I appreciate the memetic-evolution framing, but I’m somewhat skeptical of the strong emphasis on tension-reduction as the primary (or even a major) explanatory driver of successionist beliefs. Given that you take successionism to be “false and dangerous,” it seems natural that your preferred explanation foregrounds memetics; but that sits a bit uneasily with the stated goal of analyzing why people hold these views irrespective of their truth value, which you state you're doing at the beginning.
Even if we bracket the object level, a purely memetic or cognitive-dissonance-based explanation risks drifting into an overly broad epistemic relativism/skepticism. Under many accounts of truth—process reliabilism being one—what makes a belief true is precisely that it’s formed by a reliable process. If we exclude the possibility that people arrive at their views through such processes and instead explain them almost entirely via dissonance-reduction pressures, we risk undermining (almost) all belief formation, not just things like successionism.
There’s a related danger: sociological/memetic explanations of belief formation can easily shade into ad hominem-esque critiques if not handled carefully (of course, ad hominems in some forms -- i.e. talking about someones likelihood to get to a true belief -- is relevant to evidence, but it's bad for good epistemic hygiene and discourse). One could tell a similar story about why people believe in, say, AI x-risk—Tyler Cowen has suggested that part of the appeal is the feeling of possessing secret, high-stakes insight. And while this may capture a fragment of the causal picture for some individuals, to me, it’s clearly not the dominant explanation for most thoughtful, epistemically serious people. And if it were the main cause, we would be right to distrust the resulting beliefs, and yet this doesn't seem particularly more convincing in one case or another as an explanation (unless you already think one is false and one is true).
So while memetic fitness and tension-resolution offer part of an explanation, I’m not convinced they do most of the work for most people. For most, object-level reasoning—about value theory, metaethics, consciousness, agency, and long-run trajectories—plays a substantial role in why they end up where they do. To the extent that successionist ideologies spread, part of that spread will track memetic dynamics, but part will also track genuine and often rigorous attempts to reason about the future of value and the structure of possible worlds.
Curious what people think about this, though, and very open to constructive criticism/I don't feel very confident about this.
While I think LW’s epistemic culture is better than most, one thing that seems pretty bad is that occasionally mediocre/shitty posts get lots of upvotes simply because they’re written by [insert popular rationalist thinker].
Of course, if LW were truly meritocratic (which it should be), this shouldn’t matter — but in my experience, it descriptively does.
Without naming anyone (since that would be unproductive), I wanted to know if others notice this too? And aside from simply trying not to upvote something because it’s written by a popular author, anyone have good ideas for preventing this?
“Albania has introduced its first artificial intelligence “minister”, who addressed parliament on Thursday in a debut speech.” lol, what???
Not sure how much this really matters vs is just a PR thing, but it’s maybe something people on here should know about.
Thanks for the comment!
I hear the critique, but I’m not sure I’m as confident as you are that it’s a good one.
The first reason is that I’m unsure whether the trade-off between credibility for having a wiki page doesn’t outweigh the loss of control.
The second reason is that I don’t really think there is much losing control (minus in extreme cases like you mention) - you can’t be super ideological on wiki sites, minus saying things like “and here’s what critics say”. On that point, I think it’s just pretty important for the standard article on a topic to have critiques of it (as long as they are honest/ good rebuttals, which I’m somewhat confident that the wiki moderators can ensure). Another point on this is that LWers can just be on top of stuff to ensure that the information isn’t clearly outdated or confused.
Curious to hear pushback, though.
1Good call - that was from an earlier version of this post.
Good point, and I think I somewhat agree. If you think we just reach an intelligence explosion at some level (seems pretty plausible), you wouldn't update to previous pre-training levels because we'd be closer and what really matters is hitting that point (and post-training can possibly take you to that point). While it means that you shouldn't update towards before pre-training, I still think the general point of being a large update back still stands (perhaps this point--the degree-- depends on some other priors, though, which I didn't want to get into).
In a similar vain, I’ve always thought Chesterton’s fence reasoning was a bit self defeating — in that, using chestertons fence as a conceptual tool is, in itself, often breaking it. Often people do the tradition thing for cultural, familial, religious reasons. While I understand it’s a heuristic and this doesn’t actually undermine the fence, this seems like an underrated point.
I saw this good talk on the Manifest youtube channel about using historical circumstances to calibrate predictions - this seems better for training than regular forecasting because you have faster feedback loop between the prediction and the resolution.
I wanted to know if anyone had recommendations on where to find some software or site where I can do more examples of this (I already know about the estimation game). I would do this myself, but it seems like it would be pretty difficult to do the research on the situation without learning the outcome. I would also appreciate people giving takes about why this might be a bad way to get better at forecasting.
Here's an argument against this view - yes, there is some cost associated with helping the citizens of a country and the benefit becomes less great as you become a rentier state. However, while the benefits do go down and economic prosperity becomes greater and greater for the very few due to AGI, the costs of quality life become significantly cheaper to help others in the society. It is not clear that the rate at which the benefits diminish actually outpaces the reduction in costs of helping people.
In response to this, one might be able to say something like regular people become totally obsolete wrt efficiency and the costs, while reduced stay positive. However, this really depends on how you think human psychology works -- while some people would turn on humans the second they can, there are likely some people who will just keep being empathetic (perhaps this is merely a vestigial trait from the past, but it irrelevant -- the value exists now, and some people might be willing to pay some cost to avoid shaping this value even beyond their own lives). We have a similar situation in our world: namely, animals -- while people aren't motivated to care about animals for power reasons (they could do all the factory farming they want, and it would be better), some still do (I take it that this is a vestigial trait of generalizing empathy to the abstract, but as stated, the description for why this comes to be seems largely irrelevant).
Because of how cheap it is to actually help someone in this world, you may just need one or a few people to care just a little bit about helping people and that could make everyone better off. Given that we have a bunch of vegans now (the equivalent to empathetic but powerful people post AGI), depending on how low the costs are to make lives happy (presumably there is a negative correlation between the costs to make lives better and the inequality of power, money, etc), it might be the case that regular citizens end up pretty alright on the other side.
Curious what people think about this!
Also, many of the links at beginning (YouTube, World Bank, Rentier states, etc) don't work.
In case anyone wants it, Rob Long wrote an excellent summary and analysis of this paper here.