All of Panic_Lobster's Comments + Replies

So you are saying that the competition wouldn't be any fun if everyone believed that one particular team winning was the only acceptable outcome - it would defeat the purpose of the competition (fun) and devalue it to the point that there would no longer be any difference in utility anyway. That's basically the categorical imperative (if everyone broke their promises, there would be no such thing as promising, so the whole concept breaks down and so the rule makes no sense) Is that what you are getting at?

The problem is that not everyone does believe that Brazil should win. So I don't think we have a good solution for an individual utilitarian reasoner in a world in which most people do not think the same way.

0[anonymous]
Now that you mention I too think that it is an instance of categorical imperative. However I think the categorical imperative is an analytical tool for primarily individuals for comparing policies based on different kinds of individual behavior. And yes essentially I am saying what you wrote in your previous comment, but perhaps I'm concentrated on the qualities that could be seen being of utility on the general level, like having honest tournaments and competitions. And I tried to sort of link them to an example of something that would be of utility on the individual level, like fun. Works better with the courts of law, since an environment which has fair trials is easier to perceive as meaningful. However in the hypothetical situation when somebody places no particular meaning for honest tournaments and fair competition, they don't have any particular moral issues with letting their team down and losing on purpose, so that the greater good can happen and lots of people can be happy, then perhaps there is a harder dilemma remaining, in which case it really needs to be weighed, what is more important. Morality isn't necessarily easy either, sometimes decisions are difficult, which is not necessarily to say that your methods of processing the dilemmas would be insufficient, but that can also be the case. People having differing views on matters is likely to produce situations where ideal outcome is hard to find. If that's the case, perhaps then it can also function as an additional reason to appreciate the general stuff like the honest competitions.

Are utilitarians theoretically obligated to prefer that Brazil win the world cup? Consider: of the 32 participating countries, only the USA has a larger population, but the central place of soccer in Brazilian culture, and their status as hosts mean that they have more at stake in this competition. So total utility would probably be maximized by a Brazil win.

These considerations would seem to make rooting for any other team immoral from a strict utilitarian perspective. This exposes some things I find problematic about utilitarianism. For example, I also... (read more)

2TheAncientGeek
Surely the greatest joy will come to a team that hasn't one for a long time.
1Jiro
Brazilians gain utility from fair victory, not a win at all costs. Not trying to win would increase the chance that Brazil wins at the cost of reducing the fairness of the victory. Of course, that doesn't apply to just rooting for the other team.
5Tenoke
I dislike football and I realized a few days ago that a win for the US would bring me the most utility - the largest number of soccer fans will [probably] be upset this way, which should decrease the global popularity of the sport slightly. At any rate, if you are purely maximazing global utility, then the conclusion looks sounds.
A1987dM
270

These considerations would seem to make rooting for any other team immoral from a strict utilitarian perspective.

Only if rooting for a team makes it more likely for it to win. ;-)

3[anonymous]
I think I know how to escape this problem partially. The same method works for courts of justice. It might be pragmatical to give sentences to people to make them examples so new criminals wouldn't do those crimes. Exaggerated sentences. Everytime a court would dish out a verdict, they would double the numbers for jailtime, surely there will be less new criminals when this pattern is maintained. I think it is the approach the US Goverment has tragically taken on whistleblowers too by the way. Though this logic works in the single event, it's bad policy. What is lost on the general level, from the bigger picture, is fair trials. People lose their ability to believe in a fair court. They can't trust the law, they can't trust society. The football world cup is similar. You're giving up the fun of football competitions on largescale so that you would preserve some fun on the smallerscale. It's a pyrrhic victory. Do you think this reasoning is sufficient to deal with the dilemma?

Why do you believe that there are god-like beings that interact with humans? How confident are you that this is the case?

I believe so for reasons you wouldn't find compelling, because the gods apparently do not want there to be common knowledge of their existence, and thus do not interact with humans in a manner that provides communicable evidence. (Yes, this is exactly what a world without gods would look like to an impartial observer without firsthand incommunicable evidence. This is obviously important but it is also completely obvious so I wish people didn't harp on it so much.) People without firsthand experience live in a world that is ambiguous as to the existence or ... (read more)

Positivism: "Anything that can't be verified is meaningless". This can't be verified. So Positivism is meaningless / false.

The needs of the many...outweigh...the needs of the few."

-Mr Spock, Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan

There is also a fair bit of continuity between the two--he retains one of the main theses of his earlier work: that much of our confusion about so called 'philosophical problems' is caused by people abusing language.

The reason that testability is not enough is that prediction is not, and cannot be, the purpose of science. Consider an audience watching a conjuring trick. The problem facing them has much the same logic as a scientific problem. Although in nature there is no conjurer trying to deceive us intentionally, we can be mystified in both cases for essentially the same reason: appearances are not self-explanatory. If the explanation of a conjuring trick were evident in its appearance, there would be no trick. If the explanations of physical phenomena were eviden

... (read more)
5Lumifer
I disagree with Deutsch, I think prediction is much more important to science than he makes it out to be. The issue is the questions (about the future) you ask. Deutsch says and, of course, that is true, but these are "uninteresting" questions to ask. Let me ask for different predictions: please predict what will happen to the balls if the cups are transparent. Please predict what will happen to the person being sawed in half if we take away three sides of the box he's in. Given the proper questions one will have to understand "how the trick works" to produce correct forecasts. Science is about predictions, provided you ask to predict the right thing.
0IlyaShpitser
"Testability" is not precisely defined, but most people agree that it can involve RCTs. That is to "test" something can mean "to give some causal account (explanation)."
0[anonymous]
Wow, I didn't realize how far gone Deutsch is.

What makes a mind powerful--indeed, what makes a mind conscious--is not what it is made of, or how big it is, but what it can do. Can it concentrate? Can it be distracted? Can it recall earlier events? Can it keep track of several different things at once? Which features of its own current activities can it notice or monitor? When such questions as these are answered, we will know everything we need to know about those minds in order to answer the morally important questions. These answers will capture everything we want to know about the concept of cons

... (read more)

When philosophers use a word—"knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name"—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?—What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. You say to me: "You understand this expression, don't you? Well then—I am using it in the sense you are familiar with."— As if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word, which it carried with it into every kind of application.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 116-117

1PrometheanFaun
Since English isn't Sound and like 90% of English words simply don't have real definitions, I'm not sure I want to tangle with this guy's work. It's either going to be tenuous logic with an exploration in equivocation, or a baffling/impressive display of linguistics. Which was it?

... I really don't think my syntax is that unclear.

9TheOtherDave
Well, strictly speaking your syntax is ambiguous, though of course there's no real ambiguity about what you meant. Still, it would be awesome if you'd gotten a bunch of 5th grade kids to teach you how to convert decimals to fractions. My fifth-grade teacher got me to teach her how to convert from decimal to binary once; it was a great pedagogic tool. Also, yay you for teaching kids math!
1A1987dM
I guess that was supposed to be a joke.

Tough crowd.

Today I taught a bunch of 5th grade kids how to convert decimals into fractions and vice versa.

1CoffeeStain
A bunch of 5th grade kids taught you how to convert decimals to fractions?

Thanks! I've read some of the stuff by Yvain but not these posts.

Let me see if I can unpack this idea a bit more.

CEV is based on the idea that there is an algorithm that can look at the state of my brain, filter out various kinds of noise, and extrapolate what sort of desires and values I'd want to have if I lived in a kinder more benevolent society, wasn't subject to nearly as many serious cognitive biases, etc.

The problem I'm seeing is that the origin and meaning of terms like 'desire' and 'value' are in prescientific culture - folk psychology. they were created by people in absolute ignorance about how brains work,... (read more)

2Wei Dai
You may be interested in Yvain's Blue-Minimizing Robot sequence, which addresses these concerns. To read it, go to http://lesswrong.com/user/Yvain/submitted/?count=25&after=t3_8kn, and read the posts from "The Blue-Minimizing Robot" to "Tendencies in reflective equilibrium".

Is Friendly AI or more specifically CEV predicated on Eliminative Materialism being false? To what extent is FAI predicated on folk psychological theories of mental content turning out to accurately reflect human neurobiology?

From the article:

Modern versions of eliminative materialism claim that our common-sense understanding of psychological states and processes is deeply mistaken and that some or all of our ordinary notions of mental states will have no home, at any level of analysis, in a sophisticated and accurate account of the mind. In other words,

... (read more)
3Panic_Lobster
Let me see if I can unpack this idea a bit more. CEV is based on the idea that there is an algorithm that can look at the state of my brain, filter out various kinds of noise, and extrapolate what sort of desires and values I'd want to have if I lived in a kinder more benevolent society, wasn't subject to nearly as many serious cognitive biases, etc. The problem I'm seeing is that the origin and meaning of terms like 'desire' and 'value' are in prescientific culture - folk psychology. they were created by people in absolute ignorance about how brains work, and it seems increasingly plausible that these concepts will be totally inadequate for any accurate scientific explanation of how brains produce human behaviour. It seems to be common sense that desires and values and the like are indispensable theoretical posits simply because they are all we have. Our brains' extremely limited metacogntive abilities prevent us from modelling ourselves as brains, so our brains invent a kind of mythology to explain their behaviour, which is pure confabulation. If these ideas are right, by asking CEV to consider folk psychological ideas like desires and values, we would be committing it to the existence of things that just aren't really present in our brain states in any objective sense. In the worst case, running CEV might be somewhat analogous to asking the AI to use Aristotelian physics to build a better airplane. What we perceive as the fragility and complexity of human based values might not map onto brain states at all - 'values' as we wish to conceive of them may not exist outside of narrative fiction and philosophy papers. My recent thinking on these topics has been heavily influenced by the writings of Scott Bakker , Daniel Hutto and Peter Watts' Blindsight I hope I'm wrong about this stuff, but I don't have the training to fully analyze and debunk these ideas by myself - if it's even possible. I hope LW and MIRI have some insights about these issues, because I am

Faced with the task of extracting useful future out of our personal pasts, we organisms try to get something for free (or at least at bargain price): to find the laws of the world -- and if there aren't any, to find approximate laws of the world -- anything at all that will give us an edge. From some perspectives it appears utterly remarkable that we organisms get any purchase on nature at all. Is there any deep reason why nature should tip its hand, or reveal its regularities to casual inspection? Any useful future-producer is apt to be something of a

... (read more)

Karl Popper used to begin his lecture course on the philosophy of science by asking the students simply to 'observe'. Then he would wait in silence for one of them to ask what they were supposed to observe. [...] So he would explain to them that scientific observation is impossible without pre-existing knowledge about what to look at, what to look for, how to look, and how to interpret what one sees. And he would explain that, therefore, theory has to come first. It has to be conjectured, not derived.

David Deutsch, The Beginning of Infinity

0Daniel_Burfoot
Hmm, this point seems more Kuhnian than Popperian. Maybe Deutsch got the two confused.
0Richard_Kennaway
Another view.
9Bugmaster
Did Karl Popper populate his class with particularly unimaginative students ? If someone asked me to "observe", I'd fill an entire notebook with observations in less than an hour -- and that's even without getting up from my chair.

Cervantes, the author of the first modern novel, widely regarded as one of the best books ever written

It's worth emphasizing just how modern and readable this book is, especially considering it is contemporaneous with Shakespeare. If you get a modern English translation, you will be delighted. Cervantes really invented modern literature.

How do you pronounce 3^^^3?

2[comment deleted]
0[anonymous]
I like "Three-triple-Knuth-three"
0komponisto
My inclination is to say "three triple-arrow three". People at SIAI in 2010 were saying "three triple-head three". I don't know why.
0jimrandomh
I pronounce it "three trip-up three". The pun is always appropriate.
2A1987dM
(There was a SMBC comic I wanted to jokingly link to which called ^^^ “penetration”, but I don't know how to search for it -- neither this thing nor googling for smbc penetration help.)
0MrMind
I have a proposal: let's call x^^^y "x knuth y", just because it's used quite often in this community :)

Three to the to the to the three / is how you say it if you're M to the P

2linkhyrule5
3-pentate-3. Actually pronouncing the up-arrows is generally too clunky for me. How do you pronounce 3^(n)3, that is, 3 (n up-arrows) 3? "n-tate" works for simple numbers, but "3 (3 pentate 3)-ate 3" isn't exactly... comprehensible.
4answer
"Three to the pentation of three".
9Leonhart
Threee-eee-eee.
maia
130

I've heard "three up up up three."

0Rukifellth
"Three ar-ruh-ruh-row"
0OnTheOtherHandle
I usually say "three to the three to the three to the three" even though that's not technically correct unless I pronounce the parentheses in the proper places.
6Adele_L
"three up arrow up arrow up arrow three" ETA: The notation is called Knuth's up-arrow notation, and is usually written with up-arrows instead of carets.

I don't read very much fiction, but recently I've read

  • The Eternal Flame by Greg Egan - book two of his Orthogonal series, where he imagines life in a universe with different spacetime symmetries, where the velocity of light is a function of its wavelength. In this instalment, alien scientists on a generation ship try to discover the secrets of matter, and of their own biology, which will allow them to return home. There is a lot of focus on the scientific method and the character of physical law, and the treatment of the (made up) physics is much, much

... (read more)

Not coincidentally, that is the next novel on my summer reading list.

Okay, I will be sure to do that next time - but I don't see a reason to start a second thread on Neuropath over there right now. If a mod wants to move this thread over there, that's cool.

0Adele_L
You just got a good reason for starting a second thread, and I don't think mods can move comment threads (at least not with a reasonable amount of effort).

Jryy gur fubpxvat vqrn va Arhebcngu vf gung bhe 'srryvatf' bs univat serr jvyy, bs univat zbeny vaghvgvbaf, bs orvat n fhowrpg jvgu 'dhnyvn' naq bs univat vagragvbanyvgl (cersreraprf, oryvrsf, tbnyf, rgp.) ner whfg xvaqf bs angheny nabfbtabfvnf, dhvexf bs irel fcrpvsvp naq sentvyr arhebculfvbybtvpny qrsvpvgf unaqrq gb hf ol ribyhgvbanel nppvqrag - naq gung rira fznyy inevngvbaf va zvaq qrfvta fcnpr jvyy bzvg gurfr guvatf pbzcyrgryl.

Cbfguhznaf znl irel jryy unir ab 'rkcrevrapr bs dhnyvn' be bs 'serr jvyy' be rira bs orvat vagragvbany flfgrzf - naq guvf jbh... (read more)

0ESRogs
Vg frrzf vapbafvfgrag gb qrfpevor gur rkpvfvat bs svefg-crefba fhowrpgvivgl nf na hctenqr juvyr nyfb pnyyvat cerqvpgvbaf bs vgf pbagvahrq rkvfgrapr bcgvzvfgvp. (Gubhtu znlor gung'f jul lbh hfrq gur 'anvir' dhnyvsvre?) Vf gur fpranevb bar jurer jr'q cersre gb xrrc svefg-crefba fhowrpgvivgl, ohg jr'er sbeprq gb tvir vg hc qhr gb fbzr bgure pbafgenvag?
Pfft
100

Have you read Blindsight? It explicitly mentions this idea, and is generally very nice.

Just finished reading Neuropath by Scott Bakker. It deals with a radical vision of the reductionistic nature of consciousness, intentionality and personhood and now stands alongside Greg Egan's Permutation City and Diaspora as one of the most philosophically shocking books I have read.

I really don't recommend it to anyone who hasn't been very strongly innoculated against Existential Angst.

If Mitchell Porter has read it or is familiar with Bakker's ideas from other sources I'd be interested in hearing his thoughts, as the philsophy of Neuropath really challenges the credibility of any form of realism regarding qualia.

2[anonymous]
I get the description of Permutation City as shocking (I remember when a friend I lent the book to called me up in the middle of the day when he got to one of the wham sentences) but what in Diaspora was shocking?
2Risto_Saarelma
I might have missed something in Neuropath. What I got from it was mostly a technotriller plot using near-future brain surgery to give people creepier versions of the sorts of Oliver Sacks delusions people already get when they get brain damage. The possibility of doing this doesn't seem like a very radical thesis if you already take it as given that the brain runs on physics. I'd agree with the description of Permutation City as philosophically shocking, it had a very strange core idea in it that still wasn't obviously wrong.
4ArisKatsaris
Perhaps you would like to post this in the latest (July 2013) media thread? When I wonder what book to read next, I might look through the media threads, but not the open threads...

We can reasonably say that something has a "thinking life" if it functions as a state machine where 'states' correspond to abstract models of sensory data (patterns in external stimuli). The complexity of the possible mental states is correlated with the complexity (information content) of the sensory data that can be collected and incorporated into models.

A cat's brain can be reasonably interpreted as working this way. A nematode worm's 302 neurons probably can't. A plant's root system almost definitely can't.

Note that this concept of a "thinking life" or sentience is a much weaker and more inclusive than the concept of "personhood" or sapience.

Has anyone here heard of Michael Marder and his "Plant Thinking" - there is this book being published by Columbia University which argues that plants need to be considered as subjects with ethical value, and as beings with "unique temporality, freedom, and material knowledge or wisdom." This is not satire. He is a research professor of philosophy at a European university.

http://www.amazon.ca/Plant-Thinking-A-Philosophy-Vegetal-Life/dp/0231161255 and here is a review http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/39002-plant-thinking-a-philosophy-of-vegetal-l... (read more)

3MrMind
If I'm not mistaken, there have been some study on plant communication and data elaboration from their roots, enough to classify them as at least primitively intelligent. Anyway, since they are in fact living and autonomous being, I don't see why they shouldn't be considered subjects of ethical reflections...
Jack
190

In Gender Trouble (1990), Judith Butler

...

accommodates plants' constitutive subjectivity, drastically different from that of human beings, and describes their world from the hermeneutical perspective of vegetal ontology (i.e., from the standpoint of the plant itself)"

...

So, in addition to the "vegetal différance" and "plants' proto-writing" (112) associated with Derrida, we're told that plant thinking "bears a close resemblance to the 'thousand plateaus'" (84) of Deleuze and Guattari. At the same time, plant thin

... (read more)
4gwern
It's too bad; a book on what plants might think or what their views might look like - a look which took the project seriously in extrapolating a possible plant civilization and its views and ethics, a colossally ambitious and scientificly-grounded work of SF - could be pretty awesome. But from the sound of that review, it's exactly where Marder falls down.

Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language. [...] And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact not problems at all.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 1921

Here is a blog which asserts that a global conspiracy of transhumanists controls the media and places subliminal messages in pop music such as the Black Eyed Peas music video "Imma Be" in order to persuade people to join the future hive-mind. It is remarkably lucid and articulate given the hysterical nature of the claim, and even includes a somewhat reasonable treatment of transhumanism.

http://vigilantcitizen.com/musicbusiness/transhumanism-psychological-warfare-and-b-e-p-s-imma-be/

Transhumanism is the name of a movement that claims to support

... (read more)

Good to know that someone's keeping the ol' Illuminati flame burning. Pope Bob would be proud.

The thing I find most curious about the Illuminati conspiracy theory is that if you look at the doctrines of the historical Bavarian Illuminati, they are pretty unremarkable to any educated person today. The Illuminati were basically secular humanists — they wanted secular government, morality and charity founded on "the brotherhood of man" rather than on religious obedience, education for women, and so on. They were secret because these ideas were illeg... (read more)

-1hankx7787
Thanks!