Two of us showed up, we'll be hanging out in the back under the large square white tent if anyone else is looking
Maybe buying IPV4 addresses? https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=32416043 some discussion here.
Civilization has been trying to move to ipv6 for decades, but IPV4 is still widespread and commands a premium. With more internet growth this could blow up more.
Yeah, the version I liked was that someone else bribed a guard/guards into letting him kill himself but that's basically the same.
It's been hard keeping to it, but I do notice myself being more productive when I do. One thing that has stayed is not having an email tab always open. Hoping that over time I get better at following it strictly; it has such immediate positive effects that I'm not so worried I'll gradually forget and stop, like happened with other productivity attempts (e.g. making to-do lists.)
Consider the shortest algorithm that simulates the universe perfectly.
Meaningless, on my metaphysics. Definition is circular - in order to define fundamental you have to already assume that the universe can be simulated "perfectly", but to define a perfect simulation you'll need to rely on concepts like "fundamental", or "external reality".
Assuming that the way the universe looks changes continuously with these constants, it seems strange to insist that if the changes are so small you can't notice them they don't exist.
The assumption is meaningless....
On my metaphysics it's not coherent to talk about "fundamental" constants, for multiple reasons. Try tabooing that and ask about what, if anything, is actually meant.
If you can't measure any of these constants past a hundred significant digits, what does it mean to talk about the constant having any digits beyond that? And what does it mean for a constant to be fundamental?
I really liked this post. As a result of reading it, I'm trialling the following:
Every time I go on my computer or phone, I need to specifically have a plan for one specific thing I am going to do. This can be "check all notifications from X/Y/Z), or "write this one long email", or even, "15 minutes of unstructured time", but it should always be intentional. If I get the urge to do something else, I need to save it for a future session, which can be immediately afterwards.
Yes, but you said they're buying the no-coup shares, which subsidizes a coup. Article contradicts itself.
Mars buys shares that pay out 5 million Dogecoin if there is not a coup
Suppose the prior implied probability of a regime change is 0.20. Mars can buy its shares for 1 million Dogecoin, pocketing a risk-free net utility equivalent to 4 million Dogecoin.
I'm confused - if the prior probability of a coup is 20% and Mars is buying shares that pay out if no coup, Mars would pay 4M?
I wrote the post, everything is true.
In general I find stories of how others have succeeded interesting and useful. It's also interesting to see how various markets are inefficient at times. Same motivation as my post on prediction markets last year.
I have nothing wrong with the probability request here, I have a problem with the scenario. What kind of evidence are you getting that makes these two and only these two outcomes possible? Solomonoff/Bayes would never rule out any outcome, just make some of them low probability.
I've talked about the binding problem in Solomonoff before, see https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/Jqwb7vEqEFyC6sLLG/solomonoff-induction-and-sleeping-beauty and posts it links back to. See also "dust theory".
Not deployed yet except some minor positions. Will probably be ~30% private fiat funds, some crypto funds, and most chasing short term yield farming opportunities or related DeFi plays. It's not something easily scalable and requires quite a lot of active management.
I blew away both the market and crypto this year with a range of exotic strategies and low risk. Think it's basically impossible to repeat performance at current levels, but it seems hard to lose money given my risk appetite and diversification, and the only way I wouldn't make significant money is if crypto enters a bear which is probably correlated to a stock market bear as well, in which case I'm probably close to flat.
Putting together an article, for now here's 22 predictions:
Tether is worth less than 99c by end of year: 2%
Biden or Harris mentions GPT-4: 2%
At least one school district or university is reported to tell students not to use language models (not just one teacher): 15%
A deepfake goes viral (>1 million views) with very few people, at first, realizing that it's fake: 15%
Russia is widely considered to have captured the capital of Ukraine, Kyiv: 10%
S&P 500 goes up: 80%
Annual CPI inflation released Jan 2023 (for Dec 2022) over 3.5%: 40%
The 7 day roll...
Probability is in the mind. Your question is meaningless. What is meaningful is what your expectations should be for specific experiences, and that's going to depend on the kind of evidence you have and Solomonoff induction - it's pretty trivial once you accept the relevant premises.
It's just not meaningful to say "X and Y exist", you need to reframe it in terms of how various pieces of evidence affect induction over your experiences.
There's been a handful of kashrus scandals where people mixed in meat from other supply chains into stuff that was supposed to be kosher certified, which seems a useful reference point for how this can slip through even with an extensive monitoring system intended to prevent that.
Technically part of the US, if you move here as a US citizen you get 0% capital gains tax rates which is really good if you're investing/trading/etc. Would love if more people moved here.
San Juan, Puerto Rico.
I'm currently looking into buying a bank or insurance company to do exactly that.
It's really non-trivial to borrow large amounts at low rates to lend. Way easier said than done.
Crypto yields are currently 20%+ annualized with fairly low risk if you know what you're doing
No, because that's a meaningless claim about external reality. The only meaningful claims in this context are predictions.
"Do you expect to see chaos, or a well formed world like you recall seeing in the past, and why?"
The latter. Ultimately that gets grounded in Occam's razor and Solomonoff induction making the latter simpler.
I've spent a lot of time and written a handful of posts (including one on the interaction between Solomonoff and SIA) building my ontology. Parts may be mistaken but I don't believe it's "confused". Tabooing core concepts will just make it more tedious to explain, probably with no real benefit.
In particular, the only actual observations anyone has are of the form "I have observed X", and that needs to be the input into Solomonoff. You can't input a bird's eye view because you don't have one.
Anyway, it seems weird that being altruistic affects the agent's d...
A couple of things.
If you're ok with time inconsistent probabilities then you can be dutch booked.
I think of identity in terms of expectations. Right before you go to sleep, you have a rational subjective expectation of "waking up" with any number from 1-20 with a 5% probability.
It's not clear how the utility function in your first case says to accept the bet given that you have the probability as 50/50. You can't be maximizing utility, have that probability, and accept the bet - that's just not what maximizes probability under those assumptions.
My version of the bet shouldn't depend on if you care about other agents or not, because the bet doesn't affect other agents.
You can start with Bostrom's book on anthropic bias. https://www.anthropic-principle.com/q=book/table_of_contents/
The bet is just each agent is independently offered a 1:3 deal. There's no dependence as in EYs post.
You're just rejecting one of the premises here, and not coming close to dissolving the strong intuitions / arguments many people have for SIA. If you insist the probability is 50/50 you run into paradoxes anyway (if each agent is offered a 1:3 odds bet, they would reject it if they believe the probability is 50%, but you would want in advance for agents seeing green to take the bet.)
Yes, rejecting probability and refusing to make predictions about the future is just wrong here, no matter how many fancy primitives you put together.
I disagree that standard LW rejects that, though.
Variance only increases chance of Yes here. If cases spike and we're averaging over 100k, reporting errors won't matter. If we've averaging 75k, a state dumping extra cases could plausibly push it over 100k
Two Moderna doses here with no significant side effects
I know what successful communication looks like.
What does successful representation look like?
Yes, it appears meaningless, I and others have tried hard to figure out a possible account of it.
I haven't tried to get a fully general account of communication but I'm aware there's been plenty of philosophical work, and I can see partial accounts that work well enough.
I'm communicating, which I don't have a fully general account of, but is something I can do and has relatively predictable effects on my experiences.
Not at all, to the extent head is a territory.
What does it mean for a model to "represent" a territory?
>On the other hand, when I observe that other nervous systems are similar to my own nervous system, I infer that other people have subjective experiences similar to mine.
That's just part of my model. To the extent that empathy of this nature is useful for predicting what other people will do, that's a useful thing to have in a model. But to then say "other people have subjective experiences somewhere 'out there' in external reality" seems meaningless - you're just asserting your model is "real", which is a category error in my view.
My own argument, see https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/zm3Wgqfyf6E4tTkcG/the-short-case-for-verificationism and the post it links back to.
It seems that if external reality is meaningless, then it's difficult to ground any form of morality that says actions are good or bad insofar as they have particular effects on external reality.
But, provided you speak about this notion, why would verificationismism lead to external world anti-realism?
Anti-realism is not quite correct here, it's more that claims about external reality are meaningless as opposed to false.
...One could argue that synthetic statements aren't really about external reality: What we really mean is "If I were to check, my experiences would be as if there were a tree in what would seem to be my garden". Then our ordinary language wouldn't be meaningless. But this would be a highly revisionary proposal. We arguably don't
I granted your supposition of such things existing. I myself don't believe any objective external reality exists, as I don't think those are meaningful concepts.
Perhaps. It's not clear to me how such facts could exist, or what claims about them mean.
If you've got self locating uncertainty, though, you can't have objective facts about what atoms near you are doing.
>If they didn't write the sentence, then they are not identical to me and don't have to accept that they are me.
Sure, some of those people are not identical to some other people. But how do you know which subset you belong to? A version of you that deluded themselves into thinking they wrote the sentence is subjectively indistinguishable from any other member of the set. You can only get probabilistic knowledge against, i.e. "most of the people in my position are not deluding themselves", which lets you make probabilistic predictions. But saying "X is true" and grounding that as "X is probable" doesn't seem to work. What does "X is true" mean here, when there's a chance it's not true for you?
I'm tentatively ok with claims of the sort that a multiverse exists, although I suspect that too can be dissolved.
Note that in your example, the relevant subset of the multiverse is all the people who are deluding themselves into thinking they typed that sentence. If there's no meaningful sense in which you're self located as someone else vs that subset, then there's no meaningful sense in which you "actually" typed it.
What form of realism is consistent with my statement about level 4?
External reality is not a meaningful concept, some form of verificationism is valid. I argued for it in various ways previously on LW, one plausible way to get there is through a multiverse argument.
Verificationism w.r.t level 3 multiverse - "there's no fact of the matter where the electron is before it's observed, it's in both places and you have self locating uncertainty."
Verificationism w.r.t. level 4 multiverse - "there's no fact of the matter as to anything, as long as it's true in some subsets of the multiverse and false in others, you just have self locating uncertainty."
Lots of people seem to accept the first but not the second.
How is that different than say the CIA taking ESP seriously, MKULTRA etc?
From what I can tell, most of the people who lost significant sums on the CO2 markets were generally profitable and +EV. Although I guess I'm mostly seeing input from the people who hang out on the discord all day, which is a skewed sample.
Prediction markets are tiny compared to real world markets. Something like $100 million total volume on Polymarket since inception. There just aren't as many people making sure they're efficient.
It's actually a bit worse - there's a 2% fee paid to liquidity providers, so if you only bet and don't provide liquidity then you lose money on average. Of course you can lose money providing liquidity too if the market moves against you. Anyone can provide liquidity and get a share of that 2%.
Probability is in the mind. It's relative to the information you have.
In practical terms, you typically don't have good enough resolution to get individual percentage point precision, unless it's in a quantitative field with well understood processes.
USDC is a very different thing than tether.
Do you have most of your net worth tied up in Eth, or something other than USD at any rate? If not I don't see how the volatility point could apply.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dendrochronology tree rings gets us 14k years