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Stuart_Armstrong comments on Avoiding doomsday: a "proof" of the self-indication assumption - Less Wrong
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I get that - I'm just pointing out that your position is not "indifferent to irrelevant information". In other words, if there a hundred/million/trillion other observers created, who are ultimately not involved in the whole coloured room dilema, their existence changes your odds of being red or green-doored, even after you have been told you are not one of them.
(SIA is indifferent to irrelevant extra observers).
Yes, SIA is indifferent to extra observers, precisely because it assumes I was really lucky to exist and might have found myself not to exist, i.e. it assumes I am a random selection from all possible observers, not just real ones.
Unfortunately for SIA, no one can ever find himself not to exist.