jwdink comments on Open Thread: July 2009 - Less Wrong

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Comment author: jwdink 08 July 2009 07:12:06PM 0 points [-]

If they are being called "fundamentally mental" because they interact by one set of rules with things that are mental and a different set of rules with things that are not mental, then it's not consistent with a reductionist worldview...

Is it therefore a priori logically incoherent? That's what I'm trying to understand. Would you exclude a "cartesian theatre" fundamental particle a priori?

(and it's also confused because you're not getting at how mental is different from non-mental). However, if they are being called fundamentally mental because they happen to be mechanistically involved in mental mechanisms, but still interact with all quarks in one consistent way everywhere, it's logically possible.

What do you mean by mechanical? I think we're both resting on some hidden assumption about dividing the mental from the physical/mechanical. I think you're right that it's hard to articulate, but this makes Eliezer's original argument even more confusing. Could you clarify whether or not you're agreeing with his argument?

Comment author: byrnema 08 July 2009 07:24:06PM *  0 points [-]

If they are being called "fundamentally mental" because they interact by one set of rules with things that are mental and a different set of rules with things that are not mental, then it's not consistent with a reductionist worldview..

I deduce that the above case would be inconsistent with reductionism. And I think that it is logically incoherent, because I think non-reductionism is logically incoherent, because I think that reductionism is equivalent with the idea of a closed universe, which I think is logically necessary. You may disagree with any step in the chain of this reasoning.

What do you mean by mechanical?

I think you guessed: I meant that there is no division between the mental and physical/mechanical. Believing that a division is a priori possible is definitely non-reductionist. If that is what Eliezer is saying, then I agree with him.

To summarize, my argument is:

[logic --> closed universe --> reductionism --> no division between the mental and the physical/mechanical]

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