathematically possible for a more recent hinge to be hingier than a hinge further back in time.

If we draw a tree of all possible timelines (and there is an end to the tree) the older choices will always have more branches that will sprout out because of them. If we are purely looking at the possible endings then the 1 in the first image has a range of 4 possible endings, but 2 only has 2 possible endings. If we're looking at branches then the 1 has a range of 6 possible branches, while 2 only has 2 possible branches. If we're looking at ending utility then 1 has a range of [0-8] while 2 only has [7-8]. If we're looking at the range of... (read more)

1crl826
Its seems like it's only impossible because that is how you've drawn it. Not that it isn't actually mathematically impossible. Why couldnt one of the final branches in your example be -100?

I know LessWrong has become less humorous over the years, but this idea popped into my head when I made my bounty comment and I couldn't stop myself from making it. Feel free to downvote this shortform if you want the site to remain a super serious forum. For the rest of you: here is my wanted poster for the reference class problem. Please solve it, it keeps me up at night.

Thanks for replying to my question, but although this was nicely written it doesn't really solve the problem. So I'm putting up a $100 bounty for anyone on this site (or outside it) who can solve this problem by the end of next year. (I don't expect it will work, but it might motivate some people to start thinking about it).

I've touched on this before, but it would be wise to take your meta-certainty into account when calibrating. It wouldn't be hard for me to claim 99.9% accurate calibration by just making a bunch of very easy predictions (an extreme example would be buying a bunch of different dice and making predictions about how they're going to roll). My post goes into more detail but TLDR by trying to predict how accurate your prediction is going to be you can start to distinguish between "harder" and "easier" phenomena. This makes it ... (read more)

I can also "print my own code", if I make a future version of a MRI scan I could give you all the information necessary to understand (that version of) me, but as soon as I look at it my neurological patterns change. I'm not sure what you mean with "add something to it", but I could also give you a copy of my brain scan and add something to it. Humans and computers can of course know a summery of themselves, but never the full picture.

An annoying philosopher would ask whether you could glean knowledge of your "meta-qualia" aka what it consciously feels like to experience what something feels like. The problem is that fully understanding our own consciousness is sadly impossible. If a computer discovers that in a certain location on it's hardware it has stored a picture of a dog, it must then store that information somewhere else, but if it subsequently tries to know everything about itself it must store that knowledge of the knowledge of the picture's location somewh... (read more)

4Stuart_Armstrong
There are computer programs that can print their own code: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quine_(computing) There are also programs which can print their own code and add something to it. Isn't that a way in which the program fully knows itself?

I was not referring to the 'billionaires being universally evil', but to the 'what progressives think' part.

I was talking about the "as progressives think"

2ESRogs
Oh!
billionaires really are universally evil just as progressives think

Can you please add a quantifier when you make assertions about plurals. You can make any group sound dumb/evil by not doing it. E.g I can make atheists sound evil by saying the truthful statement: “Atheists break the law”. But that's only because I didn't add a quantifier like “all”, “most”, “at least one”, “a disproportionate number”, etc.

3ESRogs
Isn't "universally" already the quantifier you seek?
7Virgil Kurkjian
I think that statement reads pretty clearly as both a hypothetical and as a joke; I don't consider "universally evil" to be an especially likely explanation.

And by what metric do you separate the competent experts from the non-competent experts? I also prefer listening to experts because they can explain vast amounts of things in "human" terms, inform me how different things interact and subsequently answer my specific questions. It's just that for any single piece of information you'd rather have a meta-analysis backing you up than an expert opinion.

4Kaj_Sotala
There's no hard-and-fast rule, obviously, just as there's no hard-and-fast rule for figuring out which meta-analyses you can trust (for problems with meta-analyses, see e.g. [1, 2, 3, 4]). But if the experts explicitly discuss the reasons behind their opinions and e.g. why they think that one particular meta-analysis is decent but another one is flawed, you can try try to evaluate how reasonable their claims sound.

Thanks, fixed it for all the files (and made some other small changes)

Well to be fair this was just a short argument against subjective idealism with three pictures to briefly illustrate the point and this was not (nor did it claim to be) a comprehensive list of all the possible models in the field of philosophy of mind (otherwise I would also have to include pictures with the perception being red and the outside being green, or half being green no matter where they are, or everything being red, or everything being green etc)

2Matt Goldenberg
Yes, that's fair.  This was definitely a nitpicky request.

Yes the malicious demon was also the model that sprung to my mind. To answer your question; there are certainly possible minds that have "demons" (or faulty algorithms) that make finding their internal mistakes impossible (but my current model thinks that evolution wouldn't allow those minds to live for very long). Although this argument has the same feature as the simulation argument in that any counterargument can be countered with "But what if the simulation/demon wants you to think that?". I don't have any real solution fo... (read more)

2Matt Goldenberg
I think this is true in every day life, but not true when you're doing philosophy of mind like in the above post.  I don't think any of your argument is wrong, I just think you should include the possibility that your observations don't exist in your reasoning.

I already mentioned in the post:

Most people agree that it isn't smaller than the things you perceive, because if I have perception of something the perception exists

Obviously you can hallucinate a bear without there being a bear, but the hallucination of the bear would exist (according to most people). There are models that say that even sense data does not exist but those models are very strange, unpopular and unpersuasive (for me and most other people). But if you think that both the phenomenon and the noumenon don't exist, then I would be interested in hearing your reasons for that conclusion.

3Matt Goldenberg
Biggest world where that's the case for me is some form of the malicious demon argument.   1. I can make mistakes when doing things like adding 297 + 972, and forget to carry a one. 2. Could there be a malicious demon that always makes me make the same mistakes?  So I really believe the logical answer is 1296, because every time I check using different procedures, I get the same answer? 3. Could the same malicious demon then make me make a separate mistake, so I believed that 2+2 =5? It just has to be a bigger mistake that I make every time, doesn't seem different in kind than the previous thought. 4. Logically, my experience exists because that's a priori the definition of existence.  But couldn't the same malicious demon make me believe that was logically sound, while actually there's some error that I was making every time to draw that conclusion?  Again, that doesn't seem very different in kind than believing 2+2=5. 5. In the space of all possible minds, is it possible there are some that have a malicious demon baked in.  If mine was one, how would I know?

This goes without saying and I apologize if I gave the impression that people should use this argument and it's visualization to persuade rather than to explain.

You are correct, this argument only works if you have a specific epistemic framework and a subjective idealistic framework which might not coincide in most subjective idealist. I only wrote it down because I just so happened to have used this argument successfully against someone with this framework (and I also liked the visualization I made for it). I didn't want to go into what "a given thing is real" means because it's a giant can of philosophical worms and I try to keep my shortforms short. Needless to say that this argument works w... (read more)

2Vladimir_Nesov
(I think making arguments clear is more meaningful than using them for persuasion.)

This is a short argument against subjective idealism. Since I don't think there are (m)any subjective idealist on this site I've decided to make it a shortform rather than a full post.

We don't know how big reality really is. Most people agree that it isn't smaller than the things you perceive, because if I have perception of something the perception exists. Subjective Idealism says that only the perceptions are real and the things outside of our perception don't exist:

But if you're not infinitely certain that subjective ideali... (read more)

2Matt Goldenberg
It bothers me that there are no red things in your perception in any of your pictures.
2Richard_Kennaway
Isn't this a universal argument against everything? "There are so many other things that might be true, so how can you be sure of this one?"
2Vladimir_Nesov
It's not clear what "subjective idealism is correct" means, because it's not clear what "a given thing is real" means (at least in the context of this thread). It should be more clear what a claim means before it makes sense to discuss levels of credence in it. If we are working with credences assigned to hypotheticals, the fact that the number of disjoint hypotheticals incompatible with some hypothetical S is large doesn't in itself make them (when considered altogether) more probable than S. (A sum of an infinite number of small numbers can still be small.) Working with credences in hypotheticals is not the only possible way to reason. If we are talking about weird things like subjective idealism, assumptions about epistemics are not straightforward and should be considered.

I mean I did say in advance that I would publish the raw data, plus I specifically tried to avoid too personal questions, plus I explicitly said in my old posts to not answer questions you feel uncomfortable about, but if it makes you really uncomfortable I'll delete that part of the post.

1Sherrinford
No, sorry - you are right, you mentioned all that in advance.

That's probably because the moderators decided to keep the post a personal blogspot for some reason.

I was trying to convey the same problem, although the underlying issue has much broader implications. Apparently johnswentworth is trying to solve a related problem but I'm currently not up to date with his posts so I can't vouch for the quality. Being able to quantify empirical differences would solve a lot of different philosophical problems in one fell swoop, so that might be something I should look into for my masters degree.

Does the previous belief count as a hit or miss for the purposes of meta-certainty?

A miss. I would like to be able to quantify how far off certain predictions are. I mean sometimes you can quantify it but sometimes you can't. I have previously made a question posts about it that got very little traction so I'm gonna try to solve this philosophical problem myself once I have some more time.

One could also mean that a belief like "probability for world war" could get different odds when asked in the morning, afternoon or night while dice o
... (read more)
1Slider
Well it clarifies that the first of the three kind of directions was intended. If that is a miss what do hits look like? If I have a belief of 50%, 50% coin at what point can I say that the distribution is "confirmed". If the true distribution is 49.9999% vs 50.0001% and that counts as a miss that would make almost all beliefs to be misses with hits being rare theorethical possibiliies. So within rounding error all beliefs that reference probablities not 1 or 0 have meta-certainty 0. Note that in calculating p-values the null hypothesis is not ever delineated a clear miss but there always remains a finite possiblity that noise was the source of the pattern.
What does it mean to have certainty over a degree of certainty?

When I say "I'm 99% certain that my prediction 'the dice has a 1 in 6 chance of rolling a five' is correct", I'm having a degree of certainty about my degree of certainty. I'm basically making a prediction about how good I am at predicting.

How do you go about measuring whether or not the certainty is right?

This is (like I said) very hard. You can only calibrate your meta-certainty by gathering a boatload of data. If I give a 1 in 6 probability of an event occu... (read more)

6ChristianKl
Basically you are not speaking about Bayesian probability but about frequentist probability? If that's the case it's quite good to be explicit about it when you post on LessWrong where we usually mean the Bayesian thing.  In the sense the term probability is used in scientific realism, it's defined about well-defined empiric events either happening or not happening. Event X has probability Y however isn't an empiric event and thus it doesn't have a probability the same way that empiric events do. If it would be easy to define a meta-certainity metric, then it would be easy for you to reference a statistician who properly defined such a thing or a philosopher in the tradition of scientific realism. Even when it's intuitively desireable to define such a thing it's not easy to create it.

Your degree of certainty about your degree of certainty. That's why it's called meta-certainty.

2ChristianKl
That doesn't operationalize what it means to have a degree of certainty over a degree of certainty.  What does it mean to have certainty over a degree of cetainty? How do you go about measuring whether or not the certainty is right?
2Slider
Probability is easy to resolve when things have clear outcomes. I don't find it trivial to apply it to probability distributions. Say that you belive that a coin has 50% chance of coming up heads and 50% chance of coming up tails. Later it turns out that the coin has 49.9% chance of coming up heads and 49.9% chance of coming up tails and 0.2% chance of coming up on it's side. Does the previous belief count as a hit or miss for the purposes of meta-certainty? If I can't agree what hits and misses are then I can't get to ratios. One could also mean that a belief like "probability for world war" could get different odds when asked in the morning, afternoon or night while dice odds get more stable answers. There "belief professed to when asked" has clear outcomes. But that is harder to link to the subject matter of the belief. It could also point to "order of defence" kind of thing, which beliefs would be first in line to be changed. High degree of this kind could mean a thing like "this belief is so important to my worldview that I would rather believe 2+2=5 than disbelieve it". "conviction" could describe it but I think subjective degrees of belief are not supposed point to things like that.

I was writing a post about how you can get more fuzzies (=personal happiness) out of your altruism, but decided that it would be better as a shortform. I know the general advice is to purchase your fuzzies and utilons separately but if you're going to do altruism anyway, and there are ways to increase your happiness of doing so without sacrificing altruistic output, then I would argue you should try to increase that happiness. After all, if altruism makes you miserable you're less likely to do it in the future and if it makes you happy you will b... (read more)

Not really. It's so strange that the US journalistic code of ethics has very strict rules about revealing information from anonymous sources, but doesn't seem to have any rules about revealing information from pseudonymous sources.

I don't think the code cares about the distinction between anonymous / pseudonymous  but about whether there's a journalist-source relationship.

Just wanted to add a link to the newest carbon capture plant that could suck out as much carbon dioxide as 40 million trees. Backed by Bill Gates this plant can capture one ton of co2 for less than $233.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XHX9pmQ6m_s

I think Natural Reasons by Susan Hurley made the same argument (I don't own a copy so I can't check)

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