All of florian's Comments + Replies

florian00

I don't think that's a good question. You're right that, technically, nobody knows, but my impression is that many physicists would be comfortable assigning p > 0.9 that it will.

0A1987dM
The LHC has already collected a few sigma's worth of evidence that the Higgs boson exists. (I'm assuming find means ‘> 5 sigma’ here.)
florian420

Making the (flawed) assumption that in a disagreement, they cannot both be wrong.

1Endovior
Perhaps, but it is rather unlikely that they are equally wrong. It is far more likely that one will be less wrong than the other. Indeed, improving on our knowledge by the comparison between such fractions of correctness would seem to be the whole point of Bayesian rationality.
4shokwave
I have also heard it quoted like this.

Also, they could be wrong about whether they actually disagree.

florian10

It's a fictional example and it's not that uncommon in fiction to have terminology that's almost, but not entirely like the equivalent in the real world. I find that kind of thing amusing, so I thought the author might have a similar sense of humour, so it could be intentional. But I admit that Occam's razor supports the theory that it's simply a mistake.

0MarkusRamikin
Hm... That doesn't strike me as true, actually. Can you think of an example or three? EDIT: Actually now that i think of it, this can be true for when an author is creating an alternative reality but wants things to be familiar to the audience. Like in Dragon Age, all the titles of the nobility and such things are similar to real-world terms for no special reason. But then compare Warhammer 40k, which is not an alternative world but rather a far future of ours: a computer is a "cogitator" and a camera is a "picter". Clearly different words, but rather than complete inventions, they're obviously based on somewhat plausible alternative etymologies. However, that doesn't apply to a story like this, which is trying to logically follow from its starting premise, and in which the formation of the terms happens wthin the story itself. It's that plausible etymology that is lacking.
florian20

I assumed that was intentional, as the players would not know the terminology of chess if they had to deduce the rules.

8kilobug
Thanks for the excuse, but I've to admit... I was really a mistake :/ In French we say "échec" and "échec et mat" and the name of the game is "les Échecs". So... I confused the English terms. But well, your excuse is cute, so I'll leave the mistake in the text ;)
3MarkusRamikin
That doesn't seem to make sense. What are the odds they would have invented the word "chessmate" if the computer never used it?
florian10

Sorry, I somehow missed the "recent" in the title.

florian20

I recently read Stuart Sutherland's Irrationality, which also explains a lot of the more common biases and errors in reasoning. Decent book, but -again- probably not a lot of new ideas for less wrongers.

1lukeprog
Sutherland's book is good but older.
0Dr_Manhattan
I read a number of these but particularly liked Sutherland, don't remember why tho.
florian140

The incentive is weaker than you seem to suggest. Surely, I gain nothing tangible by inducing people to tiptoe carefully around my minefield.

Yes, you do. If everything unpleasant to you causes you a huge amount of suffering instead of, say, mild annoyance, other people (utilitarians) will abstain from doing things that are unpleasant to you as the negative utility to you outweighs the positive utility to them.

3Perplexed
What you say is certainly true if the utility monster is simply exaggerating. But I understood VM to be discussing someone who claims offense where no offense (or negligible offense) actually exists. Or, someone who self-modifies to sincerely feel offended, though originally there was no such sensitivity. But in any case, the real source of the problem in VM's scenario is adhering to an ethical system which permits one to be exploited by utility monsters - real or feigned. My own ethical system avoids being exploited because I accept personal disutility so as to produce utility for others only to the extent that they reciprocate. So someone who exaggerates the disutility they derive from, say, my humming may succeed in keeping me silent in their presence, but this success may come at a cost regarding how much attention I pay to their other desires. So the would-be utility monster is only hurting itself by feeding me false information about its utility function.