This is well-recognized issue in philosophy of science, known as the (Pierre) Duhem thesis, that any test of a theory is actually a test of a a conjunction of the theory and the theory of the experiment, and that any resulting disconfirming data might have disconfirmed the theory, the theory of the experiment, or both. The picture turns out to be even more complex, because more than just the theory and the theory of the experiment are tested, but so are background, often nonconscious assumptions, and irrelevant assumptions about statistics. The most deta... (read more)
This is well-recognized issue in philosophy of science, known as the (Pierre) Duhem thesis, that any test of a theory is actually a test of a a conjunction of the theory and the theory of the experiment, and that any resulting disconfirming data might have disconfirmed the theory, the theory of the experiment, or both. The picture turns out to be even more complex, because more than just the theory and the theory of the experiment are tested, but so are background, often nonconscious assumptions, and irrelevant assumptions about statistics. The most deta... (read more)