CarlShulman comments on Avoiding doomsday: a "proof" of the self-indication assumption - Less Wrong

18 Post author: Stuart_Armstrong 23 September 2009 02:54PM

You are viewing a comment permalink. View the original post to see all comments and the full post content.

Comments (228)

You are viewing a single comment's thread. Show more comments above.

Comment author: CarlShulman 23 September 2009 09:18:14PM 1 point [-]

If civilization lasts forever, there can be many simulations of 2009, so updating on your sense-data can't overcome the extreme initial SIA update.

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 23 September 2009 11:08:27PM 0 points [-]

Simulation argument is a separate issue from the Doomsday Argument.

Comment author: SilasBarta 24 September 2009 04:32:09PM *  4 points [-]

What? They have no implications for each other? The possibility of being in a simulation doesn't affect my estimates for the onset of Doomsday?

Why is that? Because they have different names?

Comment author: Eliezer_Yudkowsky 25 September 2009 08:31:47PM 0 points [-]

Simulation argument goes through even if Doomsday fails. If almost everyone who experiences 2009 does so inside a simulation, and you can't tell if you're in a simulation or not - assuming that statement is even meaningful - then you're very likely "in" such a simulation (if such a statement is even meaningful). Doomsday is a lot more controversial; it says that even if most people like you are genuinely in 2009, you should assume from the fact that you are one of those people, rather than someone else, that the fraction of population that experiences being 2009 is much larger to be a large fraction of the total (because we never go on to create trillions of descendants) than a small fraction of the total (if we do).

Comment author: Unknowns 25 September 2009 08:51:51PM 1 point [-]

The probability of being in a simulation increases the probability of doom, since people in a simulation have a chance of being turned off, which people in a real world presumably do not have.

Comment author: CarlShulman 29 June 2010 12:43:10PM 0 points [-]

The regular Simulation Argument concludes with a disjunction (you have logical uncertainty about whether civilizations very strongly convergently fail to produce lots of simulations). SIA prevents us from accepting two of the disjuncts, since the population of observers like us is so much greater if lots of sims are made.