All of Karthik Tadepalli's Comments + Replies

For what it's worth, your "small and vulnerable" post is what convinced me that people can really have an unbelievable amount of kindness and compassion in them, a belief that made me much more receptive to EA. Stay out of the misery mines pls!

I've seen a lot of EAs who are earnest. I think they are in for hurt down the line. I am not earnest in that way. I am not committed to tight philosophical justifications of my actions or values. I dont follow arguments to the end of the line. But one day I heard will macaskill describe the drowning child thought experiment, thought "yeah that makes sense to me", and added that to my list of thoughts. When I realized I was on the path to an economics PhD (for my own passions), I figured it was worth looking up this EA stuff and seeing what it had to say. I... (read more)

Great essay. Before this, I thought that the impact of more noisy signals about Normies was mainly through selectors being risk-averse. This essay pointed out why even if selectors are risk neutral, noisy signals matter by increasing the weight of the prior. Given that selectors also tend to have negative priors about Normies, noisy signals really function to prevent positive updates.

You're right that legibility alone isn't the whole story, but the reason I think Presties would still be advantaged in the many-slots-few-applicants story is that admissions officers also have a higher prior on Prestie quality. The impact of AOs' favorable prior about Presties is, I think, well acknowledged; the impact of their more precise signals is not, which is why I think this post is onto something important.

If AI risk arguments mainly apply to consequentialist (which I assume is the same as EU-maximizing in the OP) AI, and the first half of the OP is right that such AI is unlikely to arise naturally, does that make you update against AI risk?

2tailcalled
Yes Not quite the same, but probably close enough. You can have non-consequentialist EU maximizers if e.g. the actionspace and statespace is small and someone manually computed a table of the expected utilities. In that case, the consequentialism is in the entity that computed the table of the expected utilities, not the entity that selects an action based on the table. (Though I suppose such an agent is kind of pointless since you could as well just store a table of the actions to choose.) You can also have consequentialists that are not EU maximizers if they are e.g. a collection of consequentialist EU maximizers working together.