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PlaidX comments on Avoiding doomsday: a "proof" of the self-indication assumption - Less Wrong
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SIA makes perfect sense to me, but I don't see how it negates the doomsday argument at all. Can you explain further?
If the human race ends soon, there will be fewer people. Therefore, assign a lower prior to that. This cancels exactly the contribution from the doomsday argument.
Oh, I see. How are we sure it cancels exactly, though?
see Bostrom's paper
Ah, that makes sense. In retrospect, this is quite simple:
If you have a box of ten eggs, numbered 1 through 10, and a box of a thousand eggs, numbered 1 through 1000, and the eggs are all dumped out on the floor and you pick up one labeled EGG 3, it's just as likely to have come from the big box as the small one, since they both have only one egg labeled EGG 3.
I don't buy bostrom's argument against the presumptuous philosopher though. Does anyone have a better one?