This post does not talk about strength of preferences so this seems a bit off topic. Nevertheless I think this misses some important considerations. You say:
the probability that one would actually go ahead and vote in a race does correlate with the strength of one's preferences. So, perhaps, this is indeed working as intended.
This doesn't take into account voter suppression. Take for example Texas; from 2012 to 2018, 542 polling places were closed in counties with significant increases in African-American and Latino populations, while counties with fewer m...
the best-researched article I know of on gender differences in chess
So I read this article and occasionally checked the sources and while it's not a bad article by any stretch, the scientific backing is not as strong as they imply. For example they write:
the sexes differ in their -preferences- for competition. As both Kasparov and Repková have intuited, men are simply -more competitive-
With the words "preferences" and "more competitive" being hyperlinks to their source. This implies (especially in the context) a "nature" explanation, but the source doesn't...
Hmmm, I don't know if that works. There have definitely been times were I (phenomenologically) felt inconsistent preferences at the same time, e.g. I simultaneously want to hang a painting there and not hang a painting there. I do get this a lot more with aesthetic preferences than with other preferences for some reason. I think the proposed solution that we're multiple agents is quite plausible, but it does have some problems, so that's why I proposed this solution as a possible alternative.
I tried a bit of a natural experiment to see if rationalists would be more negative towards an idea if it's called socialism vs if it's called it something else. I made two posts that are identical, except one calls it socialism right at the start, and one only reveals I was talking about socialism at the very end (perhaps it would've been better if I hadn't revealed it at all). The former I posted to LW, the latter I posted to the EA forum.
I expected that the comments on LW would be more negative, that I would get more downvotes and gave it a 50% chance t...
My problem with calling things "socialist" is that the word is typically used in a motte-and-bailey fashion: "seizing the means of production, centralized planning" vs "cooperating, helping each other". (Talking about the latter, but in a way that makes an applause light of the former.) This is analogical to "religion" meaning either "following the commandments in ancient books literally, obeying religious leaders" or "perceiving beauty in the universe, helping each other". Neither socialists not christians have invented the concept of human cooperation.
Mo...
Sorry guys. I woke up to another giant batch of new comments and I just don't have the time or energy to respond to them all with the quality that I would want. My comments were already getting shorter and shorter while my longer, more nuanced comments were getting sniped before I could post them. I'm sure some of you made some excellent points.
I cited controlled experiments, you counter with an observation that I have already responded to in both the post and the comments:
...I explained this in this section:
One issue that arises with starting a socialist firms is acquiring initial investing.[27] This is probably because co-ops want to maximize income (wages), not profits. They pursue the interests of their members rather than investors and may sometimes opt to increase wages instead of profits. Capitalist firms on the other hand are explicitly investor owned so investor interests wil
A spot check is supposed to take a number of random sources and check them, not pick the one claim you find most suspicious (that isn't even about co-ops) and use that to dismiss the entire literature on co-ops.
I cite four different studies that show that the theory doesn't match the observations, Lao Mein doesn't cite anything. This is the most extreme version of being a selective skeptic.
I’m not handwaving anything I wrote a whole section about how experiments contradict this and what could explain this:
“Experiments have shown that people randomly allocated to do tasks in groups where they can elect their leaders and/or choose their pay structures are more productive than those who are led by an unelected manager who makes pay choices for them.[20] One study looked at real firms with high levels of worker ownership of shares in the company and found that workers are keener to monitor others, making them more productive than those with low ...
My prior is that other things are less effective and you need evidence to show they are more effective not vice versa.
Appeal to presuppositions always feels weird to me. A socialist could just as easily say 'my priors say the opposite'. In any case, you made a claim of comparison, not me, why is the burden of proof suddenly on me?
Of course. I'm saying it doesn't even get to make that argument which can sometimes muddy the waters enough to make some odd-seeming causes look at least plausibly effective.
I'm trying to explain the scientific literature on co-ops, not persuade you of some scam.
However, in spot-checking whether the statistics were totally wrong, I found myself struggling with wading through signups and links and long mostly irrelevant articles. Of course some nonzero amount of this is likely to happen with spot-checks but it seemed like the layers of links just made it even worse.
This is dishonest, the vast majority of the sources are primary scientific studies and the few times I do refer to secondary sources it isn't irrelevant.
You did handle it right, especially your deleted comment.
...OP to explain what data/model it was based o
But anyway, no, this link doesn't link directly to the study either, it links to a report that links to the study
You can immediately see a button that says "download report" when you click on that link. I wouldn't call that "digging for sources".
The wall of text doesn't really answer my questions about the independence of employee engagement.
Furthermore they suggest that managers have a huge effect on employee engagement, which seems to point to a potential area where this assumption could fail.
It's not independent, co-ops let you vote on managers which al...
I've already explained why socialists firms wouldn't necessarily take over the economy even if they were productive in both the post and other comments.
- They were not direct links to the study, but instead i direct links to articles that talk about the study, so I had to dig further manually.
It was the second source in the post: [2]
- The articles are often big and contain lots of specific things that might not be directly relevant to your point of using it in the post.
There was a summary of it on the linked page itself:
Unfortunately, most employees remain disengaged at work. In fact, low engagement alone costs the global economy $7.8 trillion.
...Even having opened the study, I'm still left wit
There's just no way that things like this are remotely as effective as say GiveWell causes
Do you have any evidence for this?
and it barely even has longtermist points
Not all EA's are longtermists.
What data and model are these estimates of the causal effects of it based on?
You can find my sources in the references section. This was based on a gallup study
Another thing that confuses me is why socialist firms need special support and don't naturally come to dominate the economy. You seem to attribute this to owners extracting value, but that seems short-sighted; presumably if you have an economy with a mixture of socialist and non-socialist firms, and the socialist firms are much more productive, they would grow quicker and become dominant over time.
I...
I have a Mnemonic device for checking whether a model is Gears-like or not.
G E A R S:
Does a variable Generate Empirical Anticipations?
Can a variable be Rederived?
Is a variable hard to Substitute?
There's evidence in the form of observations of events outside the cartesian boundary. There's evidence in internal process of reasoning, whose nature depends on the mind.
My previous comment said:
both empirical and tautological evidence
With "empirical evidence" I meant "evidence in the form of observations of events outside the cartesian boundary" and with "tautological argument" I meant "evidence in internal process of reasoning, whose nature depends on the mind".
...When doing math, evidence comes up more as a guide to intuition than anything explicitly cons
I meant both empirical and tautological evidence, so general information that indicates whether a belief is more or less valid. When you say that you can keep track of truth, why do you believe you can? What is that truth based on, evidence?
It might be interesting to distinguish between "personal hingeyness" and "utilitarian hingeyness". Humans are not utilitarians so we care mostly about stuff that's happening in our own lives, when we die, our personal tree stops and we can't get more hinges. But the "utilitarian hingeyness" continues as it describes all possible utility. I made this with population ethics in mind, but you could totally use the same concept for your personal life, but then the most hingey time for you and the most hingey time for ever...
If in the first image we replace the 0 with a -100 (much wider) what happens? The amount of endings for 1 is still larger than 3. The amount of branches for 1 is still larger than 3. The width of the range of the possible utility of the endings for 1 is [-100 to 8] and for 3 is [-100 to 6] (smaller). The width of the range of the total amount of utility you could generate over the future branches is [1->3->-100 = -96 up to 1->2->8= 11] for 1 and [3->-100= -97 up to 3->6= 9] for 3 (smaller). Is this a good example of what you're trying to convey? If not could you maybe draw an example tree, to show me what you mean?
Ending in negative numbers wouldn't change anything. The amount of endings will still shrink, the amount of branches will shrink, the range of the possible utility of the endings will still shrink or stay the same length, the range of the total amount of utility you could generate over the future branches will also shrink or stay the same length. Try it! Replace any number in any of my models with a negative number or draw your own model and see what happens.
If we draw a tree of all possible timelines (and there is an end to the tree) the older choices will always have more branches that will sprout out because of them. If we are purely looking at the possible endings then the 1 in the first image has a range of 4 possible endings, but 2 only has 2 possible endings. If we're looking at branches then the 1 has a range of 6 possible branches, while 2 only has 2 possible branches. If we're looking at ending utility then 1 has a range of [0-8] while 2 only has [7-8]. If we're looking at the range of...
I know LessWrong has become less humorous over the years, but this idea popped into my head when I made my bounty comment and I couldn't stop myself from making it. Feel free to downvote this shortform if you want the site to remain a super serious forum. For the rest of you: here is my wanted poster for the reference class problem. Please solve it, it keeps me up at night.
Thanks for replying to my question, but although this was nicely written it doesn't really solve the problem. So I'm putting up a $100 bounty for anyone on this site (or outside it) who can solve this problem by the end of next year. (I don't expect it will work, but it might motivate some people to start thinking about it).
I've touched on this before, but it would be wise to take your meta-certainty into account when calibrating. It wouldn't be hard for me to claim 99.9% accurate calibration by just making a bunch of very easy predictions (an extreme example would be buying a bunch of different dice and making predictions about how they're going to roll). My post goes into more detail but TLDR by trying to predict how accurate your prediction is going to be you can start to distinguish between "harder" and "easier" phenomena. This makes it ...
I can also "print my own code", if I make a future version of a MRI scan I could give you all the information necessary to understand (that version of) me, but as soon as I look at it my neurological patterns change. I'm not sure what you mean with "add something to it", but I could also give you a copy of my brain scan and add something to it. Humans and computers can of course know a summery of themselves, but never the full picture.
An annoying philosopher would ask whether you could glean knowledge of your "meta-qualia" aka what it consciously feels like to experience what something feels like. The problem is that fully understanding our own consciousness is sadly impossible. If a computer discovers that in a certain location on it's hardware it has stored a picture of a dog, it must then store that information somewhere else, but if it subsequently tries to know everything about itself it must store that knowledge of the knowledge of the picture's location somewh...
I was not referring to the 'billionaires being universally evil', but to the 'what progressives think' part.
I was talking about the "as progressives think"
billionaires really are universally evil just as progressives think
Can you please add a quantifier when you make assertions about plurals. You can make any group sound dumb/evil by not doing it. E.g I can make atheists sound evil by saying the truthful statement: “Atheists break the law”. But that's only because I didn't add a quantifier like “all”, “most”, “at least one”, “a disproportionate number”, etc.
And by what metric do you separate the competent experts from the non-competent experts? I also prefer listening to experts because they can explain vast amounts of things in "human" terms, inform me how different things interact and subsequently answer my specific questions. It's just that for any single piece of information you'd rather have a meta-analysis backing you up than an expert opinion.
Thanks, fixed it for all the files (and made some other small changes)
Well to be fair this was just a short argument against subjective idealism with three pictures to briefly illustrate the point and this was not (nor did it claim to be) a comprehensive list of all the possible models in the field of philosophy of mind (otherwise I would also have to include pictures with the perception being red and the outside being green, or half being green no matter where they are, or everything being red, or everything being green etc)
Yes the malicious demon was also the model that sprung to my mind. To answer your question; there are certainly possible minds that have "demons" (or faulty algorithms) that make finding their internal mistakes impossible (but my current model thinks that evolution wouldn't allow those minds to live for very long). Although this argument has the same feature as the simulation argument in that any counterargument can be countered with "But what if the simulation/demon wants you to think that?". I don't have any real solution fo...
I already mentioned in the post:
Most people agree that it isn't smaller than the things you perceive, because if I have perception of something the perception exists
Obviously you can hallucinate a bear without there being a bear, but the hallucination of the bear would exist (according to most people). There are models that say that even sense data does not exist but those models are very strange, unpopular and unpersuasive (for me and most other people). But if you think that both the phenomenon and the noumenon don't exist, then I would be interested in hearing your reasons for that conclusion.
This goes without saying and I apologize if I gave the impression that people should use this argument and it's visualization to persuade rather than to explain.
You are correct, this argument only works if you have a specific epistemic framework and a subjective idealistic framework which might not coincide in most subjective idealist. I only wrote it down because I just so happened to have used this argument successfully against someone with this framework (and I also liked the visualization I made for it). I didn't want to go into what "a given thing is real" means because it's a giant can of philosophical worms and I try to keep my shortforms short. Needless to say that this argument works w...
This is a short argument against subjective idealism. Since I don't think there are (m)any subjective idealist on this site I've decided to make it a shortform rather than a full post.
We don't know how big reality really is. Most people agree that it isn't smaller than the things you perceive, because if I have perception of something the perception exists. Subjective Idealism says that only the perceptions are real and the things outside of our perception don't exist:
But if you're not infinitely certain that subjective ideali...
I mean I did say in advance that I would publish the raw data, plus I specifically tried to avoid too personal questions, plus I explicitly said in my old posts to not answer questions you feel uncomfortable about, but if it makes you really uncomfortable I'll delete that part of the post.
That's probably because the moderators decided to keep the post a personal blogspot for some reason.
I was trying to convey the same problem, although the underlying issue has much broader implications. Apparently johnswentworth is trying to solve a related problem but I'm currently not up to date with his posts so I can't vouch for the quality. Being able to quantify empirical differences would solve a lot of different philosophical problems in one fell swoop, so that might be something I should look into for my masters degree.
Does the previous belief count as a hit or miss for the purposes of meta-certainty?
A miss. I would like to be able to quantify how far off certain predictions are. I mean sometimes you can quantify it but sometimes you can't. I have previously made a question posts about it that got very little traction so I'm gonna try to solve this philosophical problem myself once I have some more time.
One could also mean that a belief like "probability for world war" could get different odds when asked in the morning, afternoon or night while dice o...
What does it mean to have certainty over a degree of certainty?
When I say "I'm 99% certain that my prediction 'the dice has a 1 in 6 chance of rolling a five' is correct", I'm having a degree of certainty about my degree of certainty. I'm basically making a prediction about how good I am at predicting.
How do you go about measuring whether or not the certainty is right?
This is (like I said) very hard. You can only calibrate your meta-certainty by gathering a boatload of data. If I give a 1 in 6 probability of an event occu...
Your degree of certainty about your degree of certainty. That's why it's called meta-certainty.
I was writing a post about how you can get more fuzzies (=personal happiness) out of your altruism, but decided that it would be better as a shortform. I know the general advice is to purchase your fuzzies and utilons separately but if you're going to do altruism anyway, and there are ways to increase your happiness of doing so without sacrificing altruistic output, then I would argue you should try to increase that happiness. After all, if altruism makes you miserable you're less likely to do it in the future and if it makes you happy you will b...
Not really. It's so strange that the US journalistic code of ethics has very strict rules about revealing information from anonymous sources, but doesn't seem to have any rules about revealing information from pseudonymous sources.
I don't think the code cares about the distinction between anonymous / pseudonymous but about whether there's a journalist-source relationship.
Just wanted to add a link to the newest carbon capture plant that could suck out as much carbon dioxide as 40 million trees. Backed by Bill Gates this plant can capture one ton of co2 for less than $233.
I think Natural Reasons by Susan Hurley made the same argument (I don't own a copy so I can't check)
You might find my post on this interesting.