I'll have to take your word on how it would bother you, but I think a crucial difference is that in the instance of the cute salt shaker, the instinct is to protect - notice that the word used, "cruel," is dependent upon how it's received by the anthropomorphized salt shaker. If I tell the soup, "You're too cold and have too high a potato-to-clam ratio!" - is it seen as cruel or mean? It seems more like it's seen as, like you said, hostile - a statement more about my feelings in intent than the "feelings" of the salt shaker in...
My point is that it's perceived as nasty and cruel at all, rather than bizarre or slightly rude or honest. Imagine it was an excessively large salt shaker - say, several feet tall. And faced it and said, "You're worthless because you're too large to be useful." People would give me a quizzical look, like, what's wrong with this guy? But the instinct wouldn't be to protect the large salt shaker.
I actually included that because of exactly that response from various girls about objects like hotel shampoo bottles, Japanese candies, a very small salt-shaker, a tiny spoon, etc. It usually goes something like, "Look at that salt shaker; it's so cute." And then I look at the salt shaker and say, "You're worthless because you're too small to be useful." And the girl will go, "Don't say that!" and then immediately grabs the salt shaker.
One time I drew pictures on a piece of scratchpaper in such a way that when a Japanese can...
tl;dr: Cuteness is the word that we use when we want something to experience a feeling of safety or otherwise be more confident than we think they would feel without special effort to make them feel that way.
Thanks for expanding. I want to throw out a warning that we're treading dangerously close to the foul line, but I think we're still in-bounds.
Using the word "cute" sarcastically is a very different use of the word with a completely different meaning.
I understand the general point that words can have different meanings, and I'm open to t...
It seems very oversimplified to say, "We think babies are cute because we have to." "Cuteness" casts a pretty wide net when you start thinking of all the things we say are "cute." A sample list of things I've heard described as cute:
It seems like we reserve the word for "things that are vulnerable/harmless/ineffective...
A priest goes before the altar and prostrates himself before it and says, "I am nothing before you God." A rich man comes in after him, prostrates himself before the altar and says, "I am nothing before you God." A beggar comes off the street and prostrates himself before the altar and says, "I am nothing before you God."
The rich man then whispers to the priest, "Look who thinks HE'S nothing."
Puns are a hard fit, I admit. I especially have a hard time with them because they don't produce laughter in me; I have a hard time recognizing them as humor unless they're presented in the same way as other jokes, or pre-identified as jokes.
But that joke has status built into it, as well - for example, it's not funny to say "star-mangled spanner sounds like star-spangled banner."
Personally, I call these "Bob Hope Humor," which is when people laugh to demonstrate that they "get" the joke, not because it actually tickles them.
I have spent a great deal of time thinking about humor, and I've arrived at a place somewhat close to yours. Humor is how we pass on lessons about status and fitness, and we do that using pattern recognition. I heard a comedian describe comedy by saying, "It's always funny when someone falls down. The question is, is it still funny if you push them?" He said for a smaller group of the population, it is. Every joke has a person being displayed as not fit - even if we have to take an object, or an abstraction, and anthropomorphize it. This is the b...
I think so, but it's important to identify the time at which it became predictable - for example, you could only predict that you were painting yourself into a corner just prior to when you made the last brushstroke that made the strip(s) of paint covering the exit path too wide to jump over. This seems hard.
Also, you'd have to know what your utility function was going to be in the future to know that some event was even worth predicting. This seems hard, too.
The reason ancient Greek writers thought women were like children is the same reason men in all cultures think women are like children: There are significant incentives to do so. Men who treat women as children reap very large rewards compared to those men who treat women as equals.
EDIT: If someone thinks this is an invalid point, please explain in a reply. If the downvote(s) is just "I really dislike anyone believing what he's saying is true, even if a lot of evidence supports it" (regardless of whether or not evidence currently supports it) th...
This conversation has been hacked.
The parent comment points to an article presenting a hypothesis. The reply flatly drops an assertion which will predictably derail conversation away from any discussion of the article.
If you're going to make a comment like that, and if you prefix it with something along the lines of "The hypothesis in the article seems superfluous to me; men in all cultures treat women like children because...", and you point to sources for this claim, then I would confidently predict no downvotes will result.
(ETA: well, in this ...
I don't want to disrespect the graciousness of conceding this minor point, but I also don't have a great suggestion. Maybe something as simple as
someone at least making an attempt at substantiating their accusations of groupthink
becoming
someone backing up their accusations of groupthink
? But up to you, I just wanted to point out that "attempt" was bringing in some probably-unintended judgments.
EDIT: This comment does not apply to the current version of the post.
Considering the post to which you linked (about labeling the cryonics opinion on LW as groupthink) has no attempts at rebuttal, it seems like it merits an answer instead of merely dismissing it as an "attempt" - which is just saying, "This isn't sufficient" without any statement about what would be sufficient.
This is a form of cognitive dissonance, where you notice your actions and your values are incongruent, and the resulting discomfort motivates you to reduce the gap between them. You can change your actions and leave your values the same, leave your actions the same and change your values, or somewhere in between.
Other people much, much prefer you change your actions - this is because your values are the guilt-free way of manipulating you. If I want Albert to make a paperclip, and I know Albert also wants to make a paperclip, then I can motivate Albert by ...
Here's some metaphors I use; if it's bogus, someone please crush them.
Imagine a city with a slum. People ask why the police don't clean up the slum. The police know that if they come in and break up the slum, they'll decentralize the crime - better to keep it fenced in, under watchful eyes, than run wild.
I see a lot of people working roughly with the model that religion is an infection. Sometimes atheism is presented as antibiotics, but regardless of what the prescription is, there seems to be an impression that religion is some kind of foreign force, wh...
… sometimes. This seems like a vastly overly broad requirement for humor. First off, there are puns. Some people don't find them to be humor, but I don't have to look far to find a non-pun exception - I fail to see a status lowering in today's Square Root of Minus Garfield, for instance, and even if it's not a masterpiece, it's somewhat funny.
I could find many other examples which only incidentally involved social status changes - Today's xkcd is a put-down, but the relevant status (dominance of chemical elements over Greek elements) is so drastic that no ...
If my debate partner is willing to change his mind or stop debating because the community disagrees, I want to know that. I also don't think a) the community's karma votes represent some sort of evidence of an argument's rightness or b) that anyone has a right to such evidence that this tactic denies them.
I am insincerely up-voting someone: True.
They are using this as peer information about their rationality: People are crazy, the world is mad. Besides, who really considers the average karma voter their peer?
Encouraging a person C to down-vote them: Also, person D who only upvotes because they see someone else already upvoted, so they know they won't upvote alone.
Excessively aggressive comments may not themselves contain objectionable content, but they tend to have a deleterious effect on the conversation, which certainly does affect subsequent content.
(General "you") Only if you see the partner who is the target of aggression as your equal. If you get the impression that target is below your status, or deserves to be, you will reward the comment's aggression with an upvote.
For who? Quote from my comment:
Publicly failing in the quantity necessary to maximize your learning growth is very low-status and not many people have the stomach for it.
We have preferences for what we want to experience, and we have preferences for what those preferences are. We prefer to prefer to be wrong, but it's rare we actually prefer it. Readily admitting you're wrong is the right decision morally, but practically all it does is incentivize your debate partners to go ad hominem or ignore you.
I thought about it further, and decided that I would have moral qualms about it. First, you are insincerely up-voting someone, and they are using this as peer information about their rationality. Second, you are encouraging a person C to down-vote them (person B) if they think person B's comment should just be at 0. But then when you down-vote B, their karma goes to -2, which person C did not intend to do with his vote.
So I think this policy is just adding noise to the system, which is not consistent with the LW norm of wanting a high signal to noise ratio.
This argument would have to apply to people who were born completely blind, or completely deaf. Just imagine that all humans are echolocation-deaf/blind.