The same idea goes for insisting that the charity you donate to is actually good at its mission. If you get your warm glow from the image of yourself as a good person, and if your dollars follow your glow, then competition among charitable organizations will take the form of trying to get good at triggering that self-image. If you get your glow from results, and if your dollars follow that, then charities will have much better incentives.
Your conclusion matches your data, but the data is suspiciously focused on charity. Is scope neglect easier to elicit in such contexts? Other explanations include it being hard to make large numbers relevant, and lack of imagination by researchers.
Douglas, I understand that scope insensitivity decreases substantially, but does not go away entirely, when personal profits are at stake.
It's not easy to devise experiments that distinguish unambiguously between the explanations that center around prototype-dominated affect, versus the warm glow of moral satisfaction. It seems pretty likely that both effects are at work.
How do people react if told "Here is a fixed amount of cash, that must go to charity. How do you wish it to be spent?"
Might that not distinguish "purchase of moral satisfaction" from "scope neglect"?
I strongly favor the "warm glow" explanation, but I'd take it a step further.
For most people, the warm glow is only worth it if they get social credit.
Those yellow LiveStrong bracelets are a great example. They're about $1 or so, and purchasers wear them around all day advertising that they care about cancer. How many of those people would have donated an equivalent amount (just a buck) without the badge of caring they get to wear around?
Those yellow LiveStrong bracelets are a great example. They're about $1 or so, and purchasers wear them around all day advertising that they care about cancer. How many of those people would have donated an equivalent amount (just a buck) without the badge of caring they get to wear around?
Actually, in my experience it's the other way round - people feel they're doing their bit just by wearing the bracelets, so they'll pay less for a bracelet than they'd donate anonymously.
But like most anecdotes, that one story doesn't tell you anything - we need statistics if we want to truly know how people behave.
I'm not sure I buy that this is completely about scope insensitivity rather than marginal utility and people thinking in terms of their fair share of a kantian solution. Or put differently, I think the scope insensitivity is partly inherent in the question, rather than a bias of the people answering.
Let's say I'd be willing to spend $100 to save 10 swans from gruesome deaths. How much should I, personally, be willing to spend to save 100 swans from the same fate? $1000? $10,000 for 1,000 swans? What about 100,000 swans -- $1,000,000?
But I don't have $1,000,000, so I can't agree to spend that much, even if I believe that it is somehow intrinsically worth that much. When I'm looking at what I personally spend, I'm comparing my ideas about the value of saving swans to the personal utility I give up by spending that money. $100 is a night out. $1000 is a piece of furniture or a small vacation. $10,000 is a car or a year's rent. $100,000 is a big chunk of my net worth and a sizable percentage of what I consider FU money. As I go up the scale my pain increases non-linearly, and my personal pain is what I'm measuring here.
So considering a massive problem like saving 2 millio...
I perceive that I've neglected to convey the existence of a gigantic body of supporting evidence.
Michael Sullivan, see e.g. http://www.sas.upenn.edu/~baron/cv1.htm:
Embedding. Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) asked some subjects their WTP for improved disaster preparedness and other subjects their WTP for improved rescue equipment and personnel. The improved equipment and personnel were thus embedded in'' the improved disaster preparedness, so the preparedness included the equipment and personnel, and other things too. WTP was, however, about the same for the... I perceive that I've neglected to convey the existence of a gigantic body of supporting evidence.
There is much counterevidence in the literature as well, but more importantly the literature does not clearly suggest the extent to which people are scope sensitive when they are (which is often), nor does it suggest what normative sensitivity might look like given the complexities of the decision problems and of human preferences. The literature doesn't tell us the extent to which self-identifying total-utilitarian-style altruists in particular are scope sensitive, nor what methods of assigning WTP values they use. Whether or not their decisions are normative according to their professed optimization criteria, and more importantly whether their decisions are more or less normative than a naive "shut up and multiply the salient numbers" approach, is unknown.
A naive total utilitarian approach is clearly lacking. There are always hidden and unmentioned complexities like predetermined ecological niche sizes, i.e. 50 saved birds will quickly breed so as to fill a niche whereas 5,000 birds will remain at the limits. The difference between 1,000 out of 50,000 versus 1,000 out of ...
how many lives an action saves is less important than the emotional connotations of the act which takes the lives. take micronutrient dispersal programs vs terrorism. malnutrition kills orders of magnitude more people and yet far more money is spent on terrorist prevention (well, mostly terrorist prevention signaling, but that's another topic). This is because fighting terrorism is more exciting than fighting scurvy. The order of magnitude difference in impact is ignored when evaluating which thing to spend money on. This makes choosing terrorism easier as saving 100 people from terrorism is much better for public relations than saving 100 random kids with goiters.
I came across an interesting book that includes the topic of scope insensitivity: "Determining the value of non-marketed goods: economics, psychological, and policy relevant aspects of contingent valuation methods" by Raymond J. Kopp, Werner W. Pommerehne, Norbert Schwarz. They suggest that while scope insensitivity on surveys is possible, it is not inevitable.
After providing an impressive list of studies rejecting the insensitivity hypothesis, they highlight two in particular: "First, the scope insensitivity hypothesis is strongly rejected ...
The world of business tends to emphasize pattern over particular. But intellectual aspects of pattern prevents people from caring.
So the marketer would win by using the sad and more concrete image of the oily bird, persuading more people by means of the Ludic fallacy.
A proposed health program to save the lives of Rwandan refugees garnered far higher support when it promised to save 4,500 lives in a camp of 11,000 refugees, rather than 4,500 in a camp of 250,000. A potential disease cure had to promise to save far more lives in order to be judged worthy of funding, if the disease was originally stated to have killed 290,000 rather than 160,000 or 15,000 people per year.
Hmm... pinging my head for a plausible reason for why I would rate one health program higher or lower this math popped out: Program A promised to save 4,500 / 11,000 refugees; Program B promised to save 4,500 / 250,000 refugees. Program A has a significantly higher "success rate." Since I know nothing about how health programs work the potentially naive request that Program A is chosen and sent to work at Site B. Why wouldn't its success rate work with larger numbers? I assume that reality has a few gotchas but I can see the mental reasoning there.
Likewise, for the disease cures, it would make more sense to work on a cure that had a much higher success rate. A cure that works 90% is "better" than a cure that works 10% of the time. The math in terms of ...
Once upon a time, three groups of subjects were asked how much they would pay to save 2000 / 20000 / 200000 migrating birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups respectively answered $80, $78, and $88 [1]. This is scope insensitivity or scope neglect: the number of birds saved - the scope of the altruistic action - had little effect on willingness to pay.
An alternate interpretation is that people conceptualize the problem not in terms of absolute number of birds saved, but in terms of the fraction of birds saved. And they have no idea how many migrating birds there are. Presenting the number 2000, or 200,000, probably suggests to them that that's on the order of how many migrating birds there are.
Keyword connection for literature searches: Loss Aversion
Jonah Lehrer has blogged recently about what he described as loss aversion -- doctors will take more risks if the same problem is framed as reducing loss of life rather than saving lives.
He summarizes some of the same papers mentioned in the post and also a new Feb 2010 PNAS paper, "Amygdala damage eliminates monetary loss aversion".
The ideas overlap with those in Circular Altruism, I'm not sure which post I originally meant to make this comment under.
If three groups of subjects were asked how much they would pay to save 2000/20000/200000 birds... Was one group asked how much they would pay to save 2000 birds, another group asked how much they would pay to save 20000 birds, and the final group asked how much they would pay to save 200000 birds? Or was one group asked how much they would pay to save 2000, then 20000, then 200000 birds, and the experiment repeated on the other two groups? I didn't quite understand... I think I was reading too hard into the subtext. But I'm leaning towards the first one, can anyone elaborate?
This may be nitpicky but I found an errata in the references. [3] I believe should be 1993 instead of 1995.
That said, there are 3 broken links for me - [4], [6] and [7] - and the non-broken links don't seem to currently be providing full text access. So, here's an updated references table, with links to full text access in each except for the book in [3] which has an amazon link instead:
[1] Desvousges, W. Johnson, R. Dunford, R. Boyle, K. J. Hudson, S. and Wilson K. N. (1992). Measuring non-use damages using contingent valuation: experimental evaluation ac...
This may be nitpicky but I found an errata in the references. [3] I believe should be 1993 instead of 1995.
That said, there are 3 broken links for me - [4], [6] and [7] - and the non-broken links don't seem to currently be providing full text access. So, here's an updated references table, with links to full text access in each except for the book in [3] which has an amazon link instead:
[1] Desvousges, W. Johnson, R. Dunford, R. Boyle, K. J. Hudson, S. and Wilson K. N. (1992). Measuring non-use damages using contingent valuation: experimental evaluation ac...
From Abhijit V. Benerjee and Esther Duflo's Poor Economics,
...Researchers gave students $5 to fill out a short survey. They then showed them a flyer and asked them to make a donation to Save the Children, one of the world’s leading charities. There were two different flyers. Some (randomly selected) students were shown this:Food shortages in Malawi are affecting more than 3 million children; In Zambia, severe rainfall deficits have resulted in a 42% drop in maize production from 2000. As a result, an estimated 3 million Zambians face hunger; Four million Angolans—one third of the population—have been forced to flee their homes; More than 11 million people in Ethiopia need immediate food assistance.
Other students were shown a flyer featuring a picture of a young girl and these words:Rokia, a 7-year-old girl from Mali, Africa, is desperately poor and faces a threat of severe hunger or even starvation. Her life will be changed for the better as a result of your financial gift. With your support, and the support of other caring sponsors, Save the Children will work with Rokia’s family and other members of the community to help feed her, provide her with education, as well as basic medic
The uncertainty in how many people would be saved anyway without intervention is (as an absolute number, not a percentage) much larger for the 250000 people case. If someone claims to save 4500 people, and the uncertainty is greater than 4500, I may be skeptical that they can save anyone at all.
Imagine it as medical trials instead. If I claim I can cure 4500 out of 250000 people it may be that I can't cure anyone at all and I'm just counting the spontaneous remissions as "cures". If I claim I can cure 4500 out of 11000 people, it's very unlikely that they would have all recovered spontaneously.
Do we value saving lives independently of the good feelings we get from it?
Sure: there's the issues of rewards, reputation and status to consider. The effect of saving lives on the former may scale somewhat linearly - but the effect on the others certainly does not.
Who are you to say for Z person that the value of saving X number of Y valuable commodity is linear?
Real world example: the fire alarm goes off in my apartment building at night about once every two weeks. Many people decide to stay in their room, as opposed to evacuating the building. They aren't understanding the magnitude of how bad it would be if there was a fire and they ended up getting seriously injured or dying. (There have been two real fires so far; the chance of a real fire is not trivial)
I’m not questioning scope insensitivity in general here, but can someone explain to me why does it matter what number of birds they’re trying to save? Obviously, your contribution alone is not going to save them all (unless your’re rich and donating a lot of money), and, if you don’t know anything about how efficient those programs are, you may as well assume a fixed amount of money will save a fixed number of birds.
I have a question. (I’m not questioning the scope insensitivity though, well, kinda)
Let’s just say people would pay the same amount for 2000,20000,and 200000 birds saved. But wouldn’t 200000 birds cause a bigger reaction in the society so that more people would pay?
Let’s say there are 1000 people paying for 2000 birds (each 80 dollars). But 20000 would raise a stronger attention which leads to 10000 people willing to pay, same for 200000 birds saved.
I think. It also might be somehow related to the bystander effect, as people generally believe if there’s 20...
I can see natural situations where scope insensitivity seems to be the right place to be:
Could one way of thinking about this, be that, decisions for loss aversion in the nth being from oneself, get less and less sensitive as our degrees of separation increase? My example would be the indiscriminate termination of the indigenous tribes of the Americas, on its 'discovery'.
I ran across a work of fiction that proposed an interesting hypothesis as to why we have some of this programming:
If you're a primitive tribesman, and something wipes out half your kin in a single incident, that's probably not something you can pick up your spear and hope to fight with any effectiveness. But if it gets just one or two, that might be something you can take on and win. And so as numbers grow larger we tend to grow numb to it and prefer avoidance over confrontation as a survival strategy.
I find the remark about the exponential increase in scope inducing a linear increase in willingness-to-pay perhaps being due to the number of zeroes quite amusing, and it leads me to speculate how a different base numbering system would change the willingness-to-pay.
I predict that given identical proficiency in any base b numbering system, a base-2 numbering system would decrease willingness-to-pay for an identical exponential increase in scope, and a base-16 numbering system would increase it, as a result of the shorter length representations!
I imme...
I suppose in a world where people have limited time and have other priorities, we often glaze over the numbers and don't think about what they really mean in terms of magnitude. I also think desensitization due to the mass media has something to do with it -- we are shown statistics and huge numbers all them time for scenarios much worse (war deaths, crimes, disease deaths), so a number as large as 200,000 birds saved wouldn't make anyone bat an eye -- it just becomes another number in the book.
My suggestion for alternative explanation is that people somehow assume that for saving more birds, more people will be asked to donate, so after dividing, the amounts per person will be very similar.
When donating, people think of their capacity. A person's capacity is obviously limited. There is only a finite amount of money a person can have.
When people answer that they would pay $78, they only expect to save like 10 birds, but not all birds. It is already the limit of their capacity for those birds. However many birds in danger, they can only expect to save 10 birds and the rest, if they are not personally witnessing it, they can only leave them to die.
Now, say if your organisation saving these birds is in possession of a time machine and they could...
I call BS. There is an opportunity cost for passing up a chance to help some seabirds. Most people don't go through a given day being presented with lots of opportunities to save different numbers of seabirds. If they were, they'd do the math. Most people wouldn't assume that there were a dozen different seabird charities who are all pledging to help different numbers of seabirds because that's not the world we live in. If it was, people would process this differently. When people are presented with options, such as in stores where different brands compete for shelf space, they do tend to do the math
There maybe a much simpler explanation for seeming scope "insensitivity" in saturation. The differences in the lead example with the birds seems random variation to me. Probably most participants had some maximum amount they would ever consider parting with for non personal life threatening scenarios, and it doesn't take very many birds in the scenarios to reach their maximums. Seems like modeling artificially contrived scenarios like this is overthinking the issue without giving adequate thought to alternative more likely explanations.
Might this imply fault insensitivity too? For any given behavior "B" for every continued repeat of that behavior resulting in an impact "i-0" through "i-x", humans are only willing to curtail that behavior to a point despite the increasing impact of future actions?
Would scope neglect only affect include the application on altruism? What about applications to project scope and budgeting?
This very much reminds me of the quote attributed to Stalin:
"One death is a tragedy; one million is a statistic"
I find solace that while many fellow citizens do not invest much time in educating themselves, a few insights have gained recognition through often famous (or infamous) quotes and little nuggets of advice.
Prototypes possess inherent limitations in terms of their physical attributes. Nevertheless, one can attain a sense of moral fulfillment by conceiving an improved version of oneself, which represents a non-physical characteristic of a superior self-prototype. It remains uncertain whether non-physical attributes, such as an enhanced version of oneself, share the same upper boundaries as physical qualities, like a specific number of birds. Consequently, does scope neglect genuinely occur if the scope in question influences a non-physical aspect of a prototype? Is the scalability of a prototype restricted when the scope impacts a non-physical characteristic?
The usual finding is that exponential increases in scope create linear increases in willingness-to-pay
interesting
I wonder whether a cost judgement plays a part in these examples. Saving 2000 birds will have low effort cost and the risk of failure is less significant - trending towards 'there's nothing to lose'. Meanwhile, and attempt to save 200,000 birds (on its face) appears to entail a higher effort costs and the repercussions of failure would be more severe. Where faced with a situation where the default state is a negative outcome, people are often reluctant to invest their resources.
I understand action wise, it might be good collectively; but I also understand for victims of certain crimes for example, it is very hard to tell them hey what you feel about the crime is not rational, and please donate to something else
Fun fact for those reading this in the far future, when Eliezer said "effective altruist" in this piece, he most likely was using the literal meaning, not referring to the EA movement, as that name hadn't been coined yet.
I think there is also a logical fallacy in that, when people donate they are not really focused on how their donation "would" affect the final outcome. Instead, people are thinking about how much they "could" donate. Personally speaking, when I donate, I'm confident that my donation couldn't save the whole pack, I'm just content with just helping out one of them, if possible.
I think it's not that the scale of the flock didn't matter to me, but if you spell it out how much it would take to rescue "one of" the people or animal in need, people would definitely donate differently.
Once upon a time, three groups of subjects were asked how much they would pay to save 2,000 / 20,000 / 200,000 migrating birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups respectively answered $80, $78, and $88.1 This is scope insensitivity or scope neglect: the number of birds saved—the scope of the altruistic action—had little effect on willingness to pay.
Similar experiments showed that Toronto residents would pay little more to clean up all polluted lakes in Ontario than polluted lakes in a particular region of Ontario, or that residents of four western US states would pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in those states than to protect a single area.2 People visualize “a single exhausted bird, its feathers soaked in black oil, unable to escape.”3 This image, or prototype, calls forth some level of emotional arousal that is primarily responsible for willingness-to-pay—and the image is the same in all cases. As for scope, it gets tossed out the window—no human can visualize 2,000 birds at once, let alone 200,000. The usual finding is that exponential increases in scope create linear increases in willingness-to-pay—perhaps corresponding to the linear time for our eyes to glaze over the zeroes; this small amount of affect is added, not multiplied, with the prototype affect. This hypothesis is known as “valuation by prototype.”
An alternative hypothesis is “purchase of moral satisfaction.” People spend enough money to create a warm glow in themselves, a sense of having done their duty. The level of spending needed to purchase a warm glow depends on personality and financial situation, but it certainly has nothing to do with the number of birds.
We are insensitive to scope even when human lives are at stake: Increasing the alleged risk of chlorinated drinking water from 0.004 to 2.43 annual deaths per 1,000—a factor of 600—increased willingness-to-pay from $3.78 to $15.23.4 Baron and Greene found no effect from varying lives saved by a factor of 10.5
A paper entitled “Insensitivity to the value of human life: A study of psychophysical numbing” collected evidence that our perception of human deaths follows Weber’s Law—obeys a logarithmic scale where the “just noticeable difference” is a constant fraction of the whole. A proposed health program to save the lives of Rwandan refugees garnered far higher support when it promised to save 4,500 lives in a camp of 11,000 refugees, rather than 4,500 in a camp of 250,000. A potential disease cure had to promise to save far more lives in order to be judged worthy of funding, if the disease was originally stated to have killed 290,000 rather than 160,000 or 15,000 people per year.6
The moral: If you want to be an effective altruist, you have to think it through with the part of your brain that processes those unexciting inky zeroes on paper, not just the part that gets real worked up about that poor struggling oil-soaked bird.
1 William H. Desvousges et al., Measuring Nonuse Damages Using Contingent Valuation: An Experimental Evaluation of Accuracy, technical report (Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI International, 2010).
2 Daniel Kahneman, “Comments by Professor Daniel Kahneman,” in Valuing Environmental Goods: An Assessment of the Contingent Valuation Method, ed. Ronald G. Cummings, David S. Brookshire, and William D. Schulze, vol. 1.B, Experimental Methods for Assessing Environmental Benefits (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld, 1986), 226–235; Daniel L. McFadden and Gregory K. Leonard, “Issues in the Contingent Valuation of Environmental Goods: Methodologies for Data Collection and Analysis,” in Contingent Valuation: A Critical Assessment, ed. Jerry A. Hausman, Contributions to Economic Analysis 220 (New York: North-Holland, 1993), 165–215.
3 Daniel Kahneman, Ilana Ritov, and David Schkade, “Economic Preferences or Attitude Expressions?: An Analysis of Dollar Responses to Public Issues,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 19, nos. 1–3 (1999): 203–235.
4 Richard T. Carson and Robert Cameron Mitchell, “Sequencing and Nesting in Contingent Valuation Surveys,” Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 28, no. 2 (1995): 155–173.
5 Jonathan Baron and Joshua D. Greene, “Determinants of Insensitivity to Quantity in Valuation of Public Goods: Contribution, Warm Glow, Budget Constraints, Availability, and Prominence,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied 2, no. 2 (1996): 107–125.
6 David Fetherstonhaugh et al., “Insensitivity to the Value of Human Life: A Study of Psychophysical Numbing,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 14, no. 3 (1997): 283–300.