All of Keith_Coffman's Comments + Replies

What part of

Also note that you don't get to define the terms that I'm using - I do.

do you not understand?

I know I am using non-standard definitions in the context of this discussion in order to make my points more clear.

Your argument has boiled down to "MY definition of your words says that you are saying X, which is wrong" when I am in fact saying Y, which you have not responded to. I don't care about what you (or Google) say evaluating a claim is supposed to mean, because what we are discussing is what I mean when I say it. The "idle ... (read more)

A conceived state of reality is something that happens in your head, not in writing or spoken aloud. The utterance of a claim is an attempt to convey this conceived state to someone else. You seem to be bordering on rejecting objective reality altogether; if there are no minds in the universe is a rock still a rock? In such a universe there would be no language, but you would agree that A still equals A, right? If you were alone and had no one to talk to, could you not still understand your surroundings via internal models of reality?

Edit: in short the fact that A=A, the concept that A=A, and the utterance A=A, are all unique things and to try to combine the latter two is unjustified.

0[anonymous]
I think this idle circularity flows from your non-ordinary use of 'claim' and 'statement', which you seem to be using in special ways. The Google definitions of each given as the first return from the search-function: 1. Statement, "a definite or clear expression of something in speech or writing". 2. Claim, "state or assert that something is the case, typically without providing evidence or proof". The object of our disagreement, 'evaluating a claim', if we follow ordinary language, means passing judgement over a linguistic statement, an obvious condition of which is finding that utterance properly intelligible. When you say "A statement about reality is not to be confused with the utterance of a claim" [where confusingly, you define 'statement about reality' and 'claim' synonymously] you simply redefine the terms of the problem and discussion. As I have said all along, you are misusing words. I don't want to go into - because it's a red herring - the possibility of pure and independent access to reality, suffice it to say that it's philosophically absurd.

The entire point has been that you have consistently said that you can evaluate utterances independently of contingent features of the speaker and context.

You are putting words into my mouth. Note that I have never even used the term "utterance" to this point in my statements. Also note that you don't get to define the terms that I'm using - I do. I'm glad that you listed these propositions in several point, since it makes this easier to deconstruct:

Let me state this in rough propositions:

  • a. evaluation is a judgement of aspects of things r

... (read more)
0[anonymous]
This is a false premise. There is no such thing. i.e. to claim something is to give motion for or against a given thought or action through utterances according with the relevant conventions of language. This is a linguistic practice perforce.

You are misrepresenting the statement-response structure.

I simultaneously say two things:

1) You must understand a claim to check it, else you wouldn't know what to check. (we both agree here, I think)

2) Given that you can understand a claim, it can be checked

You say "Hold on, you can't understand a claim without the context!" And I agree. In the practical reality that we must face on a daily basis, you can't really ever avoid the fact that we must communicate via language and we also often imply some additional details, such as time/location.

Let... (read more)

0[anonymous]
I have understood you the entire time. I think you have confused yourself. I broadly agree with (1) and (2), and have never suggested otherwise (except that all claims aren't susceptible to 'checking'). The entire point has been that you have consistently said that you can evaluate utterances independently of contingent features of the speaker and context. That is to say, you seem to be under the impression that 'evaluating a claim' does not require any knowledge about that claim. Which is obviously absurd, you can't evaluate something you know nothing about. In reality, I don't think you mean 'evaluate a claim' at all, you mean 'evaluate some set of world-referent information which happens to be in the claim'. Let me state this in rough propositions: * a. evaluation is a judgement of aspects of things relative to criteria * b. a claim is an utterance * c. utterances can contain information about things and their aspects * d. utterance intelligibility depends on knowing contingent things about the speaker and context of utterance * e. ergo, evaluation of a claim must follow these steps: to judge aspects of things related to a claim requires utterance information, which requires utterance intelligibility, which requires contingent knowledge about the speaker and context of utterance. That is to say, evaluating a CLAIM requires that contingent knowledge. You have consistently stated otherwise:

You can't check a claim independently of understanding it, for which contextual knowledge is necessary. It's as simple as that.

I know you can't check a claim without understanding it. I've said as much (the qualifier you keep mentioning). My point is that, given you do understand it, you can check it.

I am also confused as to why your think all claims are empirically verifiable, i.e. if X is Y and Z is X then Y is Z. Most language is not world-referent.

I don't think that all claims are empirically verifiable - that was my mistake in writing. However ... (read more)

0[anonymous]
I'm sorry, but this is getting absurd. You said: I responded: You responded to my response: You are flatly contradicting yourself. You keep doing this: stating the unqualified version, then upon my response, admitting the qualification, and the all of a sudden reverting back to the unqualified version. My point was that you can't, besides bare particles of sense experience, interpret the external world independent of a belief structure, but as stated - given the length and circularity of this debate - I don't want to turn this into a second discussion.

I think I see where things aren't matching, and aside from your last comment I think it's a matter of definitions rather then concepts.

Firstly, when I say "evaluate a claim" I mean checking that it matches with objective reality - NOT understanding what the claim means in it's linguistic context. If I managed to translate "barkbark22" into something I understood, I could then evaluate it. If you want to say that my definition of the phrase "evaluate a claim" is faulty, fine, but you should now understand what I mean by it.

Sec... (read more)

0[anonymous]
You can't check a claim independently of understanding it, for which contextual knowledge is necessary. It's as simple as that. I am also confused as to why your think all claims are empirically verifiable, i.e. if X is Y and Z is X then Y is Z. Most language is not world-referent.

My point was not really related to your discussion, I just wanted to clarify on your paraphrasing of "scientists think it works, so who cares what philosophers think."

I think it is slightly silly to worry about who thinks it works when the fact of the matter is that it works - this is not a point directly against your comments, just a point of clarification in general.

Each reiteration of "how someone formed their belief" is an attempt on my part to clarify the meaning, since you yourself just said that it is "extremely ambiguous." The concept I am attempting to convey remains the same, however.

I will bring in a quote by Shakespeare: "A rose by any other name would smell as sweet." Language is the means by which we communicate information interpersonally. Language is important, as it is imperative that the sender and the receiver internalize the same concept. However, the rose and how it sm... (read more)

0[anonymous]
Firstly, I never said that 'how someone formed their belief' was ambiguous, I said that 'how someone arrived at a conclusion' was; you replaced the former with the latter. You have already admit the qualification I urged several times. I am aghast as to why you persist in reverting to what you have already denied. Secondly, evaluating a claim is not travelling to the object-of-understanding and accruing the percepts to independently verify its truth-value, something which - as you admit, and as is the whole force of my half of the discussion - is itself impossible without knowing "they are talking bout the rose in the first place". That is to say, a condition of evaluation is finding intelligible the utterance given, for which speaker context and knowledge of the relevant language-game is relevant (the particular conventions of using language in particular subcultures for particular forms of activity). The action of being physically proximate to a rose and allowing its scent wave over your smell receptors and trigger certain neural connections, is obviously possible for most humans. This does not undermine in the slightest, however, that utterances about roses and their perfume are only intelligible relative to linguistic community the speaker is party to. If I contrived a private language according to whose conventions 'barkbark22' was related to smelling roses, you would obviously have no idea - and couldn't - what I was doing in making that utterance, and would not be able to, independently of understanding the utterance, judge its truth-value. Note that we are talking about evaluating a CLAIM - a linguistic utterance. NOT the independent reality which that claim might refer or relate to. I also disagree with your archaic conception of empirical verification independent of belief structure, but that is another argument which I certainly don't want to enter.

Do scientists think it works, or does it work? The end result is a model for a particular phenomenon which can be tested for accuracy. When we use a cell phone we are seeing the application of our understanding of electromagnetism, among other things. It's not scientists saying that science works - it's just working.

0[anonymous]
Can you clarify what your point is? My original objection, to which you responded, although not explicit, was that 'science going on' is not sufficient reason for the philosophy of science 'not knowing what they are talking about' - the entire post is puerile dogmatism.

I agree. I'm glad we finally got there. I have been saying your equivalent of "you have to find it intelligible" this whole time. You have to understand the claim to test it.

But you don't have to understand how they came to that conclusion. In case it's not clear, that's how I've been using the term "belief structure."

By the way, it would greatly help the discussion along if you answered all non-rhetorical questions, because that would help me understand where things aren't clicking.

*Edit: Upon rereading our discussion, it looks like ... (read more)

0[anonymous]
I said 'how they claim to that conclusion' was extremely ambiguous (it can certainly mean more than the logic relations by which they deduced something in abstraction), and gave a particular sense. I have been saying the whole time, in my own words, which I translated 'how they came to that conclusion' into after admitting ambiguity, that finding an utterance intelligible is a condition of evaluating its truth-value, for which a posteriori knowledge of language conventions and the speaker in question, is necessary (which, depending on the complexity and/or normality of the utterance, might or might not require some knowledge of the logical relations which they drew, or the epistemic practices which they exercised - but this narrow issue isn't what I have been talking about). If you cast 'how I came to that conclusion' wide enough, such as the entire belief structure of the speaker in question, then some knowledge of that doubtlessly is requisite to understanding their utterances (i.e. like what the language community in which they're embedded means when they utter a certain combination of noises). It would help if you stopped changing your claim, which is only confusing the matter, i.e. from not needing to 'know how someone formed their belief', to 'the belief structure of the person', to 'how I came to that conclusion'.

Alright, since you could not verify the Earth being round without knowing my belief structure...

2+2 = 4

You don't know my belief structure. Is it true?

I'm not asking you if you know that off the top of your head, I'm asking if you could go out and check to see if it's actually true!

That's what I mean by evaluating a claim - can you verify it? I'm sorry, but it's asinine to say that you cannot verify it because you don't know how I came to the conclusion. You seem to be arguing something about sharing my language as maintaining your point. I'm past that. If you understand the claim, you can test it.

1[anonymous]
I don't really understand what your problem is; to evaluate a claim, you have to find it intelligible, for which you have to know contingent things about the empirical practice of the relevant language-game - which, yes, is pretty much equivalent to the ordinary language statement 'if you understand the claim, you can test it'.

If it is divergent, then this

Let me distill this and see if you follow: We need to know what a claim is actually claiming - that can depend on context. Given that you do know what a claim is claiming, its veracity does not depend on context, nor the belief structure of the person behind the claim.

is what I meant. To provide an example, (which can quite often help in these situations):

I claim that the earth is approximately round.

You don't need to know how I came to that conclusion in order to evaluate my claim.

Had I claimed something a bit more comple... (read more)

1[anonymous]
I feel like this is circular: you state your claim, I state my rebuttal, you concede in qualification, and then you return to your original claim. I need to know how you came to that conclusion, which is slightly ambiguous here, in the sense that I can't understand the claim independently of the linguistic practice in terms of which your intended meaning is given. In the case of basic and well-worn facts about the natural world, I think I understand their utterance - although I could be unaware of a particular convention or idiom - because I am already very aware of the linguistic practices which endow them which intersubjective force (if I was a peasant in the Holy Roman Empire, I would doubtlessly have no idea what you were attempting to convey or do).

Let me distill this and see if you follow:

We need to know what a claim is actually claiming - that can depend on context.

Given that you do know what a claim is claiming, its veracity does not depend on context, nor the belief structure of the person behind the claim.

1[anonymous]
I understand exactly what you're saying, but the qualification is divergent from your initial statement, from which this discussion arose, and to which you returned in the second paragraph cited above: "we shouldn't really care how someone formed their beliefs when evaluating the veracity of a claim" A condition of evaluating the veracity of an utterance is to register the utterance as intelligible, for which the aforementioned considerations to context are necessary, i.e. 'how someone formed their beliefs'.

The meaning of a claim can, in fact, change based on the context. Moreover, the truth of a claim may change with time (for instance, the claim "Elvis is alive" was at one point true and is now false. Also note that, in the context of me making up a simple example of a claim to demonstrate my point, the meaning is likely referring to the famous performer Elvis Presley rather than any person named Elvis.

Thus we can see how there are a few things that we need to keep in mind when we address a claim, much as you have said above. However, the truth of... (read more)

1[anonymous]
This appears to in one stroke admit qualification: "Thus we can see how there are a few things that we need to keep in mind when we address a claim, much as you have said above. However, the truth of the claim, given that you understand the meaning and you are evaluating it at a particular time, does not depend on the belief structure." And in the next revoke it: "The reason I said "we shouldn't really care how someone formed their beliefs" is because the words that followed are "when evaluating the veracity of a claim," i.e. whether or not it is accurate. This is entirely independent of the person's reasons for making the claim." The truthful content of a claim is not independent of the utterances which comprise it, such than an understanding of those utterances is a condition of finding intelligible that claim and thus the candidature of that claim for truth/falsity.

I think we should also separate the subjects of the psychology behind when this might happen and whether or not we are using scales.

It may indeed be the case that people are bad accountants (although I rarely find myself assuming these implied things, and further if I find that my assumptions are wrong I adjust accordingly), but this doesn't change the fact that we are adding +/- points (much like you're keeping score/weighing the two alternatives).

Assuming a perfectly rational mind was approaching the proposition of reactor A vs reactor B (and we can eve... (read more)

I would call coming to conclusions like this a shortcoming of our rational thinking, rather than the weighing of benefits and costs to a decision. What HalFinney said is completely right, in that we very often have to pick alternatives as a package, and in doing so we are forced to weigh factors for and against a proposition.

Personally, I wouldn't have "factually incorrectly" jumped to the conclusion you stated here (especially if the converse is stated explicitly as you did here), and I think this is a diversion to the point that you are necessa... (read more)

Sorry for following you around so much (I just read this article since you linked to it in our other discussion)

There are two main points, both of which have largely been said or touched on already in your discussion here:

1) When discussing an event or something "playing out," we are talking about a cause and effect. Despite the fact that many things in life have many factors, there are always positive causes for things, which may or may not have counteracting factors. When we want to describe an effect of interest, then the simplest way to do it... (read more)

1Stefan_Schubert
Firstly, giving reasons for your own choices is something a bit different from explaining events over which you had no control. I'd rather concentrate on the latter cases. ---------------------------------------- Sure. I do think that Diamond should have provided pros and cons (and Pinker even more so). However, this discussion has been very useful to me in that I realize that others have different intuitions. Suppose that there is a convention which says that it's ok to omit countervailing factors (which I'm not sure there is). In that case, Diamond and Pinker are at least to some extent forgiven - they are merely following a convention. However, then I'd say that the convention should be abandoned, because I, as a reader, do want to get the full picture, and not a cherry-picked selection of factors. -- Sure. The question kind of suggests an answer along these lines - which support the notion that there is a convention according to which we're expected only to give pro-reasons. But in this case, this is clearly absurd. Why would I want to hear about Man City's fifth best characteristic (relative to Man U) over Man U's best characteristic (relative to Man C)? -- Generally, I also think that people have a bias against admitting bias, especially in themselves, but also in others. Philosophers and others have defended the hypothesis that humans are basically rational to absurdity, to my mind, despite the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. (See this excellent post on this, for instance. But the same goes not only for the notion of whether humans are rational in general, but also for whether any particular thought-process was rational or biased. I think that, given what we know about the ubiquity of human biases (as shown in experiments), we should be very open to the possibility that even great books like Diamond's and Pinker's are filled with inferences which are not rational but rather due to biases. This goes particularly for inferences and reasonings in m

I agree that it is largely off-topic and don't feel like discussing it further here - I would like to point out that the principle of indifference specifies that your list of possibilities must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive. In practice, when dealing with multifaceted things such as claims about the effects of changing the minimum wage, an exhaustive list of possible outcomes would result in an assignment of an arbitrarily small probability according to the principle of indifference. The end effect is that it's a meaningless assignment and you may as well ignore it.

I'm making a separate reply for the betting thing, only to try to keep the two conversations clean/simple.

Let's muddle through it: If I have a box containing an unknown (to you) number of gumballs and I claim that there are an odd number of gumballs, you would actually be quite reasonable in assigning a 50% chance to my claim being true.

If I claim that the gumballs in the box are blue, would you say there is a 50% chance of my claim being true?

What if I claimed that I ate pizza last night?

You might have a certain level of confidence in my accuracy and m... (read more)

1Stefan_Schubert
This is a bit of a side-track. For the Bayesian interpretation of probability, it's important to be able to assign a prior probability to any event (since otherwise you can't calculate the posterior probability, given some piece of evidence that makes the event more or less probable). They do this using, e.g. the much contested principle of indifference. Some people object to this, and argue along your lines that it's just silly to ascribe probabilities to events we know nothing about. Indeed, the frequentists define an event's probability as the limit of its relative frequency in a large number of trials. Hence, to them, we can't ascribe a probability to a one-off event at all. Hence there is a huge discussion on this already and I don't think that it's meaningful for us to address it here. Anyway, you do have a point that one should be a bit cautious ascribing definite probabilities to events we know very little about. An alternative can be to say that the probability is somewhere in the interval from x to y, where x and y are some real numbers betwen 0 and 1.

There's a whole bunch of information out there - literally more than any one person could/cares to know - and we simply don't have the time (or often the background) to fully understand certain fields and more importantly to evaluate which claims are true and which aren't. In other words, reality is objective and claims should be evaluated based on their evidence, not the person who proposes them.

It would seem to me that these claims aren't consistent. I agree with the first claim, not with the second. It's true that experts' claims are objectively and

... (read more)
3Stefan_Schubert
I feel that this discussion is getting a bit too multifarious, which no doubt has to do with the very abstract nature of my post. I'm not very happy with it. I should probably have started with more comprehensive and clear examples than an abstract and general discussion like this. Anyway, I do intend to give more examples of reverse-engineering-of-belief-structures-examples in the future. Hopefully that'll make it clearer what I'm trying to do. Here's one example of reverse engineering-reasoning I've already given. I agree that lots of the time we should "do a bit of digging ourselves"; i.e. look at the direct evidence for P rather than on whether those telling us P or not-P are reliable or not. But I also claim that in many cases deference is extremely cost-efficient and useful. You seem to agree with this - good. Sure. But reverse engineering reasoning can also be used to infer expert bias (as shown in this post). Yes. People already perform this kind of reverse engineering reasoning, as I said (cf my reference to Marx). What I want to do is to do it more systematically and efficiently.

Interesting stuff. I am all for trying to improve peoples reasoning skills, and understanding how particular people think initially is a good place to start, but I'm a bit concerned about the way you talked about knowledge in here (and where it comes from).

If we learn that some alleged expert's beliefs are more often than not caused by unreliable processes, we are better off looking for other sources of knowledge.

Frankly, I wouldn't really look to any person as a source of knowledge in the way you seem to be implying here.

Here's how knowledge & ... (read more)

1[anonymous]
"I guess the main thing I am trying to say that directly ties into your post is that we shouldn't really care how someone formed their beliefs when evaluating the veracity of a claim". This is an absurd proposition on several accounts. Firstly, a great deal of utterance meaning can only be recovered relative to a particular context, for it has complex and variable uses shifting within and across contexts, i.e. the exchange of agreement formalising marriage is not a mono-semantical reference to an internal psychological state, but does something only understandable relative to a particular convention of marriage. The upshot being that a condition of intelligibility is contextual awareness. Secondly, it is important to at least be aware of the structures of understanding through which particular intellectual subcultures and traditions give rise to scholarly output (i.e. you can't satisfactorily understand and evaluate a Marxist-Leninist work independently the sociological reality of post-Cold War vanguard parties, or modern European intellectual history).
1Stefan_Schubert
It would seem to me that these claims aren't consistent. I agree with the first claim, not with the second. It's true that experts' claims are objectively and directly verifiable, but lots of the time checking that direct evidence is not an optimal use of our time. Instead we're better off deferring to experts (which we actually also do, as you say, on a massive scale). I wrote a very long post on a related theme - "genetic arguments" - some time ago, by the way. Well according to the betting interpretation of degrees of belief, this just means that you would, if rational, be willing to accept bets that are based on the claim in question having a 50 % chance of being true (but not bets based on the claim that it has, say, a 51 % chance of being true). But sure, sometimes it can seem a bit contrived to assign a definite probability to claims you know little about. I don't agree with that. We use others' statements as a source of evidence on a massive scale (i.e. we defer to them. Indeed, experiments show that we do this automatically. But if these statements express beliefs that were produced by unreliable processes - e.g. bias - then that's clearly not a good strategy. Hence we should care very much of whether someone is biased when evaluating the veracity of many claims, for that reason. Also, as I said, if we find out that someone is biased, then we have little reason to use that person as a source of knowledge. What I want to stress is the need for cognitive economy. We don't have time to check the direct evidence for different claims lots of the time (as you yourself admit above) and therefore have to use assessments of others' reliability. Knowledge about bias is a vital (but not the only) ingredient in our assessments of reliability, and are hence extremely useful.

The "rules" of science, if they exist, are subject to change at any time.

Here's a rule of science: Your hypothesis must make testable predictions. It must be falsifiable. Is that "subject to change at any time" ? I bet there are more.

While it may not perfectly describe how actual scientists do their work all the time, the scientific method is a description of the process of how we sort out good ideas/models from bad ones, which is the quintessential goal of science (the "advancement of science," if you will).

Just to be clea... (read more)