All of mattnewport's Comments + Replies

I simply say to them "Er, human technology has progressed to the point where I can have, say, a sweet breakfast without consuming any sugar, and I'm going to do so. Cheating has nothing to do with it."

It's true that artificial sweeteners mean you can get a sweet taste without consuming calories. Beware the conclusion that they therefore don't cause you to gain weight or have other negative health effects though. There's plenty of evidence to the contrary.

I agree that eating healthily doesn't mean having to deprive yourself of all delicious fo... (read more)

5chatquitevoit
SIgh......I've certainly seen all the 'evidence to the contrary', or at least a significantly representative amount. This is the long and short of it: artificial sweeteners give taste, not satiety, so you won't be as full as you would if you ate sugar, hence may eat more. Also, if you overestimate the number of calories you're 'saving' using sweeteners, you'll undoubtedly end up eating more, and potentially gaining weight. It's the stereotypical "Ooh, I drank a diet coke instead of a real one, saved 200 calories, so I can have a donut!" Conclusion: pay attention to EVERYTHING you're eating, keeping in mind that you DO have a precondition of 'how much food you need', and do so in a manner that consciously minimizes your biases. It's not that hard, but most people don't take such a holistic approach, and I've not ever seen it specified as a factor in the 'studies' on artificial sweeteners. So, the studies are correct, per se, but you and I can hopefully be a little smarter than that....it's pretty much a problem of overcoming internal bias by acting on as complete info as possible.

I'm not sure you need uncertainty to discount at all - in finance exponential discounting comes from interest rates which are predicated on an assumption of somewhat stable economic growth rather than deriving from uncertainty.

As you point out, hyperbolic discounting can come from combining exponential discounting with an uncertain hazard rate. It seems many of the studies on hyperbolic discounting assume they are measuring a utility function directly when they may in fact be measuring the combination of a utility function with reasonable assumptions abou... (read more)

Do any of the studies on hyperbolic discounting attempt to show that it is not just a consequence of combining uncertainty with something like a standard exponential discounting function? That's always seemed the most plausible explanation of hyperbolic discounting to me and it meshes with what seems to be going on when I introspect on these kinds of choices.

Most of the discussions of hyperbolic discounting I see don't even consider how increasing uncertainty for more distant rewards should factor into preferences. Ignoring uncertainty seems like it would be a sub-optimal strategy for agents making decisions in the real world.

I think exponential discounting already assumes uncertainty. You need uncertainty to discount at all - if things are going to stay the same, might as well wait until later. And it doesn't intuitively lead to hyperbolic discounts - if there's a 1% chance you'll die each week, then waiting from now until next week should make you discount the same amount as waiting from ten weeks from now until eleven.

But there is a way to use uncertainty to get from exponential to hyperbolic discounting. You get exponential if you're worried about yourself dying/being unab... (read more)

Yes. Specifically, I'm always struck by the idea that someone offering me $100 right now, before I let them out of my sight, is more likely to deliver. If it were between me leaving and them mailing (or wiring) $100 later that day (or so they say) vs. $150 next week, clearly I'll take the $150.

But Yvain talks about the reward at time t vs the larger one at time t+1 becoming more tempting only as you get sufficiently close to t - so, if this has been measured in real people, some researchers must have avoided the obvious "we'll get back to you" credibility problem (I didn't follow cites looking for details, however).

There's room for debate whether we saw a true currency crisis in the Euro but 'this prediction has failed utterly' is overstating it. We saw unusually dramatic short term moves in the Euro in May and there was widespread talk about the future of the Euro being uncertain. Questions about the long term viability of the Euro continue to be raised.

I'd argue that charting any of the major currencies against gold indicates an ongoing loss of confidence in all of them - from this perspective the dollar and the euro have both declined in absolute value over the y... (read more)

6mwengler
I looked at Gold vs Euro from your link over 10 years. It shows a ssteady decline since mid 2004, with no change in that trend to distinguish 2010 from 2009, 2008, 2007, 2006, or 2005. It seems to me that if no special effects in currency vs currency or in currency vs gold can be seen in 2010 that the most rational label for that prediction would be "wrong." YMMV, but I don't see why it should. Would you accept "this prediction has failed" if I leave off the utterly?

According to this article a sense of vibration and rapid acceleration of the body are fairly commonly reported (I don't recall experiencing these symptoms myself). That article and the Wikipedia entry both mention some of the mythology and folklore surrounding the experience from different cultures.

Paleo diets generally consider corn a grain so you might want to avoid that. Some paleo variants (like the one I'm currently following) are ok with cheese and yogurt in moderation (and butter).

I would guess this is not true in general since many things do not want to be eaten and so evolve various defense mechanisms. In turn the organisms that eat them may develop counter-measures that enable them to safely digest their meal despite the defense mechanisms but this will depend on the complex evolutionary history of both organisms. Ruminants are adapted to a quite different diet than humans for example.

I wonder why an apple should be healthy. Wouldn't any animal be satisfied with a fruit that just had calories? Enough, in any case, to come back for more and scatter the seeds? Why should an apple -- or anything 'natural' -- be so especially healthy for humans?

You're missing the other side of the story. Humans evolved to obtain their nutritional needs from those foods that were available in the EEA and this effect is probably more significant than the selection pressure in the other direction (on fruits to be nutritionally beneficial to animals that eat them). Humans are adapted to a diet that includes things that were available to them during the long pre-agricultural evolutionary period.

0byrnema
OK. So reading between the lines somewhat and pushing the argument further, would it similarly/analogously/generally be the case that eating nearly any part of an evolutionarily 'old', highly evolved autotroph would usually be healthy, because they have learned how to make things that are useful for living things to have? (That is, ignoring the part of the argument possibly implying that we might have evolved a dependency upon apples in particular, because that seemed unlikely to me. Though I could be convinced because know it is the case to some degree for oranges and scurvy, for example.)

You're probably right but ironically I've ignored much of the standard advice on employment and it's worked out just fine for me so this example doesn't resonate very well for me. I've never worn a suit to a job interview for example.

I assumed he was saying something like "the majority of women prefer a man more 'masculine' than the median man". By analogy, if it is true that "the majority of men prefer a woman who is slimmer than the median woman" it should be obvious that being overweight will make it harder for a woman to find a match even if there are men who prefer less slim women. Saying "men prefer slim women" is a slightly sloppy generalization but not an unreasonable one in this example.

0Relsqui
We might be looking at different parts of the comment under discussion, because I've completely lost the correlation between what we're talking about and what I actually read. At this point I'd rather just drop it.

This confuses me, because it seems to imply that men need to believe that a simple personality heuristic can be applied to all or almost all women. Why is it an unacceptable answer that some women like one thing, and some like another?

The prevalence of different personality types in the population is very relevant here and you seem to be glossing over it. If the number of women attracted to your personality type is relatively low (and especially if it is low relative to the number of other men similar to you) it will still be an obstacle you need to ove... (read more)

I'd compare this with employment. Every now and then, you see a media story about some company with a highly unusual internal culture that uses all sorts of unconventional practices in hiring, organization, and management. Yet unless you luckily stumble onto some such employer and happen to be an exceptionally good candidate by their standards, you would be well-advised to stick to the standard conventional advice on how to look and behave in job interviews and, subsequently, in the workplace. In fact, doing anything else would mean sabotaging your employm... (read more)

2Relsqui
Certainly! If he'd said "women who might like me tend to also like ..." I'd have understood. My confusion was because there was no such qualification, or anything else limiting the population under discussion beyond "women," but the commenter seemed to expect consistency within that population. This is what I thought I was saying. :)

I think there's a bit more to it than just women overlooking a lack of values because of other attractive factors like confidence. There's some evidence that men with the 'dark triad' personality traits are more successful with women.

6Vladimir_M
mattnewport: Here's the research paper on which the article you link was based: http://www.mysmu.edu/faculty/normanli/JonasonLiWebsterSchmitt2009.pdf

I wonder how many potential matches know enough maths to realize why he used powers of two?

0[anonymous]
I think a better question is, how many knew enough to realize he was using an integer to encode a set, rather than doing a weighting with some things valued exponentially more than others...
4Relsqui
I suspect most of the ones who played the game at all.

A dealbreaker is something that on its own automatically rules someone out. A factor is something that swings the overall impression positively or negatively but is not on its own a deciding factor independent of other factors.

I agree the choices aren't ideal but I think "likes children", "dislikes children" and "doesn't want children" all match a search for "Doesn't have children" whereas leaving the question blank or answering that you have children means you won't show up in a search that specifies "Doesn't have children". It's a bit confusing and not a very logical setup but I think that's how it works.

0wedrifid
Particularly not ideal in as much as only 'likes' and 'dislikes' are mutually exclusive among those options. But I suggest that anyone who puts both 'has children' and 'dislikes children' on their profile is being far too honest for their own good. ;)
1Relsqui
I think you're probably right. That gives me a good reason to answer to it, but I'm still a bit uncomfortable with all the answers. "Don't want" is closest, though.

I've left the "children" field blank, for example, because I don't want them now but might some day, so neither "wants" nor "doesn't want" is correct.

I think this might be a mistake. I usually specify "Doesn't have children" when I do a match search and I'd guess this is fairly common. If you leave this question blank I believe you won't show up for people who are filtering on that search criteria.

1Relsqui
I would agree 100% if that were one of the choices. The options are "has 1 child," "has children," "likes children," "dislikes children," and "doesn't want children." The first two are certainly wrong, I don't have a strong enough opinion about children to choose either of the next two, and I haven't made up my mind about the last one yet. (Hmph--I tried several times to make that a bulleted list, using as far as I can tell the syntax in the help, but it didn't work and eventually I gave up.)

Historically, global population increase has correlated pretty well with increases in measures of overall health, wealth and quality of life. What empirical evidence do you derive your theory that zero or negative population growth would be better for these measures from?

2blogospheroid
The peak oil literature and global climate change is something that has made me seriously reconsider the classic liberal viewpoint towards population control. Also, The reflective consistency of the population control logic. Cultures that restrict their reproduction for altruistic reasons will die out, leaving the earth for selfish replicators who will , if left uncontrolled, take every person's living standards back to square one. Population control will be on the agenda of even a moral singleton. I live in India and have seen China overtake India bigtime because of a lot of institutional improvement, but also because of the simple fact that they controlled their population. People talk about India's demographic dividend but we are not even able to educate and provide basic hygiene and health to our children to take advantage of this dividend. I've seen the demographic transition in action everywhere in the world and it seems like a good thing to happen to societies. Setting up an incentive system that rewards altruistic control of reproduction, careful creation of children and sustainability seems to be an overall plus to me. My only concern is if this starts a level-2 status game where more children become a status good and political pressure increases the quotas beyond sustainability.

I just don't see any practical examples of people successfully betting by doing calculations with probability numbers derived from their intuitive feelings of confidence that would go beyond what a mere verbal expression of these feelings would convey. Can you think of any?

I'd speculate that bookies and professional sports bettors are doing something like this. By bookies here I mean primarily the kind of individuals who stand with a chalkboard at race tracks rather than the large companies. They probably use some semi-rigorous / scientific techniques t... (read more)

0Vladimir_M
mattnewport: Your knowledge about these trades seems to be much greater than mine, so I'll accept these examples. In the meantime, I have expounded my whole view of the topic in a reply to an excellent systematic list of questions posed by prase, and in those terms, this would indicate the existence of what I called the third type of exceptions under point (3). I still maintain that these are rare exceptions in the overall range of human judgments, though, and that my basic point holds for the overwhelming majority of human common-sense thinking. I don't think they're being deliberately misleading. I just think that the whole mechanism by which the public discourse on these topics comes into being inherently generates a nearly impenetrable confusion, which you can dispel to extract useful information only if you are already an expert in the first place. There are many specific reasons for this, but it all ultimately comes down to the stability of the weak EMH equilibrium. Oh, absolutely! But you're presumably estimating the rank of your abilities based on some significant accomplishments that most people would indeed find impossible to achieve. What I meant to say (even though I expressed it poorly) is that there is no easy and readily available way to excel at "rationality" in any really relevant matters. This in contrast to the attitude, sometimes seen among the people here, that you can learn about Bayesianism or whatever else and just by virtue of that set yourself apart from the masses in accuracy of thought. The EMH ethos is, in my opinion, a good intellectual antidote against such temptations of hubris.

I expected the third to be higher than most less wrongers would estimate.

In reality, it is rational to bet only with people over whom you have superior relevant knowledge, or with someone who is suffering from an evident failure of common sense.

You still have to be able to translate your superior relevant knowledge into odds in order to set the terms of the bet however. Do you not believe that this is an ability that people have varying degrees of aptitude for?

Look at the stock market: it's pure gambling, unless you have insider knowledge or vastly higher expertise than the average investor.

Vastly higher expertise than ... (read more)

-2Vladimir_M
mattnewport: They sure do, but in all the examples I can think of, people either just follow their intuition directly when faced with a concrete situation, or employ rigorous science to attack the problem. (It doesn't have to be the official accredited science, of course; the Venn diagram of official science and valid science features only a partial overlap.) I just don't see any practical examples of people successfully betting by doing calculations with probability numbers derived from their intuitive feelings of confidence that would go beyond what a mere verbal expression of these feelings would convey. Can you think of any? Well, if I knew, I would be doing it myself -- and I sure wouldn't be talking about it publicly! The problem with discussing investment strategies is that any non-trivial public information about this topic necessarily has to be bullshit, or at least drowned in bullshit to the point of being irrecoverable, since exclusive possession of correct information is a sure path to getting rich, but its effectiveness critically depends on exclusivity. Still, I would be surprised to find out that the success of some alpha-achieving investors is based on taking numerical expressions of common-sense confidence seriously. In a sense, a similar problem faces anyone who aspires to be more "rational" than the average folk in any meaningful sense. Either your "rationality" manifests itself only in irrelevant matters, or you have to ask yourself what is so special and exclusive about you that you're reaping practical success that eludes so many other people, and in such a way that they can't just copy your approach. I agree with this assessment, but the accuracy of information aggregated by a prediction market implies nothing about your own individual certainty. Prediction markets work by cancelling out random errors and enabling specialists who wield esoteric expertise to take advantage of amateurs' systematic biases. Where your own individual judgment

Incidentally, do you mean GDP per capita would decrease relative to more interventionist economies or in absolute terms? Since there is an overall increasing trend, in both more and less libertarian economies that would be very surprising to me.

I wondered about this as well. It seems an extremely strong and unlikely claim if it is intended to mean an absolute decrease in GDP per capita.

Given your position on the meaninglessness of assigning a numerical probability value to a vague feeling of how likely something is, how would you decide whether you were being offered good odds if offered a bet? If you're not in the habit of accepting bets, how do you think someone who does this for a living (a bookie for example) should go about deciding on what odds to assign to a given bet?

-3Vladimir_M
mattnewport: In reality, it is rational to bet only with people over whom you have superior relevant knowledge, or with someone who is suffering from an evident failure of common sense. Otherwise, betting is just gambling (which of course can be worthwhile for fun or signaling value). Look at the stock market: it's pure gambling, unless you have insider knowledge or vastly higher expertise than the average investor. This is the basic reason why I consider the emphasis on subjective Bayesian probabilities that is so popular here misguided. In technical problems where probability calculations can be helpful, the experts in the field already know how to use them. On the other hand, for the great majority of the relevant beliefs and conclusions you'll form in life, they offer nothing useful beyond what your vague common sense is already telling you. If you start taking them too seriously, it's easy to start fooling yourself that your thinking is more accurate and precise than it really is, and if you start actually betting on them, you'll be just gambling. I'm not familiar with the details of this business, but from what I understand, bookmakers work in such a way that they're guaranteed to make a profit no matter what happens. Effectively, they exploit the inconsistencies between different people's estimates of what the favorable odds are. (If there are bookmakers who stake their profit on some particular outcome, then I'm sure that they have insider knowledge if they can stay profitable.) Now of course, the trick is to come up with a book that is both profitable and offers odds that will sell well, but here we get into the fuzzy art of exploiting people's biases for profit.

The two things that seem to work for me most of the time: "will I feel proud / good about myself for doing this?" or, if that fails, "would person X (whose opinion of me is generally important to me) be impressed or disgusted with this behaviour if they knew about it?". Essentially, "is this behaviour consistent with the kind of person I wish myself and (particular) others to perceive me to be?".

I guess I'm playing the game right then :)

I'm curious, do you also think that a singleton is a desirable outcome? It's possible my thinking is biased because I view this outcome as a dystopia and so underestimate it's probability due to motivated cognition.

4Mass_Driver
Funny you should mention it; that's exactly what I was thinking. I have a friend (also named matt, incidentally) who I strongly believe is guilty of motivated cognition about the desirability of a singleton AI (he thinks it is likely, and therefore is biased toward thinking it would be good) and so I leaped naturally to the ad hominem attack you level against yourself. :-)
1wedrifid
Most of them, no. Some, yes. Particularly since the alternative is the inevitable loss of everything that is valuable to me in the universe.

I don't know whether ant colonies exhibit principal-agent problems (though I'd expect that they do to some degree) but I know there is evidence of nepotism in queen rearing in bee colonies where individuals are not all genetically identical (evidence of workers favouring the most closely related larvae when selecting larvae to feed royal jelly to create a queen).

The fact that ants from different colonies commonly exhibit aggression towards each other indicates limits to scaling such high levels of group cohesion. Though supercolonies do appear to exist the... (read more)

0orthonormal
I'm analogizing a singleton to a single ant colony, not to a supercolony.

Stable equilibrium here does not refer to a property of a mind. It refers to a state of the universe. I've elaborated on this view a little here before but I can't track the comment down at the moment.

Essentially my reasoning is that in order to dominate the physical universe an AI will need to deal with fundamental physical restrictions such as the speed of light. This means it will have spatially distributed sub-agents pursuing sub-goals intended to further its own goals. In some cases these sub-goals may involve conflict with other agents (this would be... (read more)

4orthonormal
Ant colonies don't generally exhibit the principal-agent problem. I'd say with high certainty that the vast majority of our trouble with it is due to having the selfishness of an individual replicator hammered into each of us by our evolution.

Two points that influence my thinking on that claim:

  1. Gains from trade have the potential to be greater with greater difference in values between the two trading agents.
  2. Destruction tends to be cheaper than creation. Intelligent agents that recognize this have an incentive to avoid violent conflict.

I agree with most of what you're saying (in that comment and this one) but I still think that the ability to give well calibrated probability estimates for a particular prediction is instrumentally useful and that it is fairly likely that this is an ability that can be improved with practice. I don't take this to imply anything about humans performing actual Bayesian calculations either implicitly or explicitly.

Are we only supposed to upvote this post if we think it is irrational?

7wnoise
Is this post a top-level comment to this post?
  • A Singleton AI is not a stable equilibrium and therefore it is highly unlikely that a Singleton AI will dominate our future light cone (90%).

  • Superhuman intelligence will not give an AI an insurmountable advantage over collective humanity (75%).

  • Intelligent entities with values radically different to humans will be much more likely to engage in trade and mutual compromise than to engage in violence and aggression directed at humans (60%).

0DanielLC
I agree with your second. Was your third supposed to be high or low? I think it's low, but not unreasonably so.
4wedrifid
I want to upvote each of these points a dozen times. Then another few for the first. It's the most stable equilibrium I can conceive of. ie. More stable than if all evidence of life was obliterated from the universe.
0[anonymous]
I'm almost certainly missing some essential literature, but what does it mean for a mind to be a stable equilibrium?
0[anonymous]
I'm almost certainly missing some essential literature, but what does it mean for a mind to be a stable equilibrium?
0Eugine_Nier
I agree with your first two, but am dubious about your third.

Agree with 1 and 3, not sure exactly what you mean with 2.

It seems plausible to me that routinely assigning numerical probabilities to predictions/beliefs that can be tested and tracking these over time to see how accurate your probabilities are (calibration) can lead to a better ability to reliably translate vague feelings of certainty into numerical probabilities.

There are practical benefits to developing this ability. I would speculate that successful bookies and professional sports bettors are better at this than average for example and that this is an ability they have developed through practice and experie... (read more)

-4Vladimir_M
I addressed this point in another comment in this thread: http://lesswrong.com/lw/2sl/the_irrationality_game/2qgm

I've seen so many decent people turn into bastards or otherwise abdicate moral responsibility when they found themselves at the helm of a company, no matter how noble their initial intentions.

Do you think this is different from the general 'power corrupts' tendency? The same thing seems to happen to politicians for example.

Evernote recommendation seconded. It's a really neat tool (I particularly like the auto text recognition in images making them searchable).

I guess that until competitive government becomes really feasible in a mass scale, this thought is very theoritical.

One of the things I particularly like about the idea of competitive government is it gives you something practical to do now as an individual. Look around the world and consciously pick a country to live in based on the value offered by its government. Surprisingly few people do this but the few that do have been enough to give us the likes of Hong Kong, Singapore, Switzerland, Luxembourg, etc.

I think being an immigrant gives you a diffe... (read more)

I found the discussion between Moldbug and Robin Hanson interesting because whilst Robin Hanson has lots of interesting ideas he does not write terribly well. He communicates his idea clearly but there is no style to his writing. Contrast Moldbug (or Eliezer) and see the impact of interesting ideas expressed with eloquence and you being to appreciate the power of language.

I wonder if I give excessive weight to Unqualified Reservations because it has such greater facility with the English language than is typical of the blogosphere. Interesting and controversial ideas expressed with rhetorical flair seem to directly trigger the reward centres of my brain.

Is there somewhere where ideas like this are discussed intelligently?

I'm not aware of a single central hub for such discussion I'm afraid. There's academic work in the area of development economics which looks at countries around the world and tries to identify what traits of governmental institutions seem to correspond with economic growth and prosperity. This is where Paul Romer and his charter cities idea is coming from.

If you want some really out there but intelligent discussion of related ideas you might want to check out Unqualified Reservations.... (read more)

Are you familiar with the background to patrissimo's comment? Competitive government is what he's getting at in the comment you linked.

0whpearson
Is there somewhere where ideas like this are discussed intelligently? A few thoughts * If the experiments in governance are atheoretical, then I'd expect most of them to be worse. Just as most random mutations in a complex organism are likely to be worse. * Experimentation has a cost, what is the expected benefit from experimenting with different forms of government. How is that expected benefit justified? Don't get me wrong, I love the idea of seasteading and competitive governments, I just find it disheartening when people don't want to try applying their brains to the problem of at least narrowing down the space of how governments should be designed.
0whpearson
I'd assumed there was something going on in the seasteading sphere. But I wasn't sure what exactly. An interesting idea, thanks for the link.

Physics provides certain tactical advantages to moon colonists. (Citing fictional evidence I know but as far as I can see the advantages are likely to be real).

I would be happy to donate money for development.

There's a lot of tools out there for task / goal tracking. I'd suggest spending some time researching them before thinking about developing a new one. Beware of falling into the trap of chasing after the elusive perfect system rather than just getting in the habit of using something good enough.

I quite like remember the milk but my main problem is still the whole getting into the habit of using it consistently part. It's pretty flexible in terms of attaching extra information to items. It's not hierarchic... (read more)

I just make a couple of fried eggs for breakfast usually. Takes less than 5 minutes and can be done in parallel with making my morning cup of tea. Advance preparation looks like overkill to me - why not just get up 3 minutes earlier?

Are you claiming that this was actually the plan all along? That our infinitely wise and benevolent leaders decided to create a panic irrespective of the actual threat posed by H1N1 for the purposes of a realistic training exercise?

If this is not what you are suggesting are you saying that although in fact this panic was an example of general government incompetence in the field of risk management it purely coincidentally turned out to be exactly the optimal thing to do in retrospect?

0jimrandomh
I have no evidence that would let me distinguish between these two scenarios. I also note that there's plenty of middle ground - for example, private media companies could've decided to create an unjustified panic for ratings, while the governments and hospitals decided to make the best of it. Or more likely, the panic developed without anyone influential making a conscious decision to promote or suppress it either way.

This looks like a fully general argument for panicking about anything.

0jimrandomh
It isn't fully general; it only applies when the expected benefits (from lessons learned) exceed the costs of that particular kind of drill, and there's no cheaper way to learn the same lessons.

There is nothing in what I wrote that implies people value their lives infinitely. People just need to value their lives highly enough such that flying on an airplane (with its probability of crashing) has a negative expected value.

Yes, that is the point.

Your claim that people flying on planes are engaging in an activity that has negative expected value flatly contradicts standard economic analysis and yet provides no supporting evidence to justify such a wildly controversial position. The only way your claim could be true in general would be if humans... (read more)

Population/natural resource exhaustion related crises are a bit iffy, because it is plainly obvious that if they remain exponentially growing forever, relative to linearly growing or constant resources (like room to live on), one or the other has got to give.

Obviously the people disputing the wrong predictions know this. Julian Simon was just as familiar with this trivial mathematical fact as Paul Ehrlich. The fact that this knowledge led Paul Ehrlich to make bad predictions indicates that his analysis was missing something that Julian Simon was considering. Often this missing something is a basic understanding of economics.

Well, you also need to factor in the severity of the threat, as well as the risk of it happening.

Well obviously. I refer you to my previous comment. At this point our remaining disagreement on this issue is unlikely to be resolved without better data. Continuing to go back and forth repeating that I think there is a pattern of overestimation for certain types of risk and that you think the estimates are accurate is not going to resolve the question.

In fact, people take such gambles (with negative expectation but with high probability of winning) everyday.

They fly on airplanes and drive to work.

In our world people do not place infinite value on their own lives.

0AnlamK
There is nothing in what I wrote that implies people value their lives infinitely. People just need to value their lives highly enough such that flying on an airplane (with its probability of crashing) has a negative expected value. Again, from Nick Bostrom's article: "Pascal: I must confess: I’ve been having doubts about the mathematics of infinity. Infinite values lead to many strange conclusions and paradoxes. You know the reasoning that has come to be known as ‘Pascal’s Wager’? Between you and me, some of the critiques I’ve seen have made me wonder whether I might not be somehow confused about infinities or about the existence of infinite values . . . Mugger: I assure you, my powers are strictly finite. The offer before you does not involve infinite values in any way. But now I really must be off; I have an assignation in the Seventh Dimension that I’d rather not miss. Your wallet, please!"

I think it's hard to enjoy gambling if you are sure you'll lose money, which is how I feel like. I may be over pessimistic.

Typical Mind Fallacy.

0AnlamK
Don't get over-excited. You are still losing money in a less than fair-odds situation. And since most people don't stop gambling until they have some deficit from gambling, casinos usually make more than the odds give them.

(1) You don't have to construe the gamble as some sort of coin flips. It could also be something like "the weather in Santa Clara, California in 20 September 2012 will be sunny" - i.e. a singular non-repeating event, in which case having 100 hundred people (as confused as me) will not help you.

A coin flip is not fundamentally a less singular non-repeating event than the weather at a specific location and specific time. There are no true repeating events on a macro scale if you specify location and time. The relevant difference is how confident... (read more)

0AnlamK
How small should x be? And if the argument does hold, are you going to have two different criteria for rational behavior - one with events where probability of positive outcome is 1-x and one that isn't. And also, from Nick Bostrom's piece (formatting will be messed up): Of course, by your reasoning, you would hand your wallet. Bravo.

Some of the match questions are really poorly phrased.

This is because they are largely user submitted and not actively filtered by OkCupid staff.

7AdeleneDawner
It doesn't help that they're limited to four answers of relatively short length, either.
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