All of solvalou's Comments + Replies

Perhaps instead of a tree it would be better to have a directed acyclic graph, since IME even if the discussion splits off into branches one often wants at some point to respond to multiple endpoints with one single comment. But I don't know if there's really a better UI for that shape of discussion than a simple flat thread with free linking/quoting of earlier parts of discussions. I don't think I have ever seen a better UI for this than 4chan's.

3Amal
yeah definitely, there could be a possibility for quoting/linking answers from other branches - i haven't seen any UI that would support something like it, but also my guess is that it wouldn't be too difficult to make one. my thinking about it was that there would be one main branch and several other smaller branches that could connect to the main one, so that some points can be discussed in greater depth. also, the branching should probably not happen always, but just when both participants occasionally agree on them.

When surveys on mturk are designed to hold a single account occupied for longer than strictly necessary to fill out an answer that passes any surface-level validity checks, the obvious next step is for people to run multiple accounts on multiple devices, and you're back at people giving low-effort answers as fast as possible.

This bit was very interesting to me:

These models are “predictive” in the important sense that they perceive not just how things are at the moment but also anticipate how your sensory inputs would change under various conditions and as a consequence of your own actions. Thus:

  • Red = would create a perception of a warmer color relative to the illuminant even if the illumination changes.

My current pet theory of qualia is that there is an illusion that they are a specific thing (e.g. the redness of red) when in reality there are only perceived relations b... (read more)

Using glossaries, indexes and other alphabetically ordered word listings to leverage the explicitly learned spellings in order to deduce beginnings of other words – e.g. if you knew how to spell the token 'the', and you kept seeing the token 'this' listed shortly after the token 'the' in alphabetic listings, you could reasonably guess that 
'this' begins with a T, its second letter could well be H, and if so, its third letter comes from the set {E, F, ..., Z}. By spending an astronomical amount of time attempting to solve something akin to a 50,000-dim

... (read more)

Thanks for mentioning reflective stability, it's exactly what I've been wondering about recently and I didn't know the term.

However, using the formalism of utility functions, we are able to make decently convincing arguments that this self-improvement process will tend to preserve utility functions.

Can you point me to the canonical proofs/arguments for values being reflectively stable throughout self-improvement/reproduction towards higher intelligence? On the one hand, it seems implausible to me on the intuition that it's incredibly difficult to predi... (read more)

5Daniel Kokotajlo
Like I said there is no proof. Back in ancient times the arguments were made here: http://selfawaresystems.com/2007/11/30/paper-on-the-basic-ai-drives/ and here Basic AI drives - LessWrong For people trying to reason more rigorously and actually prove stuff, we mostly have problems and negative results: Vingean Reflection: Reliable Reasoning for Self-Improving Agents — LessWrong Vingean Reflection: Open Problems — LessWrong  

The paper Galton - Visualised Numerals (1880) (there's several documents with this title floating around, this is the full paper and has the most pictures) contains a bunch of drawings of people's professed visualizations of the number line. Some are quite curled indeed!

solvalou*2712

Alternative explanation: everyone has qualia, but some people lack the mental mechanism that makes them feel like qualia require a special metaphysical explanation. Since qualia are almost always represented as requiring such an explanation (or at least as ineffable, mysterious and elusive), these latter people don't recognize their own qualia as that which is being talked about.

How can people lack such a mental mechanism? Either

  1. they simply have never done the particular kind of introspection that's needed to realize the weirdness of qualia, or
  2. there is
... (read more)
5Carl Feynman
You've summarized this more elegantly than I can.   Let me rewrite your explanation into my slightly different terminology: "everyone has qualia sensations, but some people lack the mental mechanism that makes them feel like there are also qualia requireing a special metaphysical explanation. Since qualia are almost always represented as requiring such an explanation (or at least as ineffable, mysterious and elusive), these latter people don't recognize their own qualia sensations as that which is being talked about." I would agree with this rephrasing as describing my experience.  I think the rephrasing is harmless, just that what I'm calling (sensation + qualia) is what you're calling (qualia + the mental mechanism etc.) As for how I can lack such a mental mechanism, I don't think you're on the right track.  Taking the points in order: 1. I've done plenty of introspection.  I suppose I might be doing 'the wrong kind', but until someone tells me how do 'the right kind', I doubt it. 2. This might be the case for me.  But if it is, I don't know what the 'correct explanation' is.  When I introspect, I simply don't experience anything 'requiring a metaphysical explanation', or that is 'mysterious, ineffable or elusive', to use your terminology. 3. I'd want to hear from someone who had actually done this before I think it's possible.

Your disagreement is mirrored almost exactly in Yudkowsky's post Zombies Redacted. The crucial point (as mentioned also in Hastings' sister comment) is that the thought experiment breaks down as soon as you consider the zombies making just the same claims about consciousness as we do, while not actually having any coherent reason for making such claims (as they are defined to not have consciousness in the first place). I guess you can imagine, in some sense, a scenario like that, but what's the point of imagining a hypothetical set of physical laws that lack internal coherence?

0tslarm
I don't think they lack internal coherence; you haven't identified a contradiction in them. But one point of imagining them is to highlight the conceptual distinction between, on the one hand, all of the (in principle) externally observable features or signs of consciousness, and, on the other hand, qualia. The fact that we can imagine these coming completely apart, and that the only 'contradiction' in the idea of zombie world is that it seems weird and unlikely, shows that these are distinct (even if closely related) concepts. This conceptual distinction is relevant to questions such as whether a purely physical theory could ever 'explain' qualia, and whether the existence of qualia is compatible with a strictly materialist metaphysics. I think that's the angle from which Yudkowsky was approaching it (i.e. he was trying to defend materialism against qualia-based challenges). My reading of the current conversation is that Signer is trying to get Carl to acknowledge the conceptual distinction, while Carl is saying that while he believes the distinction makes sense to some people, it really doesn't to him, and his best explanation for this is that some people have qualia and some don't.
2Signer
Zombies being wrong is not a problem for experiment's coherence - their reasons for making claims about consciousness are just terminated on the level of physical description. The point is that the laws of physics don't seem to prohibit a scenario like this: for other imagined things you can in principle run the calculations and say "no, evolution on earth would not produce talking unicorns", but where is the part that says that we are not zombies? There are reasons to not believe in zombies and more reasons to not believe in epiphenomenalism, like "it would be coincidence for us to know about epiphenomenal consciousness", but the problem is that these reasons seem to be outside of physical laws.

Suppose scientists one day solve the problem of consciousness according to one of these definitions, in a way that can be readily understood by any reasonably intelligent interested layman. I think it's quite likely that many adherents of other definitions would then come around and say, "ah, great job, they finally figured it out! This is exactly what I meant by 'consciousness' all along.". For example, if an explanation of the first-person subjective experience of pleasure and pain (no. 6) were available, it would probably explain perception-of-perceptio... (read more)