All of Phil_Goetz2's Comments + Replies

Good post. Nick's point is also good.

When parents say they don't care who started it, it may also be a strategy to minimize future fighting. Justice is not always optimal, even in repeated interactions.

Jorge Luis Borges, The Babylon Lottery, 1941. Government by lottery. Living under a lottery system leads to greater expectation of random events, greater belief that life is and should be ruled by randomness, and further extension of the lottery's scope, in a feedback loop that increases until every aspect of everyone's life is controlled by the lottery.

Anon: "The notion of "morally significant" seems to coincide with sentience."

Yes; the word "sentience" seems to be just a placeholder meaning "qualifications we'll figure out later for being thought of as a person."

Tim: Good point, that people have a very strong bias to associate rights with intelligence; whereas empathy is a better criterion. Problem being that dogs have lots of empathy. Let's say intelligence and empathy are both necessary but not sufficient.

James: "Shouldn't this outcome be something the C... (read more)

"I propose this conjecture: In any sufficiently complex physical system there exists a subsystem that can be interpreted as the mental process of an sentient being experiencing unbearable sufferings."

It turns out - I've done the math - that if you are using a logic-based AI, then the probability of having alternate possible interpretations diminishes as the complexity increases.

If you allow /subsystems/ to mean a subset of the logical propositions, then there could be such interpretations. But I think it isn't legit to worry about interpretation... (read more)

Eliezer: "I'll go ahead and repeat that as Goetz's misunderstandings of me and inaccurate depictions of my opinions are frequent and have withstood frequent correction, that I will not be responding to Goetz's comment."

Really? I challenge you to point to ONE post in which you have tried to correct a misunderstanding by me of your opinion, rather than just complaining about my "misunderstandings" without even saying what the misunderstanding was.

Eliezer, I have probably made any number of inaccurate depictions of your opinions, but you can't back away from these ones. You DO generally think that your opinion on topics you have thought deeply about is more valuable than the opinion of almost everyone, and you HAVE thought deeply about fun theory. And you ARE planning to build an AI that will be in control of the world. You might protest that "take over the world" has different connotations. But there's no question that you plan for your AI to be in charge.

It is deeply creepy and disturbing to hear this talk from someone who already thinks he knows better than just about everybody about what is good for us, and who plans to build an AI that will take over the world.

Michael, I thought that you advocated comfort with lying because smart people marginalize themselves by compulsive truth-telling. For instance, they find it hard to raise venture capital. Or (to take an example that happened at my company), when asked "Couldn't this project of yours be used to make a horrible terrorist bioweapon?", they say, "Yes." (And they interpret questions literally instead of practically; e.g., the question actually intended, and that people actually hear, is more like, "Would this project significantly in... (read more)

pdf23ds: The claim that atheism inevitably leads to nihilism, and that belief in god inevitably relieves it, is made regularly by religious types in the West as the core of their argument for religion.

7byrnema
And this is exactly where I'm at right now in physical materialism / atheism. I've understood since I arrived here on Less Wrong that you guys have some immunity to nihilism. However, I can't find it. What is it?? (A link would be appreciated if this has been discussed before.)

Today, in the West, people think that atheism leads to an existential crisis of meaning. But in ancient Greece, people believed in creator gods, and yet had to find their own sense of purpose exactly the same as an atheist.

We assume that the religious person has a purpose given by God. But Zeus would have said that the purpose of humans was to produce beautiful young women for him to have sex with. Ares would have said their purpose was to kill each other. Bacchus would have said it was to party. And so on. The gods ignored humans, had trivial purpos... (read more)

-1simc
In ancient Greece philosophy was not only a discipline for academics, but a way of life. Here is a quote from Hadot who wrote a book called "Philosophy as a Way of Life": "All schools agree that man, before his philosophical conversion, is in a state of unhappy disquiet. Consumed by worries, torn by passions, he does not live a genuine life, nor is he truly himself. All schools also agree that man can be delivered from this state." In Greek there is a word "eudimonia" which means a life which is generally happy and free from anxiety. The Greek schools of philosophy claimed that this state could be reached by living in accordance with their doctrines. What makes these philosophies attractive to us today is that they provide a way of living that doesn't claim to be revealed by gods but was invented by humans. An advantage of this is that we are able to hold a personal opinion about what parts of the philosophy are useful today. If you are interested you should check out: *Stoicism *Epicureanism *Aristotle's Nicomachian Ethics Each promises eudimonia but provide different ideas about how to obtain it. I don't there can be perfect philosophy but I think a lot of happiness and freedom from existential anxiety can be achieved by choosing as a guide to life a 'good enough' philosophy.

On the flip side, I'd like to see less-rational characters in fantasy books. I can't believe in pseudo-medieval worlds where the main characters have no ethnic, racial, gender, or class prejudices; have no superstitions; and never make decisions for religious reasons.

(In some fantasy, notably Tolkien, ethnic and racial stereotypes are allowed - but in those fantasy worlds, they're true almost 100% of the time; and the author assumes that the reader, like the author, won't even think of them as prejudices.)

In 1998, I wrote a rec.arts.int-fiction post called "Believable stupidity" (http://groups.google.com/group/rec.arts.int-fiction/ browse_thread/thread/60a077934f89a291/ 3fffb9048965857d?lnk=gst&q=believable+stupidity#3fffb9048965857d) split across 3 lines; rejoin for link)

saying that Eliza, a computer program that matches patterns, and fills in a template to produce a response, always wins the Loebner competition because template matching is more like what people do than reasoning is.

Someone (Russell?) once commented on the surprising efficacy of mathematics, which was developed by people who did not believe that it would ever serve any purpose, and yet ended up being at the core of many pragmatic solutions.

A companion observation is on the surprising inefficacy of philosophy, which is intended to solve our greatest problems, and never does. Like Eliezer, my impression is that philosophy just generates a bunch of hypotheses, with no way of choosing between them, until the right hypotheses is eventually isolated by scientists. Philoso... (read more)

To make it clear why you would sometimes want to think about implied invisibles, suppose you're going to launch a spaceship, at nearly the speed of light, toward a faraway supercluster. By the time the spaceship gets there and sets up a colony, the universe's expansion will have accelerated too much for them to ever send a message back. Do you deem it worth the purely altruistic effort to set up this colony, for the sake of all the people who will live there and be happy? Or do you think the spaceship blips out of existence before it gets there? This c
... (read more)

5rocurley
I'm pretty sure it is possible to escape Earth's light cone at sublight speeds. You can go arbitrarily far from earth (if you're patient). Eventually, you will get to a point where your distance from Earth*the Hubble constant is greater than the speed of light (you are now a Hubble length from Earth). At this point, a photon you shoot straight towards Earth will not approach Earth, because the distance in between is expanding at the speed of light.

PK is right. I don't think a GLUT can be intelligent, since it can't remember what it's done. If you let it write notes in the sand and then use those notes as part of the future stimulus, then it's a Turing machine.

The notion that a GLUT could be intelligent is predicated on the good-old-fashioned AI idea that intelligence is a function that computes a response from a stimulus. This idea, most of us in this century now believe, is wrong.

Eliezer, I suspect you are not being 100% honest here. I don't have any problems with a GLUT being conscious.
I have problems with a GLUT being conscious. (Actually, the GLUT fails dramatically to satisfy the graph-theoretic requirements for consciousness that I alluded to but did not describe earlier today, but I wouldn't believe that a GLUT could be conscious even if that weren't the case.)

Going on about zombies and consciousness as if you were addressing philosophical issues, when you have redefined consciousness to mean a particular easily-comprehended computational or graph-theoretic property, falls squarely into the category of ideas that I consider Silly.
Although, ironically, I'm in the process of doing exactly that. I will try to come up with a rationalization for why it is Not Silly when I do it.

0diegocaleiro
It probably doesn't feel silly when you do it because you unconsciously have two epistemic subjects in your model of the world. One is the conscious you, and the other is the brainy speaky, from wernicke to mouth to the word "consciousness" you. Since the model your physical self has made of the world includes both the physical you, and the chalmersian-conscious-you, and the physical self does not know it has this division, the model constantly switches between representations, allowing for silly things to happen. In fact, except for Chalmers, who is really skilled at dodging this mistake (because he invented it and made a career out of it), most smart people do this. (It was so hard to find where Chalmers cheated in his "The Content and Epistemology of Phenomenal Belief" I wrote an article pointing it out.) If you want to gain a few bits to the model of what feels like you, the chalmersian-conscious-you, tononi http://www.biolbull.org/cgi/content/abstract/215/3/216 will give you a little information, it will explain only (don't put high hopes) why colors are different from sounds. I have never read anything else that improves the brute model of chalmersian-conscious-me with which we are equipped naturally....

Caledonian writes:

Um, no. What it IS is a radically different meaning of the word than what the p-zombie nonsense uses. Chalmers' view requires stripping 'consciousness' of any consequence, while Eliezer's involves leaving the standard usage intact.

'Consciousness' in that sense refers to self-awareness or self-modeling, the attempt of a complex computational system to represent some aspects of itself, in itself. It has causal implications for the behavior of the system, can potentially be detected by an outside observer who has access to the mechanisms und... (read more)

Consciousness, whatever it may be - a substance, a process, a name for a confusion - is not epiphenomenal; your mind can catch the inner listener in the act of listening, and say so out loud. The fact that I have typed this paragraph would at least seem to refute the idea that consciousness has no experimentally detectable consequences.
Eliezer, I'm shocked to see you write such nonsense. This only shows that you don't understand the zombie hypothesis at all. Or, you suppose that intelligence requires consciousness. This is the spiritualist, Searlian s... (read more)

If you want to fight the good fight, edit the section "Limits of Reductionism" in the Wikipedia article on Reductionism. It cites many examples of things that are merely complex, as evidence that reductionism is false.

I'm confused as to what your purpose is with this series on reductionism. Is there a particular anti-reductionist position you're combating?

Earlier, you wrote,

Reductionism is not a positive belief, but rather, a disbelief that the higher levels of simplified multilevel models are out there in the territory.
I don't think your typical anti-reductionist is concerned about the existence of different levels of models. I've never heard one ask "How can you model the plane without the wings?"

Anti-reductionists are opposed to models in general. An an... (read more)

Tim, one-tenth would be the correct answer if Brennan were in the Heresy of Virtue, AND there were 16 people in the room. There would be 9 women in the HoV in the room, and 1 man who wasn't Brennan; hence, one in ten.

Thanks to Mike Vassar for pointing out that, if Brennan is in the HoV, you need to count how many men are in the room.

Since there are an odd number of people in the room, the guide must be posing a hypothetical question. If Brennan is in the HoV, the correct answer would be for him to say that he needs to know how many people are in the room in the hypothetical situation.

Hint for the extra credit: What is the probability that the guide is Brennan? (Zero.)

In my experience, the problem with running on curiousity is that, to be effective at something, one has to not take the time to investigate lots of unrelated things one is curious about.

For extra credit, explain how "one-tenth" could also have been the correct answer.

This reminds me of a lesson that I learned, I'm embarrassed to admit, from Tom Brown Jr. (who later threw me out of his school for trying to verify his autobiographical claims).

If you're walking through the woods with a child, and they're interested in all the different plants that they see, they'll ask you what each one is. And, often, they lose interest in each plant after you tell them its name. They still don't know anything about the plant, but they think they do, and it's no longer mysterious and exciting to them.

This is the fault of the child, not the fault of the person who gave the plant its name.