Both involve taking a mathematical result about the only way to do something in a way that satisfies certain intuitively appealing properties, and using it to argue that we therefore should do it that way.
As the Theorem treats them, voters are already utility-maximizing agents who have a clear preference set which they act on in rational ways. The question: how to aggregate these?
It turns out that if you want certain superficially reasonable things out of a voting process from such agents - nothing gets chosen at random, it doesn't matter how you cut up choices or whatever, &c. - you're in for disappointment. There isn't actually a way to have a group that is itself rationally agentic in the precise way the Theorem postulates.
Analogous in what way?
As the Theorem treats them, voters are already utility-maximizing agents who have a clear preference set which they act on in rational ways. The question: how to aggregate these?
It turns out that if you want certain superficially reasonable things out of a voting process from such agents - nothing gets chosen at random, it doesn't matter how you cut up choices or whatever, &c. - you're in for disappointment. There isn't actually a way to have a group that is itself rationally agentic in the precise way the Theorem postulates.
One bullet you could bite i... (read more)