All of Motasaurus's Comments + Replies

Guvf qbrfa'g jbex. Fvapr yngre ba jr yrnea gung lbh pna'g fraq nal vasbezngvba onpx zber guna 6uef, vg frrzf zber yvxryl gung Qhzoyrqber jnf hfvat gur pybnx gb genvy Uneel sbe gur ragver qnl (naq nyzbfg pregnvayl ba gur genva, naq creuncf rira va qvntba nyyrl).

Juvpu zrnaf gung qhzoyrqber, va gur pybnx, jngpurq uneel, va gur pybnx, uryc uneel orsber ur tbg gur pybnx naq xarj ur unq gb tb onpx 6uef gb rafher gung uneel tbg gur pybnx 5uef rneyvre.

I can think of clear examples where a particular ideological foundation allows for death to be good, without requiring a contrarian or meta-contrarian position. One thought along such lines is whether religion would fall into the contrarian, or meta-contrarian view.

If you ask most 5 year olds, they believe in the metaphysical.

So could a triad be religious/atheist/religious? Or is there an extra level, where the first kind of atheist is the fedora tipping teenager on reddit, then there be a meta-meta atheist, or would perhaps the meta-meta position be agnostic?

Is religion too complex for such an simplification?

Answer by Motasaurus10

In the Greek πιστεύω ( pisteuó ) is to believe, and is derived from πείθω ( peithó ) , which is to be persuaded of what is true. There are undoubtedly different strengths and types of persuasion, but I find that this understanding (that is to believe something is to be persuaded of the truth of it) is useful in all situations and contexts.

what is more important is the hard work of closely examining every assumption and every logical step.

I agree. This was merely an introduction.

It reminds me somehow of the way many Christians talk a lot about humility but in practice are extremely arrogant towards non-believers.

I would assign a fairly high probability that this is more annoying to me than to you.


Note: Sorry for slow replies. I am working in a different city this week and have limited time and access. The problems of life I'm afraid.

If you're using perspective in a different sense, then you're making a different point that I'm not currently following.

I am using the same sense of perspective that you are. I was saying that until actually experienced, the suffering of being hit by a car exists only in the mind of A. It is potential, but not real. B has no concept - or at best no ability to truly imagine - the suffering that wou... (read more)

3anna_macdonald
Honestly, I feel like you are playing word games, and I think I've lost interest in continuing the conversation.
within A's limits, imposing the lesser suffering is the maximally loving option that A has.

This is not so as defined. Suffering is not from the perspective of the one inflicting or reducing it, but from the perspective of the one whom experiences it. A cannot be loving by imposing a lesser suffering from A's perspective - it has to be from the perspective of B.

And from the perspective of B it is not a case of a little suffering now to avoid a potential greater suffering later but suffering now, or no suffering now.

If you would like to update o... (read more)

3anna_macdonald
Both forms of suffering, not-chase-ball and hit-by-car, would be suffering that is endured by B. In that sense, they're both from B's perspective, even though B never experiences hit-by-car, which is the whole point. A is choosing an action which results in less suffering from B's perspective than B will experience if A chooses otherwise, even if B doesn't happen to know that. If you're using perspective in a different sense, then you're making a different point that I'm not currently following.
I feel like you're doing a lot of inquiring as to my position without giving me even a rough idea of your own. Which is a little frustrating, fyi.

I do apologise for the frustration this state of affairs brings. It's not for nothing though, I don't want to be in a position to be accused of dictating the conversation. If I just came in with "we will speak about [x] in such a way that we are forced into a paradigm as defined by [y]" it would be unfair to you, and to anyone reading.

I am trying to minimise this by giving you the power... (read more)

3anna_macdonald
Ah, the parent defense. A imposes suffering (not-chase-ball) in order to prevent a greater suffering (hit-by-car); and it is important that A does not have the option to prevent hit-by-car except by imposing not-chase-ball. Because A didn't create the system in the first place and has outside constraints imposed by reality on A's options. Thus, within A's limits, imposing the lesser suffering is the maximally loving option that A has.
What do you think IS the crux of the discussion?

The axioms that build up to the logical conclusion. I think that what you said there logically follows if the statements that precede it are true.

if you can reduce someone's suffering and don't, you're not loving them as much as you could.

If you are happy doing so I would like to focus on this statement first. My selfish reasons are that it is the easiest for me to discuss and on account of being in the middle of the chain directly influences the statements that come before and after it.

If... (read more)

2anna_macdonald
I mean, sure, we can focus on that. But I feel like you're doing a lot of inquiring as to my position without giving me even a rough idea of your own. Which is a little frustrating, fyi. Mine? I'm not really clear what you're asking. The suffering I want reduced is the suffering experienced from the perspective of the person suffering. I'm the one who's doing the wanting (although the vast majority of sufferers want their suffering reduced as well). I'm not really a moral objectivist, so it's my subjective moral-things-that-I-care-about that I'm asking a hypothetical God to live up to.

Thank you for your definition.

There exists emotional pain

I am content taking this as a given.

much of which does not have enough redeeming side effects to make it preferable over the option of not experiencing it.

I am not sure this works as a statement of fact. Do you think we could try and come to some kind of agreement on a quantitative amount that does not have redeeming side effects? Or better still, how much of a redeeming side effect makes experiencing pain preferable to not experiencing it?

A loving being would seek to reduce that pain

Why? What... (read more)

2anna_macdonald
No, I don't want to quantify pain. Honestly, I think it takes optimism to look at the variety and extremes of suffering and decide they might all be worth it in some way. Do you have that optimism? What do you think makes the suffering worth it, if so? Some caveats—"less than maximally loving" rather than "unloving", and the aforementioned restriction on "within the being's physical and emotional limits"—but basically, yes, if you can reduce someone's suffering and don't, you're not loving them as much as you could. What do you think IS the crux of the discussion?
Why doesn’t this seem to you like a model grounded in empirical evidence?

Aristotle never tested it - never even wrote of the possibility of testing the model. Post-hoc reasoning is not science. It's inventing plausible (to the time) sounding explanations for observations, and then just leaving it at that.

Which is why Aristotle (or any Aristotlean naturalist) never climbed up a cliff and dropped two balls - one made of lead the other of wood.

do you remember where he says this?

In Physica - I have missed a part there which I apologise for. Only objects which are made of earth fall toward the noble position of earth - as is their want to be with their own in their own noble position. Things made of air will seek out the heavens (which is why smoke rises), things made of water will seek out water (which is why rivers flow into the sea), and things made of fire will seek out fire. For Aristotle, heavy objects contained more of the element earth - so naturally they moved quickest to reach their natural position.

It's from his argument of natural motions.

5Benquo
Why doesn’t this seem to you like a model grounded in empirical evidence?

I am content having the discussion here. I do think this is the appropriate space.

I was hoping that you would be able to posit a specific definition, as opposed to a general boiling down to. One of the difficulties with this is that without a defining example what we are actually discussing may become confused with the examples.

The reason I asked if you would be willing to offer the statement is so that I wouldn't seem to be railroading you into a discussion in my favour. I have an example of such a statement, but I worry that by proposing it the def... (read more)

1anna_macdonald
I was mostly looking for a general indication of which category your response falls into, but sure, I'll formulate my thoughts/version a little more specifically. There exists emotional pain, much of which does not have enough redeeming side effects to make it preferable over the option of not experiencing it. A loving being would seek to reduce that pain, within their own physical/emotional limits and capability of doing so. If a being is as ultimate as God is described as, especially if it made the whole system in the first place, then reducing that pain is possible and an all-loving God would have done it.

Can you explain how the story of Elijah widely changed the entire philosophical culture of the world into which it occurred, resulting in an evidence and testing based approach to natural philosophy?

If my memory serves - and I admit it may not, and I have not looked this up, the Israelites returned to the worship of Baal and the Canaanite gods soon thereafter.

3Benquo
I'm not saying that the story of Elijah effected that change on its own. I'm citing it as evidence against the claim that Jesus caused an unique transition from a world with no such tradition to a world dominated by it. Instead, there were long-established monist narratives, some of which grew in influence over time, some of which (including the one that recorded the Elijah story) strongly influenced the development of Christianity. I've been careful to refer to the time of the recording of the Elijah story (most likely around the reign of king Josiah) rather than the time it is supposed to have occurred, since there's clearer evidence for the former, so it's not very helpful to respond as though I meant the latter.
Motivated reasoning is so obvious and blatant when it concerns beliefs we don't share ourselves.

Isn't it just. If only the OP had prefaced everything with some kind of comment acknowledging that.

what follows is a descriptive narrative of my epistemology not a statement of universal fact (though some facts are contained therein).
-1waveman
I have seen a lot of these generalized disclaimers. They don't mean much. What is more important is the hard work of closely examining every assumption and every logical step. It reminds me somehow of the way many Christians talk a lot about humility but in practice are extremely arrogant towards non-believers. I am not specifically thinking of you in this paragraph.
I'm ok with being proselytized

I am not convinced the moderators would be okay with you being proselytized.

Thinking about this and about your question though I have considered ways that we could tangentially discuss it. Would you mind offering a definitive statement on the problem of pain that we could discuss from?

I would rather not discuss from assumptions.

1anna_macdonald
I'd say it boils down to the idea that a good God would not allow the kind of suffering that does, in fact, happen. If you'd feel more comfortable carrying the discussion elsewhere, I'm fine with that. (I haven't noticed an LW rule against giving out my own email address, but I'm not sure if I've looked well enough.)
I'm not sure exactly what you were hoping for in response to your introduction but I hoped my experience might be interesting to you.

I wasn't hoping for anything. I had expectations that I had assigned prior probabilities to, and could have happily continued on reading without ever mentioning anything of my epistemology. To my mind that was not the rational approach - and the guidelines that are offered are to lay your underlying assumptions bare for discussion so that people can avoid straw-manning one another. This is what I have done.

There is... (read more)

2Bucky
I'll rephrase: It sounds like you've discovered something new (rationality) and it has dissolved your previously felt cognitive dissonance regarding your belief. The dissolving of cognitive dissonance feels like it is confirming the side that you end up on, even though the actual evidence is sketchy at best. *** Corrections to my previous comments: 1. Where I said: I should have said "method for calculating a likelihood" 2. I talk about my belief in Christianity being on a scale but this is unhelpful because of the issues discussed in No, really, I've deceived myself. I should have talked about "How likely I though it was that Christianity was true" being measured on a scale. This sounds the same but means I actually assessed the truth of the statement, not just my level of belief.

Yeah I wrote that as about my 3rd comment.

The reaction to which is the inspiration for an introduction post in the first place.

I don't have one that I think is rationally valid that would not come across as proselytizing.

2anna_macdonald
I'm ok with being proselytized; I don't think there's a good solution to the problem that doesn't depend on either an optimistic interpretation of events or a way-way-higher-than-I-have valuing of free will for its own sake (which may also involve contradictory interpretations of free will.)

It's not too bad. Like most countries it has its own particular problems.

Funny how we find all kinds of ways to avoid facing uncomfortable questions head on!

Is this prescriptive or descriptive? I did eventually make my way to answer your question head on. You asked me where does your imagination fail and my answer is that my imagination fails on imagining and internally consistent universe that is not internally consistent.

Notice which of those worlds you instantly flinch away from.

I instantly flinch away from neither. I spent approximately fifteen of my first twenty years imagining myself in a world where I was mistaken i... (read more)

Aristotle used empirical evidence to inform his models

Aristotle claimed heavy objects fell to the ground because they loved the noble positions and wanted to be close to it. He also said that heavy objects would fall faster.

The story of Elijah and the priests of Baal (in which a public experiment is used to falsify one of two mutually exclusive models, implying consistency as the first criterion for truth and correspondence with evidence as the second)

Are you claiming that the God of Elijah is different to Christ?

3Benquo
This doesn't really sound like Aristotle to me, I suspect it sounds a bit different in context - do you remember where he says this?
3Benquo
I was responding to: The story of Elijah predates this.
Have you done this?

Not a cliff, but every child who has graduated highschool in my country has done this experiment from the top of a multi-story building.

7waveman
I have done this. In year 10. We tried to troll the teacher saying that the larger object landed first. He claimed this was due to 'parallax error'. Science is murkier than it looks.
0Pattern
Sounds like a nice country.

I have no way of being able to answer this.

It is not, but that is just what you would expect someone you distrust to say. I am new (been reading no more than three months) to this website, and you can check my first post.

But that is in no way convincing to someone who has decided that this is a rewrite from something years back.

Thank you for your corrections. I always appreciate anyone who is willing to help me become a better writer.

However, I think it's worth pointing out that there are pre-Christian elements which had an important part to play too.

For logic and reason you absolutely have a point. For science I don't think that the impact was much greater than giving formal logic and a mathematical basis. They lacked not only the investigative spirit that science requires, but the ability to reason that they should investigate.

For a simple example, the earliest heli... (read more)

7Benquo
Have you done this?
A standard Eliezer question: can you imagine the universe exactly the same in all observable aspects, but without anything divine in it? If not, where does your imagination fail?

I have clicked "reply" straight away, but let me ponder the question for five minutes by the clock first.

You question is inherently flawed. It is not a failure of imagination but rather a requirement of imagination that keeps me from imagining the universe exactly the same in all observable aspects, but without anything divine in it.

Are you familiar with Aquinas' ... (read more)

5Shmi
Funny how we find all kinds of ways to avoid facing uncomfortable questions head on! Let's try it differently. I assume you have noticed having been wrong before at times, about this or that. So, imagine two nearly identical worlds: one where you are right about your faith, and one where you are mistaken. There is no issue with internal consistency in either of those, since the difference is your mental processes, and we know that human mental processes are not very unreliable. Notice which of those worlds you instantly flinch away from. Noticed? That is motivated cognition at work. And motivated cognition is a telltale sign of failing in rational thinking.

Thank you for the corrections. They have been made.

Are you saying that you don't believe there is any amount of evidence that can sway you?

I do not believe that there is any amount of evidence that can sway me regarding the godhood and resurrection of Jesus Christ, no. It is completely and utterly irrational - yet as deeply held has the belief that "I exist" - and I don't believe that there is any amount of evidence that can sway me on that one either.

Of course there is the ultimate test of both - so I suppose that in that case it w... (read more)

3Shmi
A standard Eliezer question: can you imagine the universe exactly the same in all observable aspects, but without anything divine in it? If not, where does your imagination fail? If yes, why do you need an extra entity?

It seems a bit self-serving to vote your comment up, since it's you saying you don't hate what I wrote.

But I appreciate that you engaged with it instead of dismissing it out of hand. Not that I really expected anyone on a site dedicated to improving rationality to be dismissing posts out of hand... but without evidence you never can be sure.

/edit

It seems my initial thoughts were somewhat realised.

Hi Senarin.

I am also new to Less Wrong and also a Christian. I didn't write an introductory post - I guess I'm not "less wrong" enough yet (I didn't actually want to comment at all, having felt I haven't lurked enough). I don't think that there is any conflict between rationality and Christianity - and the writer of the gospel of John certainly didn't believe there to be.

For in the beginning was rationality. And rationality was with God and was God... and rationality became flesh and the world knew Him not.

3Bae's Theorem
Hi, Motasaurus. I certainly hope you stick around! Don't let our disagreements drive you off. However, on that note, I'm afraid I would have to disagree. While I think you can have "better than average" epistemology and still be a Christian, perhaps even be in the top 25% percentile, I don't believe you can aspire to be a perfect Bayesian and still be a Christian. I would respectfully point out that the Apostle John is hardly a neutral spectator in determining whether one can be both Christian and Rational. Additionally, he certainly didn't have access to anywhere near the same level of understanding of human cognition, science, and probability theory as we do; to use an Eliezer illustration, the greatest physicists of his age couldn't have calculated the path of a falling apple.
6gjm
Welcome! Please don't take the downvotes as a sign that you aren't welcome here. (They probably do indicate that things that look like proselytizing won't be well received, though.) I think translating "λόγος" as "rationality" is a bit of a stretch. I don't know of any English translations that even render it as "reason", which is more defensible. I expect you're right that the authors of the New Testament didn't see any conflict between their beliefs and reason; people usually don't, whether such conflict exists or not; in any case, our epistemic situation isn't the same as theirs and it's possible that in the intervening ~2k years we've learned and/or forgotten things that make the most reasonable conclusion for us different from the most reasonable conclusion for them. (Examples of the sort of thing I mean: 1. The success of science over the last few centuries means that the proposition "everything that happens has a natural explanation" is more plausible for us than for them. 2. The author of John's gospel, or his sources, may have actually met Jesus, and perhaps something about doing so was informative and convincing in a way that merely reading about him isn't. 3. We know the history of Christianity since their time, which might make it more credible -- after all, it survived 2k years and became the world's dominant religion, which has to count for something -- or less credible -- after all, people have done no end of terrible things in its name, which makes it less likely that a benevolent god is looking on it with special approval. 4. We have different examples available to us of other religious movements and how they've developed; e.g., we might compare the early days of Christianity with those of something like Mormonism, and they might compare it with the Essenes.)

I wonder if the desire to justify is the result of social stigma surrounding being the wrong sort of person. If to be a full person is to have reasons for your actions, and to be nice to others, then it makes sense to me that the desire to give reasons for "mean" criticism is a result of wearing the correct model of personhood.

3linkhyrule5
That, and the fact that when making decisions, it's *really important* to have non-subjective reasons -- or if you have subjective reasons, you still have objective reasons why they matter, like "if I don't like someone on a personal level, I really shouldn't spend the rest of my life with them" in dating. So people are used to a mode of thought where a subjective opinion means "you're not done explaining"/"you haven't spent enough mental effort on the problem," and they engage the -- honestly, very productive, very healthy -- same mechanisms they use when justifying a command decision. It just happens to be mis-applied in this case.
1Pattern
That explanation adds something to my understanding of the post you linked to. Thanks.
I think experiments like this are too noisy to provide useful conclusions due to numerous confounders.

Thank you. I think you are right. I did not sit down and think through this idea before proposing it. Such an experiment would not just be useless, it would probably be worse than useless. I think it would give meaningless data that could easily be confused for meaningful. I appreciate the correction.

So the choice of where to draw the line on free speech includes a play-off between allowing accurate evidence to be presented and preventing bad faith comm
... (read more)
2Bucky
The point I was trying to make was that social nicety is a prerequisite for truth, or if not social nicety per se, at least good faith communication. In general I'd agree that society values nicety more highly than is strictly healthy. To propagate rationality in such circumstances you focus on the battles that you can win. I'm not optimistic about rationality propagating fast but I don't think focusing on extreme and emotionally charged hypotheticals will get us there any faster. Maybe give it another 30 years and we'll see where we are! (Of course if this is less hypothetical then this discussion would be a very different one.)
The stuff we keep beneath, then, is disproportionately likely to be the stuff we don’t want other people to see (at least not immediately). Herein lies our fears, our insecurities, our prejudices, and our perversions. It’s going to be things which are more likely to cause disagreement, to make people like us less.

There is a certain type of person who puts all their psycho-emotional prickles and saw-teeth and spikes and off shapes on the outside and wear them like armour. What they present is all the things they dislike about themselves and keep the things... (read more)

Thank you for your response. I don't think you are misunderstanding me. I can't present certain evidence or even write too extensively on this topic (which is in part why I phrased everything as a non-specific question in the first place) as there are two publicly known cases where people in the country I live have ended up facing court for writing in a public forum on the internet - one was sent to prison for being the owner of a revisionist website that was hosted in the U.S.

most convictions appear to be for denying the use of gas chambers or
... (read more)
7Bucky
In the most general sense, any law which impinges on free speech has the potential to be detrimental to accuracy of beliefs. For example, if I make a defamatory claim about someone and they take me to court, the onus is on me to prove that what I said was true (at least in the UK). This will discourage me from making a claim that I believe to be true but don't have strong evidence for and so I cannot publish some true information. In the US the burden of proof would be more on the person who I defamed to show that what I said was false (I'm not a legal expert, I got this from an episode of The Good Wife!). This is a lesser brake on free speech and allows me to say things which I am confident are true, even if my proof would be insufficient for a UK court. However, there is a flip side. Completely free speech is not beneficial for truth seeking unless all members of the society can be trusted to communicate in good faith. Without any defamation laws everyone can say whatever they like about anyone else and no-one knows what to believe. I can imagine circumstances where if the burden of proof is overly on the defamed then people can make up things which are very hard to disprove and again the truth can suffer. Another example would be that hate-speech laws discourage racism but also make it more difficult for people to discuss the possibility of differences between races. So the choice of where to draw the line on free speech includes a play-off between allowing accurate evidence to be presented and preventing bad faith communication. In the case of Holocaust denial I don't think it would be too controversial to suggest that most revisionist theories constitute bad faith communication (I'll be honest, I haven't looked at any myself). My personal preference on this wouldn't be to ban holocaust denial, as the social norms where I am from are sufficiently strong that they constitute enough of a barrier to Holocaust denial entering the main stream but I can certain
Are you saying this is good, is bad, or is happening?

I am saying it is good because it allows experts to focus on their fields. But that I thought that Elizer was pointing out that it can be bad because it doesn't allow for dissemination of those expert ideas to others.

I haven't figured out how to quote yet. I apologise for this fact. I wanted to mention that I found this, potentially throw-away, line insightful.

"The biologists can stop arguing with creationists, and get down to sorting out the details of kin selection or whatever. The creationists can stop having to pedal creationism to the unconvinced and can get together to work out the difference between micro-evolution and macro-evolution."

This sort of thing is how we get places like WUWT exposing the flaws in the IPCCs methods, models, and media pr... (read more)

4Donald Hobson
My point was that the epistemic correlation between communicators is increasing. Before everyone was talking to everyone else more. Now experts can talk to experts, and creationists talk to other creationists. Homeopaths talk to other homeopaths. Are you saying this is good, is bad, or is happening?
4torekp
Paste text into your comment and then select/highlight it. Formatting options will appear, including a quote button.

I am new to the website. So new that this is my first comment and I didn't even particularly want to sign up. I found it interesting having just come from reading Eleizer's post about 0 and 1 not being probabilities to here I immediately had a question form in my mind.

How certain of a thing do we have to be in order to prescribe that the state be able to end someone's life for their speaking it?

There are several points in this question that require some unpacking. The most prominent being about the state being able to end someone's li... (read more)

Bucky130

Firstly, welcome!

Beyond a certain probability (say 99.9% confidence that a story is true in its generality, even if one is less sure of some of the specifics), it seems to me that the truthfulness of the story is no longer the main consideration in whether to instigate such a law. In that case I would be more interested in how such a law would alter the incentives of society and the knock-on effects of such. Not making a decision due to imperfect information can often be a mistake.

The point about granting the state authority to end a life for breaking any ... (read more)