= 27d567bc2d48d9f40e9ccc20ea370b15)
RobinHanson comments on Typical Mind and Politics - Less Wrong
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
= 783df68a0f980790206b9ea87794c5b6)
Loading…= b715d02e85f7b3b4ae65ca3d3e450868)
Subscribe to RSS Feed
Powered by Reddit
= f037147d6e6c911a85753b9abdedda8d)
You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.
Comments (128)
There really is a large literature that has already worked this issue through in great detail. I'm just trying to give you a flavor of it. The fact that people will be tempted to pretend to want things they don't want to get better deals is a standard transaction cost that makes it harder to make deals. Given transaction costs it is better if the default property right is the efficient allocation. But the ability to change who you live with makes the transaction costs lower. And we can't make the default property rights efficient unless we know which is the efficient outcome, noise or no noise.
The fact that economists familiar with this literature dismissively suggest giving in to extortion, with all the inefficiencies and weakening of property rights and expectations that entails, causes me to be skeptical of the quality of this work, even without having read it.
(I actually one time argued with an economist who demanded I read the classic Coase paper on externalities before discussing the issue with me, until he realized he misunderstood my position and thus the Coase paper is non-responsive.)
By the way, what fraction of your wealth would you pay to buy out the rights of all Harley revvers?