Vladimir_Nesov comments on The Lifespan Dilemma - Less Wrong

39 Post author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 10 September 2009 06:45PM

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Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 11 September 2009 08:55:30PM 3 points [-]

Think of the goal being stated in terms of world-histories rather than world-states. It makes more sense this way. Then, you can say that your preference for world-histories where a person is created (leading to the state of the world X) is different than for world-histories where a person is killed (starting from a different state, but leading to the same state X).

Comment author: SforSingularity 11 September 2009 09:21:26PM *  0 points [-]

Sure, you can be a histories-preferer, and also a consequentialist. In fact you have preferences over histories anyway, really.

Comment author: Vladimir_Nesov 11 September 2009 09:25:28PM 0 points [-]

Hmm... Then, in what sense can you mean the top-level comment while keeping this in mind?

Comment author: SforSingularity 11 September 2009 11:10:33PM 0 points [-]

I meant it in a hypothetical way. I don't actually like state-consequentialism - trivially, human experiences are only meaningful as a section of the history of the universe.