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All of Tsujigiri's Comments + Replies

Absolutely. Otherwise I can't exclude from the domain of "evidence of X" things which should not incline a rational person to amend their views about X, and I very much want to do that.

If someone believes the Bible is central to question of whether God exists, you can challenge that without having a definition of "evidence" that is informed by Bayes' theorem.

The premise "more calls makes psychic powers more likely" is not flawed at all.

It could be flawed if there are things that effect the number of phone calls other th... (read more)

3PhilosophyTutor13y

Fair comment. I should have said "all things", not "things", and I've edited the grandparent appropriately. There's an implicit "all else being equal" in such statements, which really shouldn't need to be spelled out if all parties are respecting the principle of charity. Any number of things (time of day, stooges working for Uri, number of listeners, service to the telephone system) could also affect the number of calls received, but if all else is equal as far as we are aware then Uri getting more calls than the skeptic is more likely in a universe where he has psychic powers. Hence by Bayes' theorem it's evidence he has psychic powers - just extremely weak evidence which is alone insufficient to shift our prior probability much. It's also more likely in a universe where Uri has more listeners, has stooges working for him, or has some other non-psychic factor working in his favour of course, and those hypotheses have much, much higher prior probabilities.

A Parable On Obsolete Ideologies

Tsujigiri13y-10

If you mean things like the base rate fallacy, then yes it does.

In the paragraph after the one you quoted, I gave an example of what I was discussing.

If you mean that putting in random numbers for your priors doesn't solve your problems, then there isn't any method of considering evidence that fixes that in principle.

You can check the source of the evidence and try to make sure that you're not putting in random numbers but reliable data.

When considering hypotheses in the real world -- like "Does God exist?" or "Is my wife cheating on... (read more)

A Parable On Obsolete Ideologies

Tsujigiri13y-10

It is, actually. It's the Bayesian definition that evidence for X is something more likely to be true in a universe where X than in a universe where -X.

What you're saying here is that you use Bayes' theorem to inform your definition of "evidence".

If I used a different definition of evidence, that doesn't mean I'm saying something about Bayes' theorem. That simply means I use the word differently.

When it comes to evidence, I don't believe Bayes' theorem deals with the real-world problems that arise when considering a hypothesis. For example, i... (read more)

4PhilosophyTutor13y

Absolutely. Otherwise I can't exclude from the domain of "evidence of X" all things which should not incline a rational person to amend their views about X, and I very much want to do that. Note that something can be "evidence" without being "evidence of X" where X is one specific something. Someone calling in to say their watch stopped is evidence that someone called in and evidence that a watch stopped and so on, just not evidence that Uri Geller has radio-propagated psychic powers. I agree with you to the extent that Bayes' theorem is not a magic wand that cures all epistemological ills. You don't have to browse this site for too long to come across people advancing silly ideas under the banner of Bayesian inference because they are using it incorrectly. However while it's not a magic wand it's a mathematical truth about how the universe works, and any time you deliberately deviate from Bayes' theorem you are deliberately going wrong as a matter of mathematical fact. What is actually going on here, assuming you are applying Bayes correctly, is that the prior probability of Uri Geller having radio-propagated psychic powers should be seen as astoundingly low. Far lower than the odds of me winning the lotto twice in a row, for example - let's say one on ten to the fourteenth as a very generous prior probability. If Uri Geller got a lot more phone calls than a skeptic pretending to be a psychic that should tip the scales a little in his favour but nowhere near enough to get P(Uri Geller has psychic powers) up to a level we should take seriously. The premise "more calls makes psychic powers more likely" is not flawed at all. If we lived in a bizarre universe where Uri Geller really could reach out through your radio and stop your watch then we would indeed see more calls coming in, and if we lived in that bizarre world we should want to believe we lived in that bizarre world. I'm very sure we do not live in that world but that's because the evidence is against it,

4thomblake13y

If you mean things like the base rate fallacy, then yes it does. If you mean that putting in random numbers for your priors doesn't solve your problems, then there isn't any method of considering evidence that fixes that in principle.

A Parable On Obsolete Ideologies

Tsujigiri13y-10

This is really a dispute over maths. The laws of probability are the law, they don't depend on word usage.

Explaining the way one uses a word isn't a statement about maths or the laws of probability either.

I'm not clear how this is relevant to the base rate fallacy though.

It's not. I was riffing on what you said.

Strictly speaking what's going on there is that you are collecting facts which might later turn out to be evidence for a hypothesis you have not articulated yet.

I was discussing ascertaining the trustworthiness of evidence concerning a h... (read more)

5PhilosophyTutor13y

It is, actually. It's the Bayesian definition that evidence for X is something more likely to be true in a universe where X than in a universe where -X. Part of the point of Bayes' Theorem is that correction for the base rate fallacy is baked in. That's a large part of what separates Bayesian rationality from irrationality,

A Parable On Obsolete Ideologies

Tsujigiri13y00

Perhaps a less abstract example would help

I don't think a less abstract example will solve a dispute over word usage.

What would have been evidence for Uri Geller having psychic powers is if he got more calls than normal people when he did that stunt.

And even if they did receive a statistically significant number of calls, perhaps people lied, grouped together and phoned in supernatural events that hadn't actually occurred.

If all you have is the one anecdote then it does count as evidence, but only in a strictly philosophical or mathematical sense.

... (read more)

1PhilosophyTutor13y

This is really a dispute over maths. The laws of probability are the law, they don't depend on word usage. Of course people can mock up evidence of things that are not in fact true. It's still evidence from the perspective of people who are not in on the plot. All of our evidence for everything could in theory have been mocked up by the architects of the Matrix and it would still all be evidence, from our perspective. I'm not clear how this is relevant to the base rate fallacy though. Strictly speaking what's going on there is that you are collecting facts which might later turn out to be evidence for a hypothesis you have not articulated yet. This is an entirely rational approach to solving certain classes of problems. It doesn't change the definition of evidence though,

A Parable On Obsolete Ideologies

Tsujigiri13y40

I think I might have to write something specifically addressing this misconception because a few people seem to have picked it up.

I think our disagreement is to do with our differing usage of "evidence", not a misconception. I'd say that a sole anecdote of someone seeing Russell's teapot can be considered evidence for its existence, even though it's not credible evidence.

It's only evidence for the existence of Russell's teapot if more people say they have seen it than you would expect in a universe where Russell's teapot does not exist.

I w... (read more)

5PhilosophyTutor13y

Perhaps a less abstract example would help. Uri Geller used to claim he was projecting his psychic powers over the TV or the radio and invite people to phone in if something "spooky" happened in their home. Inevitably people phoned in to report clocks stopping or starting, things falling off shelves and so on. It was pretty convincing stuff for people who believed in that sort of thing, but it turned out that when skeptics with no psychic powers whatsoever pretended to be psychic on the radio and invited people to phone in they got exactly the same flood of calls. Odd things happen all the time and if you get a large enough sample of people looking about the house for odd things to report you get a fair number of calls. What would have been evidence for Uri Geller having psychic powers is if he got more calls than normal people when he did that stunt. Just getting the base rate of calls anyone else would proves nothing. As you said yourself, you have to look at all the evidence. You might be thinking "I read this Bayes theorem essay, and it said evidence for X was whatever was more likely to be true in a universe where X was true. In a universe where Russell's teapot existed I'd be more likely to hear someone say they saw Russel's teapot, right? So it's evidence! Bayes says so". That line of reasoning only works if you don't have all the evidence to look at so you can't determine the base rate. If you can determine the base rate then it's probably going to turn out that the number of claimed teapot-sightings is consistent with the base rate of stupid noises humans make. If all you have is the one anecdote then it does count as evidence, but only in a strictly philosophical or mathematical sense. Not in any practical sense though since the shift in the relevant p value isn't going to be visible in the first twenty or thirty decimal places and I doubt anyone alive has that level of precision in their decision-making. (The odds of someone having seen Russell's teapo

Disguised Queries

Tsujigiri13y00

How do people use the karma system here? If you agree vote up, if you disagree vote down? That will create a very insular community.

My five cents.

7Vaniver13y

The typical advice is "if you want to see more like this, vote up; if you want to see less like this, vote down." Users try to downvote for faulty premises or logic rather than conclusions they disagree with. For short posts, where claims are made without much justification, there tends to be little besides a conclusion. Those comments will get voted down if they seem wrong or to not add much to the conversation. (I've had several offhand remarks, for which I had solid, non-obvious justification, voted down, but then in responses I made up the karma by explaining myself fully. I suspect that if I had explained myself fully at the start, I wouldn't have gotten downvoted.)

Disguised Queries

Tsujigiri13y00

Direct counterargument: I would phrase my attitude to ethics as: "I have decided that I want X to happen as much as possible, and Y to happen as little as possible." I'm not "believing" anything - just stating goals. So there's no faith required.

I'd agree. By switching from morals to your individual preferences, you avoid the need to identify what is objectively good and evil.

Disguised Queries

Tsujigiri13y20

Some

I agree that religion isn't the source of morality. In my experience, atheists believe in good and evil just as much as religious people do.

required

To believe you can somehow make the world objectively better, even in a small way, you must still believe in some sort of objective good or evil. My position is the sacrilegious idea that there is no objective good or evil -- that the universe is stuff bouncing and jumping around in accordance with the laws of nature. Crazy, I know.

There is a difference between the universe itself and our interpretat... (read more)

8Vaniver13y

That is a position shared by 13% of LW survey respondents.

3MixedNuts13y

Ah, then you want the metaethics sequence. Is morality preference?

Rational vs. Scientific Ev-Psych

Tsujigiri13y10

A point everyone seems to be missing here is that there ARE no scientific facts.

There are scientific facts, as the phrase is commonly understood. Anything that is independently verifiable is considered to be a scientific fact. Facts are not built upon theories; theories are built upon facts.

You would be right to say that that sensible scientists don't claim that they are definitely correct. They tentatively believe what the available evidence currently suggests. No more, no less.

A Parable On Obsolete Ideologies

Tsujigiri13y50

No, just as there is no evidence for Russel's teapot.

As the word evidence is commonly used, there is evidence for Russell's teapot -- just not evidence that you or me believe in. If someone says "Russell's teapot exists! I've seen it!", that is anecdotal evidence for its existence. Anything that suggests something is true or false is evidence, no matter how flawed that evidence may be.

It is by considering all the evidence, for and against our beliefs, that we progress towards truth.

PhilosophyTutor13y100

I think I might have to write something specifically addressing this misconception because a few people seem to have picked it up.

It's only evidence for the existence of Russell's teapot if more people say they have seen it than you would expect in a universe where Russell's teapot does not exist.

(That's ignoring the fact that Russell's teapot is by stipulation non-observable and hence in that artificial situation we can skip Bayesian updating and just go straight to p=1 that anyone claiming to have observed it is lying or deluded).

3DanArmak13y

But nobody is saying that... er, right?

BHTV: Yudkowsky & Adam Frank on "religious experience"

Tsujigiri13y00

It seems to me that Adam Frank doesn't do himself any favors in this debate by linking "spiritual endeavor" to religion. While one can argue that "spiritual endeavor" is the basis on which most religions are founded, if one wishes to debate the subject with an atheist it is probably better to not bring up religion at all.

You're more likely to have a fruitful conversation if you discuss "understanding the true nature of subjective reality" rather than "spiritual endeavor", "the overview effect" rather than &... (read more)

Disguised Queries

Tsujigiri13y00

For my own part, it seems to me that when I do that, my behavior is in large part motivated by the belief that it's good to avoid strong emotional responses to events, which is just as much a moral belief as any other.

There are situations where emotions need to be temporarily suppressed -- it needn't involve a moral belief. Getting angry could simply be unhelpful at that moment so you suppress it. To do so, you don't need to believe that its inherently wrong to express strong emotions.

That particular moral would come with its disadvantages. If someone c... (read more)

2TheOtherDave13y

We seem to be largely talking past each other. I agree with you that there are situations where suppressing emotions is a useful way of achieving some other goal, and that choosing to suppress emotions in those situations doesn't require believing that there's anything wrong with expressing strong emotions, and that choosing to suppress emotions in those situations without such a belief doesn't require any particular moral belief. I agree with you that the belief that expressing strong emotions is wrong has disadvantages. I agree with you that many people have confused beliefs about morality. I agree with you that much suffering has been caused by moral beliefs, some more so than others.

Disguised Queries

Tsujigiri13y-10

Would you say that if choose to simply accept that my computer behaves the way it does, and I calmly consider possible actions to get the behavior I want, and I don't have the sense that I'm being cheated by a cruel universe, that it follows from all of that that I have no relevant moral beliefs about the situation?

I'd say so, yes.

4TheOtherDave13y

OK. Given that, I'm pretty sure I've understood you; thanks for clarifying. For my own part, it seems to me that when I do that, my behavior is in large part motivated by the belief that it's good to avoid strong emotional responses to events, which is just as much a moral belief as any other.

Disguised Queries

Tsujigiri13y-30

Can you clarify what rationalization you think I'm using, exactly? For that matter, can you clarify what exactly I'm doing that you label "justifying" my beliefs?

You said "Suppose I believe that it's bad for people to suffer". I'd say that's a moral belief. The rational justification you provided for that belief was that "I derived it from the fact that I enjoy living a fulfilled and happy life, and that I anti-enjoy suffering, and that my experiences with other people have led me to believe that they are similar to me in that r... (read more)

3TheOtherDave13y

OK, thanks for clarifying. For what it's worth, I agree with you that "it's bad for people to suffer" is a moral belief, but I disagree that "I derived it from..." is any sort of justification for a moral belief, including a rational one. It's simply a speculation about how I came to hold that belief. I agree that there's no way to determine whether a moral belief is "valid" in the sense that I think you're using that word. I agree that it's possible to hold a belief (including a moral belief) in such a way that it inhibits my ability to perceive the universe as it actually is. It's also possible to hold a belief in such a way that it inhibits my ability to achieve my goals. I agree that one example of that might be if I held a moral belief about how my computer should work in such a way that when my computer fails to work as I think it should, I throw it out the window. Another example might be if I held the belief that pouring lemonade into the keyboard will improve its performance. That's not at all a moral belief, but it nevertheless interferes with my ability to achieve my goals. Would you say that if choose to simply accept that my computer behaves the way it does, and I calmly consider possible actions to get the behavior I want, and I don't have the sense that I'm being cheated by a cruel universe, that it follows from all of that that I have no relevant moral beliefs about the situation?

Disguised Queries

[+]Tsujigiri13y-70

1TheOtherDave13y

A few things: * Can you clarify what rationalization you think I'm using, exactly? For that matter, can you clarify what exactly I'm doing that you label "justifying" my beliefs? It seems to me all I've done so far is describe what my beliefs are, and speculate on how they got that way. Neither of which, it seems to me, require any sort of faith (including but not limited to blind faith, whatever that is). * Leaving that aside, and accepting for the sake of discussion that "using a rationalization to justify how I believe the world should be" is a legitimate description of what I'm doing... is there something else you think I ought to be doing instead? Why? * I agree with you that family and cultural influence have a lot to do with moral beliefs (including mine).

Disguised Queries

Tsujigiri13y40

I'll have to concede that atheists moral beliefs don't mostly adhere to the 10 commandments.

The point I wished to make was that many of the moral philosophies of rationalists are very similar to their Christian counterparts. I believe the similarity is mostly due to the culture they were brought up in rather than whether they believe God exists or not. You might even consider God to be irrelevant to the issue.

0TheOtherDave13y

I certainly agree that many people's moral beliefs are shaped and constrained by their culture, and that God is irrelevant to this, as is belief in God.

0[anonymous]13y

Agreed. Obligatory Moldbug link (warning: long, and only first in a series) for an interesting derivation of (some) modern morality as atheistic Christianity.

Disguised Queries

[+]Tsujigiri13y-130

0Tsujigiri13y

How do people use the karma system here? If you agree vote up, if you disagree vote down? That will create a very insular community. My five cents.

1Ezekiel13y

Direct counterargument: I would phrase my attitude to ethics as: "I have decided that I want X to happen as much as possible, and Y to happen as little as possible." I'm not "believing" anything - just stating goals. So there's no faith required. Reflective counterargument: But even if God did say so*, why should we obey Him? There are a number of answers, some based on prior moral concepts (gratitude for Creation, fear of Hell, etc.) and some on a new one (variations on "God is God and therefore has moral authority") but they all just push the issue of your ultimate basis for morality back a step. They don't solve the problem, or even simplify it. *Incidentally, what does it mean for an all-powerful being to say something? The Abrahamic God is the cause for literally everything, so aren't all instructions written or spoken anywhere by anyone equally "the speech of God"?

4MixedNuts13y

Some required reading.

3nshepperd13y

"Because God said so" is hardly a rational justification either.

1TheOtherDave13y

So, let's look at a specific instance, just to be clear on what we're saying. Suppose I believe that it's bad for people to suffer, and it's good for people to live fulfilled and happy lives. I would say that's a moral belief, in that it's a belief about what's good and what's bad. Would you agree? Suppose further that, when I look into how I arrived at that belief, I conclude that I derived it from the fact that I enjoy living a fulfilled and happy life, and that I anti-enjoy suffering, and that my experiences with other people have led me to believe that they are similar to me in that respect. Would you say that my belief that it's bad for people to suffer is arbitrarily invented and built on blind faith? And if so: what follows from that, to your way of thinking?

Disguised Queries

Tsujigiri13y-10

I wouldn't call moral philosophy a science.

If we both independently invented an imaginary creature, neither would be correct. They are simply the creatures we've arbitrarily created. There is no science of moral philosophy anymore than there is a science of inventing an imaginary creature.

I'd say to be science there needs to be the ability to test whether something is valid. There is no such test for the validity of morals anymore than there is a test for the validity of an imaginary creature.

Disguised Queries

Tsujigiri13y-20

There is a similarity between Christians and many atheists in their moral philosophy, however. Atheists may not believe in God, but I think they mostly adhere to the 10 commandments.

At least Christians can say they follow their moral philosophy because God told them so. What reason do atheists have?

0Bound_up10y

Christians allegedly follow the commandments because God told them to. They do what God told them to because of desire to avoid punishment, desire to obtain reward, desire to fulfill their perceived duty, or desire to express their love. They fulfill these desires because it makes them feel good/happy. Atheists do whatever they do, most of them for the same reason, cut out the idea of it being centered around a personality who effects their happiness. Harry said he preferred achieving things over happiness, but I can't help thinking that if he had sacrificed his potential, he wouldn't really have been happy about it, no matter how many friends he had. At the end of the day, happiness drives at least most people, and in theory, all (when they make their decisions through careful consideration, and not just to fulfill some role or habit. As we know, this is rare, and in reality, most people can not trace their decisions' motivation to their happiness or anyone's, or to any other consistent value; so I opine).

0Swimmer963 (Miranda Dixon-Luinenburg) 13y

Lots of reasons. It's pretty much built into the human brain that being nice to your friends and neighbours is helpful to long-term survival, so most people get pleasant feelings from doing something they consider 'good', and feel guilty after doing something they consider 'bad'. You don't need the Commandments themselves. ...Oh and the whole idea that it's better to live in a society where everyone follows laws like "don't murder"...even if you personally could benefit from murdering the people who you didn't like, you don't want everyone else murdering people too, and so it makes sense, as a society, to teach children that 'murder is bad'.

1[anonymous]13y

Well, for myself, it's because game theory says the world works better when people aren't dicks to one another, and because empathy (intuitive and rational) allow me to put myself in other peoples' shoes, and to appreciate that it's good to try to help them when I can, since they're very much like myself. I have desires and goals, and so do they, and mine aren't particularly more important simply because they're mine.

1Ezekiel13y

Nitpick: Only half of the Ten Commandments are nice humanitarian commandments like "don't murder". The other half are all about how humans should interact with God, and I don't think most atheists put much weight behind "you will not make for yourself any statue or any picture of the sky above or the earth below or the water that is beneath the earth". They can say that, but unless they already have a moral philosophy that gives God moral authority (or states that Hell is to be avoided, or justifies gratitude for Creation, or...) that's not actually a reason.

0raptortech9713y

Maybe because they have decided that a specific moral philosophy would be most useful?

[anonymous]13y100

Atheists may not believe in God, but I think they mostly adhere to the 10 commandments.

I think you're just trying to say that atheists follow moral expectations of modern Christian-influenced culture, but taken literally, the statement's nonsense.

I mean, look at the Ten Commandments:

Thou shalt have no other gods before me.

Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image (...).

Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain (...).

Remember the sabbath day, to keep it holy. (...)

Honour thy father and thy mother (...).

Thou shalt not kill.

Tho

... (read more)

5TheOtherDave13y

You have that backwards. Moral people follow their moral philosophy because they believe it's the right thing to do, whether they are Christian or atheist or neither. Some moral people also believe God has told them to do certain things, and use those beliefs to help them select a moral philosophy. Those people are moral and religious. Other moral people don't believe that, and select a moral philosophy without the aid of that belief. Those people are moral and atheist. Some immoral people believe that God has told them to do certain things. Those people are immoral and religious. Some immoral people don't believe that. Those people are immoral and atheist. Incidentally, I know no atheists (whether moral or not) who adhere to the Talmudic version of the first commandment. But then, since you are talking about the ten commandments in a Christian rather than Jewish context, I suppose you don't subscribe to the Talmudic version anyway a. (cf http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ten_Commandments#Two_texts_with_numbering_schemes) EDIT: I should probably also say explicitly that I don't mean to assert here that nobody follows the ten commandments simply because they believe God told them to... perhaps some people do. But someone who doesn't think the ten commandments are the right thing to do and does them anyway simply because God told them to is not a moral person, but rather a devout or God-fearing person. (e.g., Abraham setting out to sacrifice his son).

1ignoramus13y

I was actually just trying to say that Eliezer gave a bad example of a disguised query. As for moral philosophy, it can be considered a science. So atheists that believe in morality should value it as any other science (for it's usefulness etc). Well, hm, atheists need not be fans of science. So they can be moral because they enjoy it, or simply because "why the heck not".