All of mwacksen's Comments + Replies

I understand that - with some caveats - a waluigi->luigi transition may have low probability in natural language text. However, there's no reason to think this has to be the case for RLHF text.

especially if Ukraine disperses their population.

Something that sounds simple - "dispersing" your population - really comes with a huge cost. You can't just send your population into the fields and expect them to live there.

And trucks can still drive off-road.

For which they require gasoline.

With NATO supply lines, Ukraine can afford to lose a million trucks a month to mud

I don't think this is accurate, Nato doesn't just have a million trucks a month lying around somewhere to send.

If the people aren't in cities, what is Russia going to target?

... (read more)
1Lao Mein
Ukraine is recieving ~70% of its pre-war GDP in military aid alone. They've already sent much of their civilian population to the EU. If there's a serious nuclear threat, population dispersal is simply a continuation of existing policies. The Germans can pick up the tab if nothing happens. There are millions of civilian trucks in Europe. Yes, attrition rate will be high if they are used in a military context, but if nukes get dropped there are bigger things to worry about. Russia knocking out dams, bridges, and power-plants doesn't do much in the long-run. Sure, Ukrainian civilians won't be operating with power, and hospitals won't work, but those are small things in the context of nuclear war. The only major river in Ukraine is the Dnepier, and Russia is currently running a significant part of its supply lines through pontoons there right now. Nuking hospitals might kill a lot of people, but it doesn't do much for the war effort. As for Crimea, we're talking about the context of Russia using nuclear weapons, which pre-supposes Ukraine being able to take Crimea. And I think they will, in time. Russia is currently only spending ~5% of its GDP on its military. Ukraine, when taking into account foreign military aid, is spending 90%+. 

Me: Do you agree reviewers aim to only accept valid papers, and care more about validity than interestingness?

I've reviewed papers. I didn't spend copious amounts of time checking the proofs. Some/most reviewers may claim to only accept "valid papers" (whatever that means), but the way the system is set up peer review serves mainly as a filter to filter out blatantly bad papers. Sure, people try to catch the obviously invalid papers. And sure, many researches really try to find mistakes. But at the end of the day, you can always get your results publish... (read more)

mwacksen-1-2

I previously did an analysis of the tactical utility of nuclear weapons and came to the conclusion that they aren't as cost-effective as precision weapons.

We still live in a world where all use of nuclear weapons is strategic.

What if the Ukrainians take the nuclear threat seriously and disperse their civilian population?

So what? the point of Russia using nukes is to signal that it will do whatever it takes to defeat Ukraine. The tactical effects are beside the point. It's hard to predict what will happen exactly, but if a nuke gets used anywhere, th... (read more)

1Lao Mein
I'm saying that Russia can't, in fact, "wreck havoc on Ukranian supply-chains and leadership" with nuclear weapons, at least not for long. Rails are made of hardened steel. Roads are made of asphalt. Neither can really be "knocked out" without being inside the fireball of a nuclear weapon. Russia can use its entire nuclear stockpile to seriously damage Ukrainian logistics for a while, but I don't think their command structure can really take advantage of that, based off their recent performance. And trucks can still drive off-road. With NATO supply lines, Ukraine can afford to lose a million trucks a month to mud, if that's what it takes to get supplies to the front. As for leadership, they can disperse as well. With Starlink, they are entirely capable of directing operations from a corn field in either Poland or Ukraine. The Ukrainian command structure is also specifically built to survive decapitation strikes and interdiction of communication. Both NATO and PACT forces had detailed plans for fighting a total war after a strategic nuclear exchange. On the battlefield, nuclear weapons aren't eschalogical, they're just another weapon. Also, Russia can't exterminate the Ukrainian people with nuclear weapons, even if it uses its entire strategic stockpile there, especially if Ukraine disperses their population. It's a matter of math, not will. If the people aren't in cities, what is Russia going to target? A villiage of a few hundred with a strategic nuclear weapon? It'll run out long before making a big dent on Ukrainian demographics. So let's say it's mid 2023, Ukraine is pushing the Russians, and Russia conducts a nuclear test in Crimea. Ukraine responds by pausing operations for a week and dispersing its population. Then continues to drive into Crimea. What does Russia do then? Tactical nukes might slow things down, but only until they run out. Strategic weapons may result in conventional NATO retalliation and again can only do so much. Nuclear weapons can't stop
3ChristianKl
Biden's statement was that using a tactical nuke would just result in increased weapons deliveries and expanding the range of delivered weapons and not doing other retaliation. That was an available move because the tactical utility of the weapons is very low. India in particular and likely also China, do care about no nukes getting detonated and Russia could lose their support for donating tactical nukes.  While there's no appetite for unlimited support, I think currently the biggest limit for support is cost. The Republicans who question support for Ukraine do it based on arguments about the cost of that support. If Russia detonates a tactical nuke, it becomes very hard for anyone to argue about cost, and the current opposition of part of the Republicans to support for Ukraine is essentially destroyed. 
mwacksen-1-2

Yes, I agree, and my argument was an oversimplification. That said, I don't think you're properly considering its context. The context here is that if Ukraine were to be in a situation where it had no chance of winning the war (e.g. due to nuclear weapons being in play). Here is what I'm replying to:

As for Ukrainians there are reasons to believe they're much more willing to die than Japanese in 1945. Anecdotes first. I asked a Ukrainian yesterday what should Ukraine do if nuked. She said obviously keep fighting.

Many of your examples (1-3, arguably 4) a... (read more)

5Lao Mein
I'm not entirely convinced nukes are a "I win" button in this war. What if the Ukrainians take the nuclear threat seriously and disperse their civilian population? In that case, even full counter-value targeting of Ukraine with the full Russian atomic stockpile probably kills under a million people. I previously did an analysis of the tactical utility of nuclear weapons and came to the conclusion that they aren't as cost-effective as precision weapons. That, in fact, NATO is entirely capable of supplying so much precision weaponry to Ukraine that it does more damage to combat units than the entire Russian tactical nuclear stockpile combined. My best-guess scenario for Russia using all their tactical nuclear weapons is that, between poor target info and poor maintanance of the Russia atomic stockpile, they at most render the Ukrainian Army 50% combat ineffective. That still isn't enough to knock them out of the fight, and an influx of NATO weapons afterwards will stabilize the front. 
mwacksenΩ121

Care to bet on the results of a survey of academic computer scientists? If the stakes are high enough, I could try to make it happen.

No, no more than I would bet on a survey of <insert religious group here> whether they think <religious group> is more virtuous than <non-religious group>. Academics may claim that peer review is to check validity but their actions tell a different story. This is especially true in "hard" fields like mathematics where reviewers may even struggle to follow an argument, let alone check its validity. Given t... (read more)

2michaelcohen
Me: Peer review can definitely issue certificates mistakenly, but validity is what it aims to certify. You: No it doesn't. They just care about interestingness. Me: Do you agree reviewers aim to only accept valid papers, and care more about validity than interestingness? You:  Yes, but... If you can admit that we agree on this basic point, I'm happy to discuss further about how good they are at what they aim to do. 1: If retractions were common, surely you would have said that was evidence peer review didn't accomplish much! If academics were only equally good at spotting mistakes immediately, they would still spot the most mistakes because they get the first opportunity to. And if they do, others don't get a "chance" to point out a flaw and have the paper retracted. Even though this argument fails, I agree that journals are too reluctant to publish retractions; pride can sometimes get in the way of good science. But that has no bearing on their concern for validity at the reviewing stage. 2: Some amount of trust is taken for granted in science. The existence of trust in a scientific field does not imply that the participants don't actually care about the truth. Bounded Distrust. 3: Since some level interestingness is also required for publication, this is consistent with a top venue having a higher bar for interestingness than a lesser venue, even while they same requirement for validity. And this is definitely in fact the main effect at play. But yes, there are also some lesser journals/conferences/workshops where they are worse at checking validity, or they care less about it because they are struggling to publish enough articles to justify their existence, or because they are outright scams. So it is relevant that AAAI publishes AI Magazine, and their brand is behind it. I said "peer reviewed" instead of "peer reviewed at a top venue" because the latter would have rubbed you the wrong way even more, but I'm only claiming that passing peer review is worth
mwacksenΩ010

Peer review can definitely issue certificates mistakenly, but validity is what it aims to certify.

No it doesn't. It's hard to say what the "aims" of peer-review are, but "ensuring validity" is certainly not one of them. As a first approximation, I'd say that peer-review aims to certify that the author is not an obvious crank, and that the argument being made is an interesting one to someone in the field.

5michaelcohen
Care to bet on the results of a survey of academic computer scientists? If the stakes are high enough, I could try to make it happen. "As a reviewer, I only recommend for acceptance papers that appear to be both valid and interesting." Strongly agree - ... - Strongly Disagree "As a reviewer, I would sooner recommend for acceptance a paper that was valid, but not incredibly interesting, than a paper that was interesting, but the conclusions weren't fully supported by the analysis." Strongly agree - ... - Strongly Disagree
mwacksen-3-4

You just have to twist my words and make such an offensive response, don't you? To restate - the siege of Mariupol didn't stop Ukraine from defending Ukraine.

I don't see what's offensive, and I'm not twisting your words but pointing out something that's almost obvious: IF you have no chance of winning THEN you should stop fighting. This was true in Mariupol, and is true for the rest of Ukraine also. The siege of Mariupol absolutely stopped Ukraine from defending Mariupol. The important question is whether the IF applies. But once it does, throwing away ... (read more)

7mruwnik
Your if clause is somewhat of a false dichotomy. There are other reasons to keep fighting: * you might be fighting a rear action that you know you won't win, but will allow the rest to escape * you might be bogging down an enemies strength to keep them from going somewhere else * you might be able to inflict enough damage on them to cause them to be ineffective in later battles * you might want to inspire others * you might care about glory * you might have nowhere else to go * you might just be nihilistic * you might have someone pointing a gun at your back to stop you from retreating Most of these boil down to iterated games, rather than just a one off prisoner's dilemma.  Mariupol is a tragedy. But it really didn't stop Ukrainians from continuing the fight as long as they could. The reason they stopped was because they ran out of supplies. They also inflicted massive damage on their enemy. There is a lesson here.  Stories of last stands are powerful. A large bunch of inspiring stories are about doomed last stands - Thermopylae, Beowulf, Roland's song, Westerplatte etc. We can argue about whether they were worth the suffering of the protagonists, whether it's morally good, etc., but they work. 

As I said in the comment above the perfect endgame is Putin no longer in power.

Not it isn't, because there are alternatives that are worse than Putin. I hope there are alternatives to Putin that are both realistic and also better, but I haven't seen much evidence for this coming out of Russia.

As for Ukrainians there are reasons to believe they're much more willing to die than Japanese in 1945

Are you familiar with Japan pre 1945 at all? You have heard of kamikaze pilots at the very least, right? I will quote the Wikipedia article on them: "The tradit... (read more)

8throwaway62654
You just have to twist my words and make such an offensive response, don't you? To restate - the siege of Mariupol didn't stop Ukraine from defending Ukraine. We're afraid he may start a nuclear war. That's pretty bad already. And he clearly gets worse with time. Yet you want to give him an opportunity to build a bigger army. To eventually give it to a successor who you think will be even worse. Actions speak. I know Ukrainians who were hiding from military enlistment officers for years in relatively peaceful years. I tried to give them advice how to hide from mobilization during the invasion. But they just stopped hiding. I shared both strong and weak evidence. I didn't initially think that it's gonna be a debate... If I treated this like a debate I could say something like: "Putin never said that he's gonna use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. On the contrary, he said he's not going to use nukes in Ukraine. Therefore there's nothing to worry about." But I'm not saying it. Look, the point is Putin lied so many times about not being involved in Ukraine. He lied about not intending to start a full scale invasion. Any proposed solution that relies on him promising to not invade again has very low probability of working.

I agree, though sanctions are always sold as being strategic even when they are moral.

The fact that Putin has not used nukes yet is to his credit, but I do think that there is a marked shift in his demeanor from how would sound in speeches before to now. Make of that what you will.

Then yeah, sure. Everybody would laugh themselves to death.

It's not that simple. Nobody in the West is even in principle open to Crimea becoming Russian (and for good reason). So this wouldn't be as ridiculous as you make it sound, especially given Putin's rhetoric over the years and how salty he is about Kosovo.

But that's the whole point. A dragged out war steadily destroys Russian firepower and manpower.

That's one way of seeing it, but neither Russian firepower nor manpower should be thought of as a fixed finite resource. If Russia's current strat... (read more)

6throwaway62654
This gave me an interesting thought. Either Putin thinks retreating is deadly for him or not. If he does he will keep sending more forces to be steadily destroyed. If he doesn't retaking Crimea wouldn't trigger nuclear response by default as he will hope to conquer it again later. As I said in the comment above the perfect endgame is Putin no longer in power. But the price is artificially prolonging the conflict or increased nuclear risk in Ukraine. Which is why I said prolonging the conflict looks like a better option. As for Ukrainians there are reasons to believe they're much more willing to die than Japanese in 1945. Anecdotes first. I asked a Ukrainian yesterday what should Ukraine do if nuked. She said obviously keep fighting. I know more than one person who donated significant amounts of money to the army. A vibe I'm getting from many is victory at any cost. Ironically once I had difficulty convincing one Ukrainian why NATO can't be more involved. Polls say that only around 10% of Ukrainians think that Ukraine should hold peace talks with Russia. Even after conventional rocket showers 80+% say that Ukraine should keep fighting. Also Ukraine would in a different situation than Japan. If Putin orders a nuclear strike it would mean Ukraine is otherwise winning. So morale would be super-high among Ukrainians. Unlike losing Japan in 1945. Another thing to consider is that the first use of nuclear weapons was a shock to everyone. Many Ukrainians understand the fact that they can be nuked. Though about 2/3 (according to another poll) still don't believe Russia is capable of actually ordering a nuclear strike. If you think about it Mariupol could be even worse than a nuclear explosion. Tens of thousands dead but waiting for their fate for many weeks without much water and food, hiding from bombs, seeing familiar faces lying dead on the streets, constantly being in terror. This didn't stop Ukrainians. There is a lesswrong post that describes a subtle way Russia
2ChristianKl
And it would be a strong signal that NATO promises are worth nothing, which is bad for the Baltic states. 

The goal of sanctions is not to incentivize regime change. The goal is to make it a bit more difficult for him to wage the war.

A nice story, but I don't buy it. How exactly does banning Russian flights to Europe, or banning Russian tourists, or banning Russian bank accounts with more than €100k from transacting make it a bit more difficult for him to wage the war? Or confiscating/stealing the wealth of oligarchs? If Putin "doesn't care that much" about sanctions, isn't it pretty stupid that the West is shooting themselves in the foot, and the developin... (read more)

1throwaway62654
Sanctions turned out to be pretty underwhelming. And surely, one can easily see that the portfolio of sanctions could be much more effective. Personally I think some sanctions are needed but much better thought through. If you mean something like we tell Putin "If you do the referendum with the UN supervision and allow pro-Ukrainian people in Crimea to freely and publicly debate with pro-Russian people, then we would recognize Crimea as Russian if and only if after long debates people in Crimea still decide to be in Russia". Then yeah, sure. Everybody would laugh themselves to death. But at least there's no downside. On the other hand, if you mean something like stopping fighting after Putin promises to do a fair referendum you would just significantly increase chances of Ukraine ceasing to exist. But that's the whole point. A dragged out war steadily destroys Russian firepower and manpower. At the same time every Ukrainian child hit by a rocket makes the US send more firepower to Ukraine. Which acts as a counterbalance to the fundamental asymmetry between Russia and Ukraine. If you stop the fighting Russia will stop losing its army and Ukraine will get much less military aid. Let's consider some strategies the US can use. Just support Ukraine. At some point Ukraine probably goes "too far" and nukes may be used in Ukraine. At this point the US can either engage directly, continue support Ukraine or negotiate some kind of a deal for Ukraine. The first may start WW3. A deal would mean Putin wins. Continuing to support Ukraine would mean millions more dead. But it would be contained to Ukraine and Russia. And let's say Putin would have payed his cost for invading Ukraine. If Ukraine doesn't accept defeat after being nuked it would be the best deterrent to future uses of nuclear weapons since they don't achieve the desired outcome of quick victory. Calibrate military aid to make sure neither Ukraine nor Russia win. In theory you can prolong the war until either Put
3mruwnik
Sanctions are of 2 types: strategical and moral. The first kind are aimed at stopping an adversary from being able to produce vital stuff, like the recent chip embargo on China. These are often quite effective at producing an effect, as can be seen in how Russia is having massive logistical problems and having to pull out old Soviet tanks, rather than producing new one. The second kind are to show people that you're Doing Something and that you are Very Serious. These are very much less effective. Though they're aimed at appeasing the people at home, rather than changing how a foreign actor acts. The current sanctions are a big bag of both kinds, some of which are in fact quite successful at what they're supposed to do, i.e. make it harder for the Russians to wage war. Russia has an interesting history of loosing wars to embarrassingly weaker opponents, which then trigger deep changes. Not that it's a rule or anything, but it is suggestive. Though frankly I'm not sure if I'd prefer someone other than Putin in charge of the nukes. He at least seems rational, albeit working under the wrong assumptions. 

I did refer to people who identify as either Ukrainian or Russian and not as Crimean Tartar when I said non-Crimean Tartar. So non-'Crimean Tartar'.

Aaah got it. My bad.

the main underlying "promise" that such an experiment holds,

I'm sorry for the (very late) side remark but an "underlying promise" is an oxymoron of sorts - if nothing was explicitly promised, nothing was promised :)

I don't see better options. What would you suggest?

The situation is pretty difficult,

a) Providing clear, unambiguous and automatic mechanisms for repealing Western sanctions that are also realistic (i.e. not "we drop sanctions once you get out of Crimea"). While I also like Bryan Caplan's suggestion to offer asylum + military compensation to defecting Russian soldiers, I recognize that this is politically not feasible.

Sanctions that are not directed at the military antagonize the Russian population. Somewhat counterintuitively, they can even lead ordin... (read more)

(a) There's nothing valuable Putin would willingly give in exchange for repealing sanctions. He doesn't care that much. And potential marginal increase in Putin's support doesn't matter either. The goal of sanctions is not to incentivize regime change. The goal is to make it a bit more difficult for him to wage the war.

Asylum and financial rewards for defecting Russian soldiers were announced by Ukraine in the beginning of the invasion. But I don't know how well it works in practice.

(b) Putin will never allow an election or a referendum that he doesn't con... (read more)

Bandera was in prison when the atrocities in 1943 took place but not when those in 1941 took place.

First of all, thanks for catching this, I was mistaken. That said, it seems somewhat more complex, according to this link "Bandera was in occupied Poland when on June 30, 1941, his comrades proclaimed an independent Ukrainian state in Nazi-occupied Lviv — and the Germans banned him from traveling to Ukraine."

This doesn't, of course, vindicate him in any way - he was head of an organisation that performed atrocities and worked with Nazi Germany. But it also... (read more)

4ChristianKl
I did link to the article of the poll that's the source for the claims. The poll asked a bunch of different questions, if you are interested in understanding what Crimean think at that time, it's worthwhile to read it.  I did refer to people who identify as either Ukrainian or Russian and not as Crimean Tartar when I said non-Crimean Tartar. So non-'Crimean Tartar'.

It seems somewhat more complex, according to this link "Bandera was in occupied Poland when on June 30, 1941, his comrades proclaimed an independent Ukrainian state in Nazi-occupied Lviv — and the Germans banned him from traveling to Ukraine."

Anecdotally speaking, about two months ago a friend of mine tested this with several tests, and while she was consistently positive with nasal tests, she was only sometimes positive even when she swabbed her throat as much as she could.

Bear in mind that foreign authoritarian presidents are generally not considered reliable sources of information

I don't think the "foreign authoritarian" qualifier is necessary here...

But so far only one side has rape as part of its doctrine.

If you think Russian official military doctrine includes rape, then (and I'm trying to put this as politely as possible) you are deluded.

Only one side is engaged in wide spread plundering etc

Probably true, but I do wish we'd actually know how much plundering is going on relative to how many soldiers are there.

That seems like an important distinction.

I saw some pretty nasty psychological warfare-type stuff the Ukranians were doing that the Russian's weren't. Like sending pictures of their ... (read more)

For some reason public discourse in the Western countries gravitates towards either "let's stop helping Ukraine" with weak justifications like "will of the Crimean people" and "Ukrainians aren't saints too" or going all in up to directly fighting Russian army on the ground.

Yes, this is a good point.

I think policy of helping Ukraine but not engaging Russian army directly (basically just sticking to what's already being done) is superior to either extreme.

Wait what? I mean yes, obviously this is superior to batshit crazy options like sending troops to... (read more)

I don't see better options. What would you suggest?

It's pretty hard to disincentivise anyone to fight. Ukrainian population wouldn't accept defeat. Putin can't either. Both will fight regardless of whether they see themselves prevailing eventually. It's worth noting that Putin probably cornered himself by formally annexing more territories on purpose.

One would think that maybe we can make some kind of a peace deal. Maybe Ukraine recognizes Crimea as Russian in exchange for stopping hostilities? The problem is it's not the first time. The first time was in ... (read more)

In the Nüremberg trials, we decided that one aspect of our global democratic culture is that those who engaged in the Holocaust and mass murdered Jews and other groups were war criminals even if their excuse was that they followed orders.

While I agree with the conclusion, I really do vehemently object to the framing. Who is "we", and what on earth is "global democratic culture"?

Attempts to rewrite history and glorify fascists go both against our general Western consensus

I mean these are two separate things, and depending on who you ask rewriting his... (read more)

1ChristianKl
Bandera was in prison when the atrocities in 1943 took place but not when those in 1941 took place.  It was also the case before 2014 that the majority in Crimea was Russian and there were a lot fewer Crimean Tatars. But even if you want to ignore the Russians the poll also separates out self-identfying Ukrainans and a majority of them were also in support of the referendum. It was a reason why Ukraine got less military support from the EU before the invasion in 2022 than it wanted. Ukraine still wants to be in the EU. The EU works in a way where every member state has a veto. Hungary has an easy time justifying that veto as long as Ukraine's law is not really compatible with EU law regarding minority protections.  There are probably also a lot of others who at the European institutional level think "We already have enough problems with Polish and Hungarian nationalists, do we really want to deal with Ukrainian nationalists as well?"
2Viliam
There were two Lviv pogroms soon after each other, from 30 June to 2 July, and from 25 to 29 July, 1941. Bandera was arrested on 5 July 1941. So he probably was responsible for the first one. EDIT: Seems like he was out of Ukraine even during the first one.

Nobody here seems to have offered an unreserved defence of SMTM, so let me do it:

  • SMTM told the author of this post they advised against it, they still did it, and were happy with the result.

  • The author says "I don't think that SMTM has done enough to show that it was safe". But I notice that I am confused, because it is not the job of SMTM to make this study 'safe', whatever that means. The world is not "safe", and everyone is an adult, and adults should use their own judgement when following random internet advice. If someone regrets unreservedly fol

... (read more)
2sylsau
While the "safe" point you/they make is absolutely crucial to the whole endeavor, nobody seems to be discussing the main underlying "promise" that such an experiment holds, and that they have repeatedly stated as being one of the main drivers in their experiment : namely, that the "potato diet" seems to have a profound effect on regulating the sensation of satiety, even after the diet. This fact is new and unheard of with most, it not all weight-loss diets. This is not something you expect from a monotonous diet with rapid weight loss, much less so from a monotonous diet with rapid weight loss where you also cheat a lot. The section 7 of their report on the diet's results is clear: something is happening with many people's hunger feeling, and we don't know why. Alas, it did not concern OP (although he seems to have had a "dissipation" of hunger at some point) but that's still worth exploring.

Correlation is not causation. If the "best" data is garbage, it's still garbage. We should not update our priors based on garbage data.

2Sameerishere
It would be helpful to hear more specific thoughts on whether / why this data is "garbage". An initial thought on that (since I don't have time to dive deeper on this today) is that the first source linked in this post says most of the studies did not use a control group:

My prior for this is that the population-level differences are probably almost entirely centered around care-homes, and questions related to care-homes (or, more generally, very old people). Since my knowledge on comparisons between care-homes in scandinavian countries is close to zero, I cannot really provide any insight here. But something as banal as "did people who are sick stop going to work in care-homes" will probably bias the results far more than population density.

Edit: regarding population density: I don't think there's no effect, I just don't k... (read more)

Not exactly a fair description of what the public health measures have been. What country has been in lockdown for "a year or two" (besides China)?

Is there an end in sight? What country hasn't had covid-related public health measures - especially on entry and exit of the country - for the last year? It may not have been a full lockdown (whatever that means) for most of the time, but public health measures have certainly been in place.

Population density is entirely the wrong metric to look at here. You could fudge the denmark "population density" count by just including Greenland, and including the empty swathes of land in the nordic countries has the same effect.

5Dumbledore's Army
Well said. Eyeballing the chart shows no correlation between population density and covid death rate. Looking strictly at Europe, CSPI has a good chart (halfway down the long detailed post) showing minimal correlation. My take on population density is that the pro-lockdown media in March and April 2020 were predicting bodies piled high in the streets and the total collapse of healthcare systems without lockdowns. Because back then populations hadn’t normalised extreme losses of freedom so you needed to predict Armageddon in order to sell the lockdowns. Sweden, and later the US red states, proved that Armageddon was factually false. So the journalists needed some rationalisations for why Sweden hadn’t turned into a hell-hole and population density was the first thing they thought of.   If you still want to control for population density, compare Stockholm against European cities likeParis with similar population density. I’m pretty sure I read a good report finding that Stockholm was average again, but I seem to have lost the link.
3Sune
Fair point. The relevant metric might be something like average population density around an average person (or density might not be that relevant at all). Looking at this map of population density, my conclusion is that every country is different, so using Scadinavia without Denmark as a reference class is probably unfair cherry-picking. Still, Sweden has more than 2.6 times as many covid deaths per million as any other Scandinavian country. 

Funnily enough, I have yet to read a single not-completely-ridiculous cost-benefit analysis that goes this way. We must live in different bubbles.

An average vaccinated 30yo now loses about 6 weeks of expected life from contracting COVID instead of 2 weeks, because of waning vaccine efficacy.

The counterfactual here is "you never get covid", so I'd take this number with a large grain of salt. If, on the other hand, the counterfactual is "you get covid a few years later", then the loss of expected life does not occur. Additionally, if you do get covid, you're (probably) super immune for a while, which presumably increases your quality of life.

5Connor_Flexman
Using a counterfactual of "getting COVID a few years later and you balance out" is certainly tempting, but I don't think that's really how it would go down. Based on how vaccine efficacy wanes, reinfections occur, and new variants are introduced, my guess is that you lose all your immunity and more within 2 years, plus in the next decade we probably will develop increasingly effective drugs against it. Hard to sum everything up but my guess is that getting COVID causes a benefit that is less than half the badness. Probably I should make a best guess here and add it at some point in time but this is the type of factor of <2 that occasionally pop up on either side that I typically ignore.
2Linch
What's the intuition here? If we believe that infection confers less immunity than immunization, naively the counterfactual looks more like "get covid N-1 times" vs "get covid N times." Rather than "get covid once now" vs "get covid once some time in the future"

It's the terminology you use to signal that you believe the vaccine is safe and effective™ and therefore cannot be fully "evaded".

I'm from Germany but haven't bought any of the rapid tests myself, so I don't have any first-hand experience with the situation. From what I understand, you can use these tests to test yourself, but they aren't considered accurate enough to fulfill a condition of having to get a validated test for the bureaucracies.

I spent some time in Germany recently, and this is (or at least "was", when I was there) wrong. The tests themselves are considered accurate enough, but the bureacracies usually don't trust you to do it (or do it correctly). In some German st... (read more)

1MondSemmel
Thanks, I appreciate the clarification. I'd indeed misunderstood that part of the rules - I figured since there's such a thing as a "gold standard" test, rapid tests wouldn't be considered "good enough" by the bureaucracies (even if they sound good enough for individuals who understand type 1 and 2 errors), but it makes sense if their main worries are instead that one might lie about the test result, or not perform the test correctly, or something. And e.g. this page (in German) says that the Covid self tests are indeed identical to antigen tests except that they have to be administered by oneself and are hence only available / useful for private citizens. (Side note: Somehow your quote from my comment ends on "As far as I know, the "antigen tests" are the same as the "rapid tests".", but that sentence isn't by me. Presumably it was meant to be part of your own comment?)

though Delta is a bigger risk than Alpha, ignoring effects of vaccination

I keep seeing claims like this get thrown around, but I feel like the evidence isn't really there. Could you comment on why you think this?

Sorry for the late reply. I'm assuming you need to be "infected" in order to infect someone else (define "infected" so that this is true). Since being infected is a neccessary precondition to infecting someone else,

P(you infect someone else) <= P(you are infected),

and it's clear you can replace "<=" by "<".

This is basic probaility theory, I can't follow your notation but suspect that you are using some different definition of "infected" and/or confusing probabilities with expected values..

Sorry for the (very) late reply, but I do not understand this comment and suspect maybe my point didn't come accross clearly, cf. also my other reply to the comment below this one.

Apologies for the really late reply, but I don't think "marginal risk" in this context is well-defined. The marginal risk to yourself grows linearly in the number of people to first order. You could feel responsible for the marginal risk to all the other party goers, but they are people with their own agency, you aren't (in my opinion) responsible for managing their risk.

On the other hand, the other problem is that even if the person is accepting the risk for themselves, I'm not sure they're processing the risk that somebody else gets seriously ill or dies.

Well maybe, but are you thinking of the fact that (trivially) P(you infect someone else) < P(you are infected)?

1cistran
That's the point of the post. Given a large number of contacts, P(infecting at least one of them) > P(you are infected) Lets illustrate. Suppose P1(you are infected AND (you are asymptomatic OR you are pre-symptomatic))  P2(infecting any one of your contacts) = P2'*P1 = where P2' is the probability of infection per contact Then P3(infecting at least one of your contacts out of N) = 1- (1-P2)^N provided none of the N contacts are themselves infected. And in P3>P1 it is always possible to solve for N.
2gjm
But if infected you may infect several other people, and indirectly the number of people infected who wouldn't have been if you'd been more careful may be very large.
1J Mann
I'm not good at expressing it formally, but I was thinking more: 1. Expected total utility to my friend of going to a bar with her granddaughters > expected total value to her of staying home,* but the the expected utility to society of her going to the bar with her grandkids is negative. 2. As long as enough other people stay home, on the other hand, the social costs of her going out are  not as high as they would be if more people went out. 3. On the third hand, even if a bunch of people going out increases the cost (to both herself and society) of her going out, watching other people defect makes her feel like a sucker. *She's in her late 70s, and my feeling is she's don't the math and figures she may not have that many good years left, so she didn't want to miss out on one, even if it increased her life expectancy.

Say you meet in a group of people that all care about each other. Then, by your reasoning, each of the people is responsible for risk, so in fact (by double counting once more as in the original post), the total risk is . If however, we share the responsibility equally each person is responsible for risk which is intuitive. So this quadratic growth assumption is a bit questionable, I'd like to see it done more formally because my intuition says it is not complete nonsense, but it's obviously not the whole truth.

I feel like this is almost too ob... (read more)

1cistran
You are not allowed to not care for yourself. Particularly, you should take care that you are not infected, because if you are not infected you cannot spread the virus.
1ADifferentAnonymous
If you're deciding whether or not to add the (n+1)th person, what matters is the marginal risk of that decision.

Then I have misunderstood Everett's proof of the Born rule. Because the tensor product structure seems absolutely crucial for this, as you just can't get mixed states without a tensor product structure.

3SymplecticMan
I will amend my statement to be more precise: Everett's proof that the Born rule measure (amplitude squared for orthogonal states) is the only measure that satisfies the desired properties has no dependence on tensor product structure. Everett's proof that a "typical" observer sees measurements that agree with the Born rule in the long term uses the tensor product structure and the result of the previous proof. 

Well yeah sure. But continuity is a much easier pill to swallow than "continuity only when you aren't looking".

We don't lose unitarity just by choosing a different basis to represent the mixed states in the tensor-product space.

3SymplecticMan
I don't see how that relates to what I said. I was addressing why an amplitude-only measure that respects unitarity and is additive over branches has to use amplitudes for a mutually orthogonal set of states to make sense. Nothing in Everett's proof of the Born rule relies on a tensor product structure.

I think my question isn't really well-defined. I guess it's more along the lines of "is there some 'natural seeming' reasoning procedure that gets me QM ".

And it's even less well-defined as I have no clear understanding of what QM is, as all my attempts to learn it eventually run into problems where something just doesn't make sense - not because I can't follow the math, but because I can't follow the interpretation.

If we accept that mutually exclusive states are represented by orthogonal vectors, and we want to distinguish mutually exclusive states of

... (read more)
3SymplecticMan
If I understand what you mean, this is a consequence of what we defined as a measurement (or what's sometimes called a pre-measurement). Taking the tensor product structure and density matrix formalism as a given, if the interesting subsystem starts in a pure state, the unitary measurement structure implies that the reduced state of the interesting subsystem will generally be a mixed state after measurement. You might find parts of this review informative; it covers pre-measurements and also weak measurements, and in particular talks about how to actually implement measurements with an interaction Hamiltonian.
1paragonal
You could also turn around this question. If you find it somewhat plausible that that self-adjoint operators represent physical quantities, eigenvalues represent measurement outcomes and eigenvectors represent states associated with these outcomes (per the arguments I have given in my other post) one could picture a situation where systems hop from eigenvector to eigenvector through time. From this point of view, continuous evolution between states is the strange thing. The paper by Hardy I cited in another answer to you tries to make QM as similar to a classical probabilistic framework as possible and the sole difference between his two frameworks is that there are continuous transformations between states in the quantum case. (But notice that he works in a finite-dimensional setting which doesn't easily permit important features of QM like the canonical commutation relations).

Yes, I know all of this, I'm a mathematician, just not one researching QM. The arxiv link looks interesting, but I have no time to read it right now. The question isn't "why are eigenvectors of Hermitian operators interesting", it is "why would we expect a system doing something as reasonable as evolving via the Schrödinger equation to do something as unreasonable as to suddenly collapse to one of its eigenfunctions".

1SymplecticMan
I guess I don't understand the question. If we accept that mutually exclusive states are represented by orthogonal vectors, and we want to distinguish mutually exclusive states of some interesting subsystem, then what's unreasonable with defining a "measurement" as something that correlates our apparatus with the orthogonal states of the interesting subsystem, or at least as an ideal form of a measurement?

Ok, but OP of the post above starts with "Suppose we have a system S with eigenfunctions {φi}", so I don't see why (or how) they should depend on the observer. I'm not claiming these are just arbitrary functions. The point is that requiring the the time-evolution on pure states of the form to map to pure states of the same kind is arbitrary choice that distinguishes the eigenfunctions. Why can't we chose any other orthonormal basis at this point, say some ONB , and require that , where is defined so that this makes sense and is uni... (read more)

Isn't the whole point of the Everett interpretation that there is no decoherence? We have a Hilbert space for the system, and a Hilbert space for the observer, and a unitary evolution on the tensor product space of the system. With these postulates (and a few more), we can start with a pure state and end up with some mixed tensor in the product space, which we then interpret as being "multiple observers", right? I mean this is how I read your paper.

We are surely not on the same page regarding decoherence, as I know almost nothing about it :)

The arxiv-link looks interesting, I should have a look at it.

2TAG
Yes, the coherence-based approach (Everett's original paper, early MWI) is quite different to the decoherence-based approach (Dieter Zeh, post 1970). Deutsch uses the coherence based approach, while most other many worlders use the decoherence based approach. He absolutely does establish that quantum computing is superior to classical computing, that underlying reality is not classical, and that the superiority of quantum computing requires some extra structure to reality. What the coherence based approach does not establish is whether the extra structure adds up to something that could be called "alternate worlds" or parallel universes , in the sense familiar from science fiction. In the coherence based approach, Worlds" are coherent superpositions.That means they in exist at small scales, they can continue to interact with each other, after, "splitting" , and they can be erased. These coherent superposed states are the kind of "world" we have direct evidence for, although they seem to lack many of the properties requited for a fully fledged many worlds theory, hence the scare quotes. In particular, if you just model the wave function, the only results you will get represent every possible outcome. In order to match observation , you will have to keep discarding unobserved outcomes and renormalising as you do in every interpretation. It's just that that extra stage is performed manually, not by the programme.

Right, but (before reading your post) I had assumed that the eigenvectors somehow "popped out" of the Everett interpretation. But it seems like they are built in from the start. Which is fine, it's just deeply weird. So it's kind of hard to say whether the Everett interpretation is more elegant. I mean in the Copenhagen interpretation, you say "measuring can only yield eigenvectors" and the Everett interpretation, you say "measuring can only yield eigenvectors and all measurements are done so the whole thing is still unitary". But in the end even the Evere... (read more)

5paragonal
This is a bit of a tangent but decoherence isn't exclusive to the Everett interpretation. Decoherence is itself a measurable physical process independent of the interpretation one favors. So explanations which rely on decoherence are part of all interpretations. In the derivations of decoherence you make certain approximations which loosely speaking depend on the environment being big relative to the quantum system. If you change the roles these approximations aren't valid any more. I'm not sure if we are on the same page regarding decoherence, though (see my other reply to your post). You might be interested in Lucien Hardy's attempt to find a more intuitive set of axioms for QM compared to the abstractness of the usual presentation: https://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/0101012

I'm very confused by the mathematical setup. Probably it's because I'm a mathematician and not a physicist, so I don't see things that would be clear for a physicists. My knowledge of quantum mechanics is very very basic, but nonzero. Here's how I rewrote the setup part of your paper as I was going along, I hope I got everything right.

You have a system which is some (seperable, complex, etc..) Hilbert space. You also have an observer system O (which is also a Hilbert space). Elements of various Hilbert spaces are called "states". Then you have the joint... (read more)

3SymplecticMan
I don't know if it would make things clearer, but questions about why eigenvectors of Hermitian operators are important can basically be recast as one question of why orthogonal states correspond to mutually exclusive 'outcomes'. From that starting point, projection-valued measures let you associate real numbers to various orthogonal outcomes, and that's how you make the operator with the corresponding eigenvectors. As for why orthogonal states are important in the first place, the natural thing to point to is the unitary dynamics (though there are also various more sophisticated arguments).
3paragonal
This and this doesn't sound correct to me. The basis in which the diagonalization happens isn't put in at the beginning. It is determined by the nature of the interaction between the system and its environment. See "environment-induced superselection" or short "einselection".

I mean I could accept that the Schrödinger equation gives the evolution of the wave-function, but why care about its eigenfunctions so much?

I'm not sure if this will be satisfying to you but I like to think about it like this:

  • Experiments show that the order of quantum measurements matters. The mathematical representation of the physical quantities needs to take this into account. One simple kind of non-commutative objects are matrices.
  • If physical quantities are represented by matrices, the possible measurement outcomes need to be encoded in there somehow.
... (read more)

Thanks for the comments!

I agree with all of these points. In fact, with respect to (4) it is even plausible that some "once infected" people never go on to develop the kind of antibodies that are being tested for. Point (3) is why I control for age/sex, but of course there are a number of further complexities.

These further complexities, along with (1) and (2) are currently "un-modelable complexities" for me. There are just so many selection effects in play that it isn't clear if you gain anything from trying to take them into account. Given that there are ... (read more)