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Stuart_Armstrong comments on Avoiding doomsday: a "proof" of the self-indication assumption - Less Wrong
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As I said, it's a complicated point. For most of the toy models, "observers who think they are human" is enough, and avoids having to go into these issues.
Not unless you can explain why "universes with many observers who think they are human" are more common than "universes with few observers who think they are human". Even when you condition on your own existence, you have no reason to believe that most Everett branches have humans.
Er no - they are not more common, at all. The SIA says that you are more likely to be existing in a universe with many humans, not that these universes are more common.
Your TL post said:
And you just replaced "observers" with "observers who think they are human", so it seems like the SIA does in fact say that universes with many observers who think they are human are more likely than those with few.
Sorry, sloppy language - I meant "you, being an observer, are more likely to exist in a universe with many observers".
So then the full anthrocentric SIA would be, "you, being an observer that believes you are human, are more likely to exist in a universe with many observers who believe they are human".
Is that correct? If so, does your proof prove this stronger claim?