All of RationalDino's Comments + Replies

Hypothetically this is possible.

But, based on current human behavior, I would expect such simulations to focus on the great and famous, or on situations which represent fun game play.

My life does not qualify as any of those. So I heavily discount this possibility.

2Donald Hobson
I would expect that more notable events would tend to get more sim time.  It might or might not be hard to sim one person without surrounding social context.  (Ie maybe humans interact in such completed ways that it's easiest to just sim all 8 billion. ) But the main point is that you are still extremely special, compared to a random member of a 10^50 person galactic civilization.  You aren't maximally special, but are still bloomin special. You aren't looking at just how tiny our current world is on the scale of a billion dyson spheres.  If we scale up the resource scales from here to K3 without changing the distribution of things people are interested in, then everything anyone has bothered to say or think ever would get (I think like at least 10 ) orders of magnitude more compute than needed to simulate our civilization up to this point. 

I agree with your caveats.

However I'm not egocentric enough to imagine myself as particularly interesting to potential simulators. And so that hypothetical doesn't significantly change my beliefs.

2Donald Hobson
"Particularly interesting" in a sense in which all humans currently on earth (or in our history) are unusually interesting. It's that compared to the scale of the universe, simulating pre singularity history doesn't take much.  I don't know the amount of compute needed, but I strongly suspect it's <1 in 10^20 of the compute that fits in our universe.  In a world of 10^50 humans in a galaxy spanning empire, you are interesting just for being so early. 

This line of reasoning is a lot like the Doomsday argument.

I am well aware that my assumptions are my assumptions. They work for me, but you may want to assume something different.

I've personally interpreted the Doomsday argument that way since I ran across it about 30 years ago. Honestly AI x-risk is pretty low on my list of things to worry about.

The simulation argument never impressed me. Every simulation that I've seen ran a lot more slowly than the underlying reality. Therefore even if you do get a lengthy regress of simulations stacked on on simulations, most of the experience to have is in the underlying reality, and not in the simulations. Therefore I've concluded that I probably exist in reality, not a simulation.

3Donald Hobson
Ok, I will grant you the "simulations run slower/ with more energy" so are less common argument as approximately true.  (I think there are big caviats to that, and I think it would be possible to run a realistic sim of you for less than your metabolic power use of ~100 watts. And of course, giving you your exact experiences without cheating requires a whole universe of stars lit up, just so you can see some dots in an astronomy magazine.) Imagine a universe with one early earth, and 10^50 minds in a intergalactic civilization, including a million simulations of early earth. (Amongst a billion sims of other stuff) In this universe it is true both that most beings are in underlying reality, and that we are likely in a simulation.  This relies on us being unusually interesting to potential simulators. 

If all beliefs in a Bayesian network are bounded away from 0 and 1, then an approximate update can be done to arbitrary accuracy in polynomial time.

The pathological behavior shows up here because there are two competing but mutually exclusive belief systems. And it is hard to determine when your world view should flip.

I hope that this makes it more interesting to you.

I like your second argument. But to be honest, there is a giant grey area between "non-replicable" and "fraudulent". It is hard to draw the line between, "Intellectually dishonest but didn't mean to deceive" and "fraudulent". And even if you could define the line, we lack the data to identify what falls on either side.

It is worth reading Time to assume that health research is fraudulent until proven otherwise? I believe that this case is an exception to Betteridge's law - I think that the answer is yes. Given the extraordinary efforts that the editor of An... (read more)

2gjm
That's very interesting but it's about replicability not fraud and those are (at least sometimes) very different things. Possible counters: 1. "Not so different: results that don't replicate are probably fraudulent." I'm prepared to be persuaded but I'd be surprised if most reproducibility-failures were the result of fraud. 2. "Whatever differences between 'worse' and 'better' publications you have in mind that you'd hope would reduce fraud in the 'better' ones, you should also expect to reduce nonreplicability; apparently they don't do that, so why expect them to reduce fraud?" My impression is that a lot of nonreplicability is just "lucky": you happened to get a result with p<0.05 and so you published it, and if you'd got p>0.05 maybe you wouldn't have bothered, or maybe the fancy journal wouldn't have been interested and it would have been published somewhere worse. This mechanism will lead to nonreplicable papers being higher-profile and cited more, without there being anything much about those papers that would raise red flags if a journal is worried about fraud. So to whatever extent fraud is detectable in advance, and better journals try harder to spot it because their reputation is more valuable, better journals will tend to see less fraud but not less nonreplicability. (And: to whatever extent fraudsters expect better journals to try harder to catch fraud, they will tend to avoid publishing their fraudulent papers there.)

I have a simple solution for Pascal muggers. I assume that, unless I have good and specific reason to believe otherwise, the probability of achieving an extreme utility u is bounded above by O(1/u). And therefore after some point, I can replace whatever extreme utility is quoted in an argument with a constant. Which might be arbitrarily close to 0.

In some contexts this is obvious. For example if someone offers you $1000 to build a fence in their yard, you might reasonably believe them. You might or might not choose to do it. If they offered you $10,000, th... (read more)

2Donald Hobson
If we pretend things like AI x-risk aren't a thing for a moment. Then the balancing for the large utility for long termism is the small chance that we see ourselves being early.  Taking this as anthropic evidence that x-risk is high seems wrong.  I think the long termism is, to a large extent, held up on the strong evidence that we are at the begining. If I found out that 50% of people are living in ancestor simulations, the case for long termism would weaken a lot, we are probably in yet another sim.

It depends on subject matter.

For math, it is already here. Several options exist, Coq is the most popular.

For philosophy, the language requirements alone need AI at the level of reasonably current LLMs. Which brings their flaws as well. Plus you need knowledge of human experience. By the time you put it together, I don't see how a mechanistic interpreter can be anything less than a (hopefully somewhat limited) AI.

Which again raises the question of how we come to trust in it enough for it not to be a leap of faith.

Nobody ever read the 1995 proof.

Instead they wound up reading the program. This time it was written in C - which is easier to follow. And the fact that there were now two independent proofs in different languages that ran on different computers greatly reduced the worries that one of them might have a simple bug.

I do not know that any human has ever tried to properly read any proof of the 4 color theorem.

Now to the issue. The overall flow and method of argument were obviously correct. Spot checking individual points gave results that were also correct. The... (read more)

1Krantz
It will not take a long time if we use collective intelligence to do it together.  The technology is already here.  I've been trying to share it with others that understand the value of doing this before AI learns to do it on its own.  If you want to learn more about that, feel free to look me up on the 'X' platform @therealkrantz.

You may be missing context on my reference to the 4 color problem. The original 1976 proof, by Appel and Haken, took over 1000 hours of computer time to check. A human lifetime is too short to verify that proof. This eliminates your first option. The Objectivist cannot, even in principle, check the proof. Life is too short.

Your first option is therefore, by hypothesis, not an option. You can believe the AI or not. But you can't actually check its reasoning.

The history of the 4 color problem proof shows this kind of debate. People argued for nearly 20 years... (read more)

1Krantz
I understood the context provided by your 4 color problem example. What I'm unsure about is how that relates to your question. Maybe I don't understand the question you have. I thought it was, "What should happen if both (1) everything it says makes sense and (2) you can't follow the full argument?". My claim is "Following enough of an argument  to agree is precisely what it means for something to make sense.". In the case of the four color problem, it sounds like for 20 years there were many folks that did not follow the full argument because it was too long for them to read.  During that time, the conclusion did not make sense to them.  Then, in 1995 a new shorter argument came along.  One that they could follow.  It included propositions that describe how the computer proofing system works.  For your latter question, "What would it take for me to trust an AI's reasoning over my own beliefs when I'm unable to actually verify the AI's reasoning?".  My answer is "A leap of faith.".  I would highly recommend that people not take leaps of faith.  In general, I would not trust an AI's reasoning if I were not able to actually verify the AI's reasoning.  This is why mechanistic interpretability is critical in alignment.

Concrete example.

Let's presuppose that you are an Objectivist. If you don't know about Objectivism, I'll just give some key facts.

  1. Objectivists place great value in rationality and intellectual integrity.
  2. Objectivists believe that they have a closed philosophy. Meaning that there is a circle of fundamental ideas set out by Ayn Rand that will never change, though the consequences of those ideas certainly are not obvious and still needs to be worked out.
  3. Objectivists believe that there is a single objective morality that can be achieved from Ayn Rand's idea
... (read more)
1Krantz
I'm not sure what the hypothetical Objectivist 'should do', but I believe the options they have to choose from are:   (1) Choose to follow the full argument (in which case everything that it said made sense) and they are no longer an Objectivist or (2) Choose to not follow the full argument (in which case some stuff didn't make sense) and they remain an Objectivist   In some sense, this is the case already.  People are free to believe whatever they like.  They can choose to research their beliefs and challenge them more.  They might read things that convince them to change their position.  If they do, are they "compelled" are they "forced"?  I think they are in a way.  I think this is a good type of control.  Control by rational persuasion. For the question of whether an external agent should impose its beliefs onto an agent choosing option (2), I think the answer is 'no'.  This is oppression. I think the question you are getting at is, "Should a digital copy of yourself be able to make you do what you would be doing if you were smarter?".  Most would say no, for obvious reasons.  Nobody wants their AI bossing them around.  This is mostly because we typically control other agents (boss them around) by force.  We use rules and consequences.  What I'm suggesting, is that we will get so much better at controlling things through rational persuasion, that force will not be required for control.  All that the 'smarter version of yourself' does is tell you what you probably need to hear.  When you need to hear it.  Like your conscience.   It's important to retain the right to choose to listen to it.   In general, I see the alignment problem as a category error.  There is no way to align artificial intelligence.  AI isn't really what we want to build.  We want to build an oracle that can tell us everything. That's a collective intelligence. A metaphorical brain that represents society by treating each member as a nerve on its spinal cord.

What you want sounds like Próspera. It is too early to say how that will work out.

They took some inspiration from Singapore. When Singapore became independent in 1965, it was a poverty-stricken third world place. It now has a better GDP/capita than countries like the USA. And also did things like come up with the best way of teaching math to elementary school students.

But Singapore is only libertarian in some ways. They are also a dictatorship who does not believe in, for instance, free speech. Their point is that when you cram immigrants from many culture... (read more)

As a life strategy I would recommend something I call "tit for tat with forgiveness and the option of disengaging".

Most of the time do tit for tat.

When we seem to be in a negative feedback loop, we try to reset with forgiveness.

When we decide that a particular person is not worth having in our life, we walk them out of our life in the most efficient way possible. If this requires giving them a generous settlement in a conflict, that's generally better than continuing with the conflict to try for a more even settlement.

The first three are things most social... (read more)

Honest question about a hypothetical.

How would you respond if you set this up, and then your personal GPT concluded, from your epistemology and the information available to it, that your epistemology is fundamentally flawed and you should adopt a different one. Suppose further than when it tried to explain it to you, everything that it said made sense but you could not follow the full argument.

What should happen then? Should you no longer be the center of the prosthetic enabled "you" that has gone beyond your comprehension? Should the prosthetics do their ... (read more)

1Krantz
I'm not sure I can imagine a concrete example of an instance where both (1) everything that it said made sense and (2) I am not able to follow the full argument. Maybe you could give me an example of a scenario? I believe, if the alignment bandwidth is high enough, it should be the case that whatever an external agent does could be explained to 'the host' if that were what the host desired.

The reason why variance matters is that high variance increases your odds of going broke. In reality, gamblers don't simply get to reinvest all of their money. They have to take money out for expenses. That process means that you can go broke in the short run, despite having a great long-term strategy.

Therefore instead of just looking at long-term returns you should also look at things like, "What are my returns after 100 trials if I'm unlucky enough to be at the 20th percentile?" There are a number of ways to calculate that. The simplest is to say that if... (read more)

I'm sorry that you are confused. I promise that I really do understand the math.

In repeated addition of random variables, all of these have a close relationship. The sum is approximately normal. The normal distribution has identical mean, median, and mode. Therefore all three are the same.

What makes Kelly tick is that the log of net worth gives you repeated addition. So with high likelihood the log of your net worth is near the mean of an approximately normal distribution, and both median and mode are very close to that. But your net worth is the exponent ... (read more)

Dang it. I meant to write that as,

If you bet more than Kelly, you'll experience lower returns on average and higher variance.

That said, both median and mode are valid averages, and Kelly wins both.

2AlexMennen
The reason I brought this up, which may have seemed nitpicky, is that I think this undercuts your argument for sub-Kelly betting. When people say that variance is bad, they mean that because of diminishing marginal returns, lower variance is better when the mean stays the same. Geometric mean is already the expectation of a function that gets diminishing marginal returns, and when it's geometric mean that stays fixed, lower variance is better if your marginal returns diminish even more than that. Do they? Perhaps, but it's not obvious. And if your marginal returns diminish but less than for log, then higher variance is better. I don't think any of median, mode, or looking at which thing more often gets a higher value are the sorts of things that it makes sense to talk about trading off against lowering variance either. You really want mean for that.
1philh
(Variance is "expected squared difference between observation and its prior expected value", i.e. variance as a concept is closely linked to the mean and not so closely linked to the median or mode. So if you're talking about "average" and "variance" and the average you're talking about isn't the mean, I think at best you're being very confusing, and possibly you're doing something mathematically wrong.)

I believe that AI safety is a real issue. There are both near term and long term issues.

I believe that the version of AI safety that will get traction is regulatory capture.

I believe that the AI safety community is too focused on what fascinating technology can do, and not enough on the human part of the equation.

On Andrew Ng, his point is that he doesn't see how exactly AI is realistically going to kill all of us. Without a concrete argument that is worth responding to, what can he really say? I disagree with him on this, I do think that there are realistic scenarios to worry about. But I do agree with him on what is happening politically with AI safety.

1FlorianH
Thanks, yes, sadly seems all very plausible to me too.

I am using Trump merely as an illustrative example of techniques.

My more immediate concern is actually the ability of China to shape US opinion through TikTok.

The simple reason to use Kelly is this.

With 100% odds, any other strategy will lose to Kelly in the long run.

This can be shown by applying the strong law of large numbers to the random walk that is the log of your net worth.

Now what about a finite game? It takes surprisingly few rounds before Kelly, with median performance, pulls ahead of alternate strategies. It takes rather more rounds before, say, you have a 90% chance of beating another strategy. So in the short to medium run, Kelly offers the top of a plateau for median returns. You can deviate f... (read more)

If you bet more than Kelly, you'll experience lower average returns and higher variance.

No. As they discovered in the dialog, average returns is maximized by going all-in on every bet with positive EV. It is typical returns that will be lower if you don't bet Kelly.

Social media has proven more than capable of creating effective social contexts for persuading people.

LLMs are perfectly capable of operating in these social contexts. Particularly if they have (as in the case of TikTok and China) the support of the owner of the site.

Do you have specific cause to believe that LLMs will fail to persuade in these social contexts?

You make a good point that Cruz et al may have different beliefs than they portray publicly. But if so, then Cruz must have had a good acting coach in late 2018.

About 70 million followers, you're right to call me out for overstating it. But according to polling, that's how many people believe that the 2020 election was stolen at the ballot box. So far he has lost dozens of election challenge cases, key members of his inner circle have admitted in court that there was no evidence, and he's facing multiple sets of felony charges in multiple jurisdictions.

I t... (read more)

0FlorianH
Thanks! Cruz: I think a model where being a terribly good liar (whether coached, innate, or self-learned) is a prerequisite to for becoming a top cheese in US politics, fits observations well. Trumpeteer numbers: I'd now remove that part from my comment. You're right. Shallowly my claim could seem substantiated by things like (Atlantic) "For many of Trump’s voters, the belief that the election was stolen is not a fully formed thought. It’s more of an attitude, or a tribal pose.", but even there upon closer reading, it comes out: In some form, they do (or at least did) seem to believe it. Pardon my shallow remark before checking facts more carefully. AI safety: I guess what could make the post easier to understand, then, is if you make it clearer (i) whether you believe AI safety is in reality no real major issue (vs. only overemphasized/abused of by the big to get regulatory advantages), and if you do, i.e. if you dismiss most AI safety concerns, (ii) whether you do that mainly for today's AI or also for what we expect for the future. Ng: In no way I doubt his merits as AI pioneer! That does not guarantee he has the right assessment of future dangers w.r.t. the technology at all. Incidentally, I also found some of his dismissals very lighthearted; I remember this one. On your link Google Brain founder says big tech is lying about AI extinction danger: That article quotes Ng on it being a "bad idea that AI could make us go extinct", but it does not provide any argument supporting it. Again, I do not contest AI leaders are overemphasizing their concerns, and that they abuse of them for regulatory capture. Incentives are obviously huge. Ng might even be right with his "with the direction regulation is headed in a lot of countries, I think we’d be better off with no regulation than what we’re getting", and that's a hugely relevant question. I just don't think it's a reason to dismiss AI safety concerns more generally (and imho your otherwise valid post loses power b

With all due respect, I see no evidence that elites are harder to fool now than they were in the past. For concrete examples, look at the ones who flipped to Trump over several years. The Corruption of Lindsey Graham gives an especially clear portrayal about how one elite went from condemning Trump to becoming a die-hard supporter.

I dislike a lot about Mr. Graham. But there is no question that he was smart and well aware of how authoritarians gain power. He saw the risk posed by Trump very clearly. However he knew himself to be smart, and thought he could ... (read more)

2trevor
I think that it's generally really hard to get a good sense of what's going on when it comes to politicians, because so much of what they do is intended to make a persona believable and disguise the fact that most of the policymaking happens elsewhere. That's right, the whole point of the situation is that everything I've suggested is largely just a floor for what's possible, and in order to know the current state of the limitations, you need to have the actual data sets + watch the innovation as it happens. Hence why the minimum precautions are so important. I'll read this tomorrow or the day after, this research area has tons of low-hanging fruit and few people looking into it.

I disagree that people who do ML daily would be in a good position to judge the risks here. The key issue is not the capabilities of AI, but rather the level of vulnerability of the brain. Since they don't study that, they can't judge it.

It is like how scientists proved to be terrible at unmasking charlatans like Uri Geller. Nature doesn't actively try to fool us, charlatans do. The people with actual relevant expertise were people who studied how people can be fooled. Which meant magicians like James Randi. Similarly, to judge this risk, I think you shoul... (read more)

3trevor
My thinking about this (and other people like Tristan Harris who can't think about superintelligence) is that the big difference is that persuasion, as a science, is getting amplified by orders of magnitude greater than the 20th century.  As a result, the AI safety community is at risk of getting blindsided by manipulation strategies that we're vulnerable to because we don't recognize them. I don't imagine CFAR's founders as being particularly vulnerable to clown attacks, for example, but they also would also fail to notice clown attacks being repeatedly tested against them; so it stands to reason that today's AI would be able to locate something that would both work on them AND prevent them from noticing, if it had enough social media scrolling data to find novel strategies based on results. I'm less interested in the mass psychology stuff from the 2020s because a lot of that was meant to target elites who influenced more people downstream, and elites are now harder to fool than in the 20th century; and also, if democracy dies, then it dies, and it's up to us to not die with it. One of the big issues with AI targeting people based on bayes-predicted genes is that it can find one-shot strategies, including selecting 20th century tactics with the best odds of success.  This is why I think that psychology is critical, especially for interpreting causal data, but also we shouldn't expect things to be too similar to the 20th century because it's a new dimension, and the 21st century is OOD anyway (OOD is similar to the butterfly effect, changes cause a cascade of other changes).

Sorry, but you're overthinking what's required. Simply being able to reliably use existing techniques is more than enough to hack the minds of large groups of people, no complex new research needed.

Here is a concrete example.

First, if you want someone's attention, just make them feel listened to. ELIZA could already successfully do this in the 1970s, ChatGPT is better. The result is what therapists call transference, and causes the person to wish to please the AI.

Now the AI can use the same basic toolkit mastered by demagogues throughout history. Use simpl... (read more)

4dr_s
Yes, like the example of "Clown Attacks" isn't at all novel or limited to AI, it's old stuff. And it's not even true that you can't be resistant to them, though these days going actively against peer pressure in these things isn't very fashionable. That said, the biggest risk of LLMs right now is indeed IMO how well they can enact certain forms of propaganda and sentiment analysis en masse. No longer can I say "the government wouldn't literally read ALL your emails to figure out what you think, you're not worth the work it would take": now it might, because the cost has dramatically dropped.
2trevor
I think that this is pretty appropriately steel manned, given that there are tons of people here who do ML daily way better than I ever could in my best moments, but they're clueless about the industry/economics/natsec side and that's a quick fix on my part. If I'm underestimating the severity of the situation then they'd know.  I think that this is more like zero days in the human brain; like performing a magic trick that prevents an entire room full of string theorists from thinking about something that's important to them e.g. lab leak hypothesis. Making people talk about specific concepts in their sleep. Lie detectors that only need a voice recording from a distance. Seeing which concepts scare people and which concepts don't based on small changes in their heart rate. etc. My intuition says that engineering problems like these are hard and all sorts of problems crop up, not just Goodhart's law. Yann Lecun wrote a great post on this: This seems pretty in-line with some pretty fundamental engineering principles e.g. spaghetti code systems. I think that a big part of it is that, unlike in China, western bigtech companies and intelligence agencies are strangled from small workforces of psychology researchers/data labellers/hypothesis generators due to Snowden risk. Although discovering the human internal causality interpretability dynamic was a big update in the other direction, it being really easy to get away with doing a ton of stuff to people with very little data and older AI systems.

You would be amazed at what lengths many go to never learn.

Ever heard the saying (variously attributed) that A level people want to be around other A level people while B level people want to be around C level people?

A lot of those B level people are ones who stop getting better because they believe themselves to already be good. And they would prefer to surround themselves with people who confirm that belief than risk challenging themselves.

Furthermore, it is easier to maintain illusions of superior competency when it isn't competitive. It was a lot easie... (read more)

One example is the kind of person who began to learn something, worked at it, and became good at it compared to their friends. Without context for what "good" really means in the outside world, it is easy to believe that you are good.

In my blog I gave the example of myself as a teenager in chess. I could usually beat everyone in my school except my brother, so I felt like a good player.

But my competitive rating would have probably been about 1200-1400. I still remember my first encounter with a good chess player. A master was sitting in public, playing sim... (read more)

2Richard_Kennaway
Indeed, growing up in a small pond and then discovering the wider world can be a shock. The star high school student may discover they are only average at university. But one learns, as you learned about your chess.

I agree that when you feel sure of your reasoning, you are generally more likely right than when you aren't sure.

But when you cross into feeling certain, you should suspect cognitive bias. And when you encounter other people who are certain, you should question whether they might also have cognitive bias. Particularly when they are certain on topics that other smart and educated people disagree with them on.

This is not a 100% rule. But I've found it a useful guideline.

Answer by RationalDino10

Add me to those who have been through the physics demonstration. So I'll give it odds of, let's say, 99.9999%.

But I also don't like how most physicists think about this. In The Feynman Lectures on Physics, Richard Feynman taught it as energy and mass are the same thing, and c^2 is simply the conversion factor. But most physicists distinguish between rest mass and relativistic mass. And so think in terms of converting between mass and energy. And not simply between different forms of energy, one of which is recognized to be mass.

But let's take a hydrogen at... (read more)