Eliezer Yudkowsky and Scott Aaronson - Percontations: Artificial Intelligence and Quantum Mechanics
Sections of the diavlog:
- When will we build the first superintelligence?
- Why quantum computing isn’t a recipe for robot apocalypse
- How to guilt-trip a machine
- The evolutionary psychology of artificial intelligence
- Eliezer contends many-worlds is obviously correct
- Scott contends many-worlds is ridiculous (but might still be true)
Sure, I'm certainly not saying that the Copenhagen interpretation is correct, and my understanding is that a decoherence view is both more useful and simpler. MWI (at least as I understand it) is a significantly stronger claim. When we take the probabilities that come from wave state amplitudes as observed frequencies among actually existing "worlds" then we are claiming that there are many different versions of me that actually exist. It's this last part that I find a bit of a stretch.
If many different versions of you existing bothers you, does Schroedinger's cat bother you?
The extent to which MWI is a stronger claim than "no collapse," it's purely interpretative. It certainly doesn't posit any "splitting" beyond vanilla QM. Questions about conservation of energy suggest that you don't get this.